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 Abstract 
 
 
 
It has long been observed that speakers systematically employ language from 
concrete and perceptually rich domains to talk about abstract concepts. One of the 
paradigm examples of this is the way in which the abstract domain TIME is 
metaphorically conceptualised in terms of the concrete domain SPACE in a wide range 
of languages throughout the world. In English, there are various types of spatial 
metaphors for time, including ‘deictic’ metaphors, which situate events in relation to 
the ego, ‘sequential’ metaphors, which position events in relation to one another, as 
part of a sequence and ‘extrinsic’ metaphors, which fix events in relation to the 
forward-moving flow of time. Of these, particular attention has been paid to two 
deictic space-time metaphors: the Moving Ego metaphor, which conceptualises the 
self as moving towards events in time, e.g. We’re approaching Christmas and the 
Moving Time metaphor, which conceptualises events in time moving relative to the 
self, e.g. Christmas is approaching. In addition to linguistic evidence, a body of 
research has provided evidence for the psychological reality of these two metaphors, 
demonstrating that thinking about spatial motion under various circumstances can 
prime different construals of time. While research investigating abstract thinking 
about time has been primarily focused on examining the effects of spatial priming on 
temporal reasoning, recent research has extended beyond this, providing preliminary 
evidence that personality differences, emotional experiences and the valence of an 
event (positive or negative) may also influence people’s perspectives on the 
movement of events in time. By building upon and extending these findings, the 
overall aim of this thesis is  to shed light on the mechanisms at work during the 
interpretation of language in context, providing a more fully explanatory framework 
for the metaphoric representation of time. To do this, a series of studies were 
conducted to examine further the range of factors that may influence how people 
reason about events in time, focusing specifically on previously unexplored 
personality differences, lifestyle differences and behavioural differences (Studies 1 to 
8). Next, the focus of the investigation turned to the interpretation and usage of 
metaphorical expressions about time in prescribed contexts (Studies 9 to 14). The 
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findings of these studies are reported and discussed in terms of the theoretical, 
methodological and practical issues they raise for the language sciences. 
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Days 
 
What are days for? 
Days are where we live. 
They come, they wake us 
Time and time over. 
They are to be happy in: 
Where can we live but days? 
 
Ah, solving that question 
Brings the priest and the doctor 
In their long coats 
Running over the fields. 
 
    PHILIP LARKIN 
  
2 
 
Part I: 
 
Context 
 
  
3 
 
1. Spatial metaphors for time 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
One of the most fundamental and enigmatic aspects of human experience, that 
forms part of its rich warp and weft, is that of time. We cannot see or touch time; 
yet, we can conceive of its passage in much the way we can conceive of any other 
worldly experience (Evans 2004). The reason for this, metaphor theorists propose, 
is that the sensory and motor representations that derive from interacting in the 
natural environment are recycled in order to support abstract thought (e.g. Kövecses 
2000; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). In the domain of time, for 
instance, these representations derive from the human experience of navigating 
through, orienting within and observing motion in space. Evidence for this 
reasoning comes, in part, from patterns observed in language: language from the 
relatively concrete and perceptually rich domain of space is recruited to talk about 
the abstract domain of time (Clark 1973; Evans 2004; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; 
Traugott 1978). As such, the conceptual correspondences between space and time 
are reflected in the common phrasal lexicon used to denote relations in the two 
domains (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Space-time metaphors in English (Haspelmath 1997; Lehrer 1990) 
 
SPACE TIME 
at the corner at noon 
from here to there from two o’clock to four o’clock 
through the tunnel through the night 
he was running ahead of me he arrived ahead of schedule 
she is going to the park the rain is going to help the farmer 
we are still far from the end of the queue you will be tired at the end of the day 
she wears a long scarf the meeting was long 
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According to Clark (1973), these common phrasal parallels occur because temporal 
relations are predicated on a subset of those used for the description of objects in 
space. In particular, the applicable subset of spatial relations is determined by 
conceptualising time as a one dimensional, unidirectional and dynamic entity. For 
this reason, the spatial terms that are used to talk about time are also one 
dimensional, unidirectional terms such as in front/behind or long/short, as opposed 
to three dimensional, multidirectional terms such as shallow/deep or left/right.  
 
1.1.1. Deictic time 
 
While English exhibits an array of space-time metaphors, particular attention in the 
existing literature has been paid to two dominant spatial metaphors that are used in 
the representation of time: Moving Time and Moving Ego. In the Moving Ego 
metaphor, time is construed as a stationary landscape that the active ego moves 
across (e.g. We’re approaching Christmas; We’ve passed the deadline) and in the 
Moving Time metaphor, time is conceptualised as a conveyor belt on which events 
move, from the future to the past, relative to a stationary ego (e.g. Christmas is 
approaching; The deadline has passed) (Clark 1973; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). For 
both of these space-time metaphors, the ego’s location provides the reference 
point—a position which correlates with the present and metaphorically signifies the 
experience of now; hence, Moving Time and Moving Ego metaphors instantiate 
deictic time and are consistent with future/past relationships. Linguistically, these 
two metaphors can be used to depict events in the past, present and future: 
 
 Moving Time Moving Ego 
Future Summertime is approaching [us] We’re approaching summertime 
Present The moment of truth has arrived We’ve arrived at the moment of truth 
Past The deadline has passed [us] We’ve passed the deadline 
 
Moreover, as demonstrated by the expressions above, the Moving Time and 
Moving Ego metaphors provide inverse perspectives: either the temporal event is 
depicted as moving relative to a stationary ego (which is not always explicitly 
encoded in natural speech), or the ego is depicted as moving relative to a fixed 
temporal event. 
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The systematicity and coherence of the Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors 
in language have given rise to research investigating the psychological reality of 
these two metaphors. In a seminal study, McGlone and Harding (1998) developed a 
metaphor disambiguation paradigm, the interpretation of which depended upon the 
particular space-time metaphor that was being used. As such, this question provided 
an important tool for probing the conceptual metaphor active at the moment of 
comprehension. In their study, participants were primed with a series of context 
sentences that were phrased either in terms of the Moving Ego metaphor (e.g. we 
passed the deadline two days ago) or the Moving Time metaphor (e.g. the deadline 
passed two days ago). At the end of the block of priming statements, participants 
read an ambiguous target statement, such as The meeting originally scheduled for 
next Wednesday has moved forward two days before being asked to indicate the day 
of the week on which the event would occur. The results showed that participants 
tended to interpret the question in prime-consistent manner, such that participants 
who were primed with Moving Ego metaphors more frequently interpreted ‘moved 
forward’ in line with the Moving Ego perspective (responding Friday), and 
participants who were primed with Moving Time metaphors more frequently 
interpreted ‘moved forward’ in line with the Moving Time perspective (responding 
Monday). In discussing the implications of their findings, McGlone and Harding 
(1998) concluded that people make use of perspective information in temporal 
language comprehension, such that the perspective adopted in the interpretations of 
unambiguous temporal statements may still be activated and thus available to exert 
an influence on the interpretation of subsequent ambiguous temporal statements.  
 
Building on insights from McGlone and Harding’s (1998) findings, Boroditsky 
(2000; Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002) sought to investigate whether, in addition to 
the psychologically real distinction between space-time metaphors, space and time 
also share deeper conceptual similarities. To test this, a series of studies were 
devised to examine whether engaging in thought about spatial motion under various 
circumstances could also prime different construals of time. In one study, 
participants were asked to imagine moving towards a stationary object or to imagine 
an object moving towards them before answering the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s 
meeting question (Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002, Study 1). Based on the 
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assumption that our experience of time is grounded in our understanding of space 
(Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999), it was hypothesised that imagining 
moving through space towards a stationary object is analogous to the Moving Ego 
perspective and imagining a moving object travelling through space towards the self 
is analogous to the Moving Time perspective. Thus, if space and time do share 
some relational structure, participants primed in the ego-moving spatial condition 
should ‘reuse’ this perspective for time and answer Friday, whereas participants 
primed in the object-moving spatial condition should adopt the Moving Time 
perspective and answer Monday. As predicted, participants tended to respond in a 
prime-consistent manner to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, suggesting that 
simply thinking about spatial motion is sufficient to influence how people reason 
about events in time and their concomitant interpretation of a temporally ambiguous 
question.1 Further experiments conducted in a range of settings, such as airports, 
train stations and racetracks, have given support to these initial findings. For 
instance, Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002, Study 3) found that people who had just 
flown into the airport were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective 
(responding Friday) than those who were waiting for someone to arrive. Taken 
together, this pattern of results suggests that different ways of thinking about 
motion in space can yield different construals of time, such that the perspective 
adopted in the interpretations of ambiguous temporal statements can be influenced 
by temporal, as well as spatial primes. 
 
These preliminary results have been extended, with demonstrations that ‘spatial 
schemas’2 pertaining to fictive motion (Matlock et al. 2005; Ramscar et al. 2010), 
abstract motion (Matlock et al. 2011) and virtual reality (Alloway et al. 2006) can 
also influence the interpretations of ambiguous temporal statements. For example, 
Matlock et al. (2005) and Ramscar et al. (2010) conducted a series of experiments 
                                                 
1
 Although participants made use of spatial information to think about time, by responding in a 
prime-consistent manner, the reverse was not found: participants were not influenced by temporal 
primes when interpreting questions about space (Boroditsky 2000). The effects of the priming 
parallel a well-established asymmetry in language: people tend to talk about the abstract in terms of 
the concrete more than the other way around (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In other words, 
representations of time are asymmetrically dependent on representations of space and motion in 
space, as suggested by patterns in language. 
2
 A spatial schema can be considered as a “condensed redescription of perceptual experience for the 
purpose of mapping spatial structure onto conceptual structure” (Oakley 2010: 215; cf. Johnson 
1987). 
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to investigate whether thinking about fictive motion (FM), similarly to thinking 
about actual motion, would influence the ways in which people reason about time. 
To do this, participants were primed with one of two FM sentences, such as The 
road goes all the way to New York or The road comes all the way from New York 
(whereby the participants’ location at Stanford was the implied starting point or end 
point) before responding to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. The results 
showed that when participants were primed with FM going away from them, from 
Stanford to New York, they were more likely to provide a Friday response, whereas 
when participants were primed with FM coming towards them, from New York to 
Stanford, they were more likely to provide a Monday response. As was the case 
with actual motion, Ramscar et al. (2010) concluded that simply thinking about 
fictive motion is sufficient to influence how people reason about events in time.  
 
Probing this relationship further, Matlock et al. (2011) conducted a series of 
experiments to investigate whether, similarly to thinking about actual motion, 
thinking about subtler forms of motion, such as abstract motion,3 may influence 
how people think about time and their concomitant interpretation of a temporally 
ambiguous expression. Through a series of experiments, participants completed 
tasks which required them to think about sequences of numbers or letters that 
proceeded in either ascending order (5 to 17 or G to P) or descending order (17 to 5 
or P  to G) before answering the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting question. 
The results showed that when participants were primed with forward abstract 
motion (ascending order), they were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego 
perspective and respond Friday, whereas when participants were primed with 
backward abstract motion (descending order), there was no reliable difference 
between the proportion of Friday and Monday responses. In discussing the 
implications of their findings, Matlock et al. (2011) reasoned that forward motion is 
deeply entrenched in everyday experience—e.g. through walking, cycling and 
driving—which may encourage participants to adopt the Moving Ego perspective 
and respond Friday. By contrast, as people are far less accustomed to engaging in 
backward motion, it is probably less clear which perspective to adopt; hence, 
responses to the ambiguous meeting question were mixed. Taken together, these 
                                                 
3
 Abstract motion occurs in processes that involve mentally moving from symbol to symbol in an 
ordinal sequence (see Langacker 1986, 1987). 
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findings further substantiate the claim that when people engage in certain kinds of 
spatial-motion thinking, they may also unwittingly and dramatically change how 
they think about time. 
 
Moving beyond spatial-motion thinking, Jamalian and Tversky (2012) reasoned that 
if people use actions in space to express their construals of time and gestures are 
abstracted actions in space that frequently accompany language, then observing 
gesture may likewise affect how people reason about events in time.4 In one study 
investigating whether speech-accompanying gestures could be used to disambiguate 
the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, Jamalian and Tversky (2012) found that 
participants who viewed a gesture moving away from them accompanying the 
utterance was moved forward, were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego 
perspective (responding Friday), whereas participants who viewed a gesture 
moving towards them were more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective 
(responding Monday). Concordant with earlier findings, Jamalian and Tversky 
(2012) concluded that observing representational actions, namely gestures, also 
dramatically influence how people think about time. Moreover, information that is 
conveyed in gestures, but not in speech, can also alter people’s conceptions of time 
and their concomitant interpretation of a temporally ambiguous expression. 
 
1.1.2. Sequential time 
 
In other lines of research, it has also been observed that temporal relations exhibit a 
number of complex patterns that cannot be accounted for by the Moving Time and 
Moving Ego metaphors alone (e.g. Moore 2006; Núñez et al. 2006; Núñez and 
Sweetser 2006). Firstly, not all spatial language for time is dynamic (e.g. Christmas 
is in front of us). Secondly, temporal events are not always conceptualised as 
moving relative to the ego: in an alternative set of conceptualisations, they are 
sequenced in relation to one another, depicting an earlier/later relationship (e.g. New 
Year’s Eve follows Christmas). The differences between these two views of time 
                                                 
4
 Gestures can provide evidence for a particular ‘mental model’ when the accompanying speech does 
not (Alibali et al. 1995) and have been shown to exert an influence on an addressee’s comprehension 
of a spoken message (Goldin-Meadow and Sandhofer 1999; Thompson and Massaro 1994), 
including ambiguous passages of text, which can lead to more than one competing mental model 
(Johnson-Laird 1989). 
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can be traced back to the philosopher John McTaggart (1908), who proposed the 
fundamental distinction between two basic classifications of time. The first 
classification, ‘A-series’ (deictic time), characterises temporal events that are 
established in relation to the ego by virtue of being in the future, present or past; 
thus, deictic time depicts a constant change in the status of temporal events. The 
second classification, ‘B-series’ (sequential time), characterises temporal events that 
are established in relation to one another by virtue of being earlier or later; thus, 
sequential time depicts temporal events as a static chain, like beads strung together 
on a necklace, whose statuses never change. As such, as opposed to classifying 
temporal metaphors on the basis of which entity is moving—time or ego—and as a 
means of differentiating future/past from earlier/later, a fundamental re-
classification was proposed—one which based temporal metaphors on the relevant 
Reference Point (RP). These were classified as Ego-Reference-Point (Ego-RP) 
metaphors (deictic time in current parlance) and Time-Reference-Point (Time-RP) 
metaphors (sequential time in current parlance) (Moore 2006; Núñez et al. 2006; 
Núñez and Sweetser 2006; cf. Evans 2004).  
 
To this end, Núñez and colleagues sought evidence of the psychological reality of 
sequential time, by investigating whether ambiguous temporal statements may be 
interpreted using a temporal reference point other than the ego (Núñez 2007; Núñez 
et al. 2006). In relation to Boroditsky’s findings (2000; Boroditsky and Ramscar 
2002), they proposed that instead of indicating movement closer to the present (i.e. 
towards the ego), Monday responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question 
could indicate that the meeting has been moved towards the front of a sequence of 
days (i.e. earlier than Wednesday), which just happens to be closer to the present 
(Núñez 2007; Núñez et al. 2006). As such, a Monday response could result from 
reasoning in terms of sequential time, as opposed to deictic time. Thus, to 
investigate the role of the ego—or, specifically the absence of the ego—in temporal 
reasoning, Núñez et al. (2006) conducted a series of experiments, in which 
participants were shown an array of squares moving horizontally across a screen 
before responding to an ambiguous target question pertaining to an event in the 
future (e.g. Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days. On what 
day will the meeting now take place?), or an event in the past (e.g. Last 
Wednesday’s meeting had been moved forward two days. On what day did the 
10 
 
meeting take place?). The significance of depicting the meeting as an event in the 
past is that it forces people to choose between an interpretation relative to the ego’s 
front and one relative to the sequence’s front (i.e. the ego’s front does not correlate 
with the front of a temporal sequence situated in the past). As such, it was 
hypothesised that as all of last week should be construed as behind the ego, moving 
forward relative to the ego’s orientation should entail movement to a later time, 
which is closer to the present (i.e. moving last Wednesday’s meeting to Friday). 
Whereas, if people respond Monday after observing ego-free lateral motion, it 
would suggest that moving forward is interpreted relative to the intrinsic orientation 
of the sequence, as opposed to relative to the ego (i.e. moving last Wednesday’s 
meeting earlier in time). In line with their predictions, Núñez et al. (2006) found 
that participants in the primed condition were more likely to interpret ‘moved 
forward’ as earlier and respond Monday than participants in the control group (for 
whom the array of squares in the centre of the screen remained motionless), thereby 
establishing the psychological reality of sequential time. 
 
1.1.3. Extrinsic time 
 
More recently, an additional ego-free representation, extrinsic time, has been 
proposed (Kranjec 2006; Kranjec and McDonough 2011). In contrast to sequential 
time, which construes the intrinsic fronts of events as facing towards earlier times 
(with earlier events positioned in front of later ones), extrinsic time encompasses an 
abstracted path which leads from earlier to later times (with later events positioned 
in front of earlier ones), akin to the directionality of time on a calendar. Thus, to 
investigate the psychological reality of extrinsic time, Kranjec (2006) conducted a 
series of priming experiments by also using the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question. He predicted that if participants were primed with an extrinsic spatial 
schema, they should provide responses which are opposite to those expected if a 
sequential spatial schema was being used (i.e. opposite to those used in the studies 
of Núñez et al. 2006). To test this, participants were primed with extrinsic spatial 
schemas, such as the horizontal movement of a blue square over a rectangular bar 
across a screen before providing a response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question. In line with his predictions, participants in the primed condition tended to 
interpret ‘moved forward’ as later and respond Friday; thus, establishing the 
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psychological reality of an additional ego-free temporal representation: extrinsic 
time. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Deictic and non-deictic spatial construals of time 
(adapted from Kranjec and McDonough 2011) 
 
1.2. Thesis overview 
 
In sum, by adapting McGlone and Harding’s (1998) Next Wednesday’s meeting 
disambiguation paradigm, scholars in the cognitive sciences have provided evidence 
for the psychological reality of three distinct spatial construals of time, with 
demonstrations that deictic spatial schemas (Boroditsky 2000; Boroditsky and 
Ramscar 2002), sequential spatial schemas (Núñez 2007; Núñez et al. 2006) and 
extrinsic spatial schemas (Kranjec 2006) can be used to influence how people 
reason about time and their concomitant interpretation of an ambiguous temporal 
question. Moreover, the findings from these converging lines of research 
demonstrate that forward motion in the domain of time can be construed as 
movement to earlier times, later times, the past or the future. As such, Monday 
responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question have been attributed to deictic, 
Moving Time as well as non-deictic, sequential space-time construals and Friday 
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responses have been attributed to deictic, Moving Ego as well as non-deictic, 
extrinsic reference space-time construals. The question, thus, arises of how the 
interpretation of metaphorical language about time in prescribed contexts may differ 
between individuals. If meaning is constructed in the act of communication and all 
possible interpretations are available to the comprehender, what factors may 
encourage one interpretation in favour of another? 
 
While the “ingenious metaphor disambiguation technique” (Gentner et al. 2002: 
556) has been an invaluable paradigm for establishing the psychological reality of 
three distinct spatial construals of time, the conclusions that can be made are largely 
limited by the reliance on the single experimental paradigm. Thus, by extending 
beyond the limitations of the Next Wednesday’s meeting question and building on 
the findings of earlier research, the overall aim of this thesis is to shed light on the 
mechanisms at work during the interpretation of language in context, providing a 
more fully explanatory framework for the metaphoric representation of time. This 
aim will be addressed throughout the following chapters: 
 
CHAPTER 2: TEMPORAL FRAMES OF REFERENCE 
 
Recent theoretical developments have reformulated the temporal distinctions of 
deictic, sequential and extrinsic time in terms of a tripartite system by applying the 
theoretical construct frames of reference (Levinson 2003; Talmy 2000) to the 
domain of time (e.g. Bender et al. 2010; Evans 2013; Tenbrink 2011; Zinken 2010). 
Thus, in order to frame the current study within the broader context of the existing 
literature, Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of temporal frames of reference. 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE NATURE OF TIME 
 
In an attempt to gain a greater understanding of the existence of time as an entity of 
and unto itself, Chapter 3 explores the nature of time, focusing specifically on the 
primary temporal experiences that underpin the human perceptual process, as well 
as some of the ways in which the conceptualisation of time differs in inter-
subjectively reliable ways. 
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CHAPTER 4: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
 
As discussed, the majority of research on space-time metaphors has hitherto been 
focused primarily on investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning. While 
spatial concepts largely constitute our conceptions of temporality, such that space is 
often useful and, arguably, necessary to structure how people think about time 
(Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1999), a person’s conceptualisation of time is not 
merely dependent on their experiences of motion in space but rather a complex of 
factors. Building on insights from recent research, which have shed light on a 
number of additional influences on people’s perspectives on the movement of 
events in time (e.g. Hauser et al. 2009; Richmond et al. 2012), in Chapter 4, six 
studies investigate whether previously unexplored personality differences (Studies 1 
and 3), lifestyle differences (Study 2) and behavioural differences (Studies 4–6) 
may influence how people reason about events in time and their concomitant 
interpretation of an ambiguous temporal question. 
 
CHAPTER 5: EVENT VALENCE 
 
In other lines of research, it has also been shown that the valence of an event 
(positive or negative) and specifically the comprehender’s affective orientation 
towards the event may also influence the ways in which people think about time and 
their resolution of temporal ambiguity (Lee and Ji 2014: Margolies and Crawford 
2008). Thus, drawing on these findings and the findings from Chapter 4, in Chapter 
5, two studies investigate whether the interpretation of a temporally ambiguous 
question may arise from an interaction between the valence of the event and aspects 
of the personality (Study 7) and lifestyle (Study 8) of the comprehender. 
 
CHAPTER 6: GRAMMATICAL DIFFERENCES 
 
Noting that, while much research has made use of McGlone and Harding’s (1998) 
ambiguous meeting question, very little research has been conducted to uncover the 
linguistic contributors to the different interpretations of the question, in Chapter 6, 
the focus of the investigation is turned to the linguistic properties of individual 
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elements in the question; probing factors that may contribute to its inherent 
ambiguity (Study 9 and 10). 
 
CHAPTER 7: CULTURAL ARTEFACTS 
 
Cross-linguistic research demonstrates that conceptual metaphors are as much 
cultural as they are internally represented in the minds of individuals, with culture 
playing an instrumental role in shaping embodiment and, hence, metaphorical 
thought (cf. Gibbs 1999). Combining two separate lines of research on space-time 
mappings—namely, research investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning 
and research investigating the culturally specific associations between space and 
time—in Chapter 7, three studies investigate the role of cultural artefacts, namely 
calendars and clocks, in the interpretation of metaphorical expressions about time 
(Studies 11, 12 and 13). 
 
CHAPTER 8: SPATIAL METAPHORS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE 
 
While the nature of the relationship between space and time has been scrutinised 
extensively by researchers in the cognitive sciences, one area that has received 
comparatively less attention is the usage of space-time metaphors in naturally-
occuring temporal expressions. To address this, in Chapter 8, a brief corpus study is 
conducted to investigate the frequency and contexts of use of Moving Ego and 
Moving Time metaphors in the description of temporal motion events in natural 
language (Study 14). 
 
CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
 
The thesis is drawn to a conclusion and the findings of these studies are reported 
and discussed in terms of the theoretical, methodological and practical issues they 
raise for the language sciences. In addition, with an aim of continuing the ongoing 
process of mutual feeding between theoretical and experimental research in the field 
of cognitive linguistics (Núñez 2007), new areas of research are suggested for 
further empirical testing. 
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2. Temporal frames of reference 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In language, distinctions are made between the underlying coordinate systems 
people use for delineating a spatial scene (Levinson 2003; Talmy 2000). A spatial 
frame of reference (s-FoR) provides a conceptual basis for locating objects with 
respect to a spatial coordinate system. Specifically, s-FoRs consist of at least three 
components: an object to be located (the figure); an object with a known location 
which is used to locate the figure (the ground); and a system for locating objects 
(the origin and orientation of the coordinate system). The notion of Frame of 
Reference takes into account the fact that a number of possible perspectives are 
available for describing a spatial scene. Levinson (2003) differentiates between 
three basic s-FoRs: absolute, intrinsic and relative. Whereas absolute s-FoRs rely 
on fixed bearings, such as cardinal points (e.g. the ball is north of the cat), intrinsic 
s-FoRs employ the orientational properties of the ground object (e.g. the ball is in 
front of the cat) and relative s-FoRs are dependent on the position and viewpoint of 
the observer (e.g. the ball is to the left of the cat).5 
 
Recently, attempts have been made to extend Frames of Reference from the domain 
of space to the domain of time. The hypothesis is that if the structure of space is 
recruited to organise events in time then, analogous to the domain of space, the 
domain of time should also exhibit distinct reference strategies (e.g. Bender et al. 
2010; Kranjec 2006; Tenbrink 2011; Zinken 2010). However, similarly to the 
spatial frames of reference literature, there is wide variation in the literature 
concerning the distinctions considered to be necessary for characterising temporal 
frames of reference. For instance, by building upon and systematically extending 
                                                 
5
 It should be noted that the details of the relative projection vary between languages: in most world 
languages, including in English, the observer’s coordinates are ‘reflected’ from the ground, as 
though the ground object was another observer facing the actual observer; however, there are a few 
documented cases of languages, such as Tongan, Marquesan and Hausa, in which the observer’s 
coordinates are ‘translated’ onto the ground object (see Bennardo 2000; Cablitz 2006; Hill 1978, 
1982, respectively). 
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Levinson’s (2003) seminal account of spatial reference frames, Tenbrink (2011) has 
proposed a cross-domain framework for representing frames of reference in the 
domains of space and time. Crucially, for Tenbrink, the framework also accounts 
for dynamic spatial concepts, which she claims is prerequisite for conceptually 
transferring reference strategies from space to time. Her exhaustive framework 
distinguishes between 19 different FoRs in the spatial domain and eight in the 
temporal domain which vary in terms of: intrinsic, relative and absolute; external 
and internal relationships between entities; and static and dynamic situations. 
Whereas Tenbrink’s (2011) framework is based exclusively on English, Bender et 
al. (2010) have developed a taxonomy of t-FoRs based on cross-linguistic variation 
in spatial reference strategies that is intended to account for culture-specific 
preferences; thereby, making it applicable cross-linguistically. Specifically, 
adapting Levinson’s taxonomy of s-FoRs, Bender et al.’s (2010) taxonomy 
distinguishes between four FoRs in the domain of time: absolute (in the direction of 
later times, viewpoint independent); intrinsic (in the direction of earlier times, 
viewpoint independent); relative reflection (in the direction of the past, viewpoint 
dependent); and relative translation (in the direction of the future, viewpoint 
dependent). While Tenbrink’s (2011) and Bender et al.’s (2010) taxonomies differ, 
both in terms of approach and purpose, there are a number of assumptions that both 
taxonomies converge on, the first of these being that it is possible and indeed 
desirable to systematically map FoRs from the domain of space onto the domain of 
time. Secondly, despite the fundamental differences between space and time, 
theoretical constructs for space are applicable to theoretical constructs for time. 
Indeed, Bender et al. (2010) propose that the directionality of time compensates for 
its deficiency in dimensions. In this respect, parallels between the underlying 
reference strategies that space and time employ can be drawn: relative reference 
strategies are anchored by the human experience (an observer in the spatial domain 
and the egocentric experience of now in the temporal domain); intrinsic reference 
strategies make use of the relationship deriving from an entity’s relationship with 
another entity (object or event); and absolute reference strategies are anchored by 
culturally-determined systems, such as cardinal directions (in the spatial domain) or 
calendars (in the temporal domain). 
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Diverging from this train of thought, more recently, in a book-length treatment, 
Evans (2013) has developed a taxonomy of t-FoRs that is built upon a different 
doctrine entirely: despite acknowledging that an application of spatial frames of 
reference to time is insightful, his taxonomy focuses primarily on the claim that the 
two domains are fundamentally distinct. Specifically, although time and space may 
converge on a number of domain-general reference strategies, there are a number of 
fundamental domain-specific differences between the nature of spatial and temporal 
reference strategies; hence, the relations involved in spatial reference are also 
different to those involved in temporal reference. In this vein, noting that, while the 
systematicity of space-time metaphors has amassed a body of research, disanalogies 
between space and time have been comparatively neglected, this chapter will begin 
by reviewing the similarities and differences between the domains of time and space 
and, in doing so, will assess the suitability of using s-FoRs to develop t-FoRs. Next, 
a detailed overview of temporal frames of reference is provided; thereby, framing 
the current study within the broader context of the existing literature. 
 
2.2. The configuration of time and space 
 
Time and space constitute homologous categories. That is, they appear to share 
structural commonalities (Talmy 2000). In recent research, it has been proposed that 
the domains of time and space are comparable across four parameters: magnitude, 
directionality, dimensionality and transience (Galton 2011; cf. Evans 2013).6 The 
finding that emerges from these lines of research is that the configuration of time 
and space is indeed quite distinct. To demonstrate, these parameters are considered 
in more detail in the following sub-sections: 
 
MAGNITUDE 
 
The parameter magnitude relates to the ways in which a substrate—the content of a 
conceptual domain—can be quantified. According to Talmy (2000), the substrate 
that exists in space is matter, which is present in two forms: as discrete solid objects 
                                                 
6
 It should be noted, however, that although the domain of space exhibits other parameters, for the 
purpose of this discussion, the parameters of space that either overlap with, or are absent from the 
domain of time will remain the focus. 
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(e.g. a rock, an apple), and as continuous mass substances (e.g. water, air). The 
substrate that exists in time is action, which is also present in two forms: as a 
discrete action, also called an act (e.g. to dress), and as a continuous action, also 
called an activity (e.g. to sleep). Notably, the distinction between the domains of 
space and time is conveyed in grammatical structure: whereas entities in space are 
typically represented by nouns and noun phrases, entities in time are typically 
represented by verbs and verb phrases. 
 
The substrate of a conceptual domain also exhibits certain properties pertaining to 
its disposition, which allows for the substrate to be quantified, or cut up into 
amounts. This is referred to as the state of boundedness and relates to extension in 
the spatial domain and duration in the temporal domain (Evans 2013; Talmy 2000). 
In application, the state of boundedness largely corresponds to the linguistic 
distinction between mass and count nouns in the spatial domain and to linguistic 
distinction between imperfective and perfective verbs in the temporal domain 
(Talmy 2000). This is exemplified by the examples below: 
 
i. Extension Distinction State of boundedness 
 Mike bought some water [mass] unbounded 
 Mike bought a bottle of water [count] bounded 
ii. Duration Distinction State of boundedness 
 Liz was singing [imperfective]  unbounded 
 Liz sang [perfective]  bounded 
 
Because space and time can be conceived in terms of magnitude, it allows for 
conceptual alternativity, i.e. the possibility of conceptualising one domain in terms 
of another. For instance, in response to the question “How far is Newcastle from 
Leeds?”, the distance between the two cities can be quantified in terms of extension 
or duration; thus, a person could reasonably answer “About a hundred miles” 
(spatial) or “About two hours” (temporal). 
 
 
 
19 
 
DIMENSIONALITY 
 
The parameter dimensionality relates to the extent to which a substrate can be 
quantified. The substrate of space is exhibited by length (one dimension), area (two 
dimensions) and volume (three dimensions) and is quantifiable along three salient 
axes: sagittal (in front/behind), lateral (left/right) and coronal (up/down). In 
contrast, the substrate of time is by exhibited by linearity (one dimension). In 
addition to this, the domain of time is associated with progression, a concept which 
involves a continuum of successiveness, or a sequence of distinct representations 
that change from one instance to the next (Talmy 2000). As such, the substrate of 
time is quantified in terms of succession (Evans 2013), which is characterised as the 
sequential relationship that holds between distinct units and sub-units of action. 
 
DIRECTEDNESS 
 
The parameter directedness relates to the symmetricity of a substrate. That is, 
whether a domain is asymmetric (i.e. anisotropic) or symmetric (i.e. isotropic). The 
domain of time is asymmetrically organised and unidirectional; hence, it is 
anisotropic. Moreover, the anisotropic nature of time is commonly associated with 
the Arrow of Time, a term coined by Sir Arthur Eddington (1928), that relates to the 
thermodynamic property of matter: the second law of thermodynamics stipulates 
that the overall entropy of a system is greater at later times than at earlier ones, e.g. 
ice will melt in a warm room and will not spontaneously re-freeze again. In 
addition, it has also been argued that it is possible to distinguish between different 
varieties of the Arrow of Time. Notably, Le Poidevin (2003) proposes three such 
varieties: the thermodynamic arrow proceeds from lower to higher entropy; the 
psychological arrow entails the continuous movement of events in terms of 
anticipation (the future), current perception (the present) and memory (the past); 
and the causal arrow involves causes and effects, i.e. the causal event occurs before 
the event it affects. In contrast to the domain of time, the domain of space is 
isotropic: it symmetrically organised. Space is also multidirectional; thus, 
movement is possible in any direction, e.g. forward and back; side to side. Although 
space does not possess an intrinsic directionality comparable to that of time, 
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different directions in space can be distinguished from one another. For instance, 
there is a marked asymmetry between up and down, which is imposed by the earth’s 
gravity. Furthermore, there is an asymmetry between front and back, which is 
imposed by the bilateral symmetry of the human body: we can see what is in front 
of us, but not what is behind (Clark 1973). 
 
TRANSIENCE 
 
One parameter that is exhibited by time, but not by space, is that of transience. 
According to Galton (2011), transience, which conveys the idea that a given 
moment only occurs once and fleetingly, can at most be attributed to space 
secondarily by direct correlation with time via motion. This is demonstrated by the 
apparent motion of the landscape rushing past the window when viewed from a 
moving train. Moreover, there are a number of expressions that are described in 
terms of spatial motion, such as Here today, gone tomorrow and It came to pass, 
that capture the notion of transience; however, as noted by Galton (2011), it is not a 
property of space that exhibits the transience of time but rather a property of 
motion. Specifically, motion can be described in terms of a change in position but it 
is the aspect of change, as opposed to position, that correlates with the transience of 
time. In this respect, Galton (2011) proposes that transience is the hallmark of time 
and hence is part of its sui generis character. 
 
In sum, Galton (2011) proposes that the four parameters of time form an ordered 
series, whereby each parameter presupposes the one that comes before it: time 
cannot exhibit dimensionality without exhibiting temporal magnitude; it cannot 
exhibit directedness without exhibiting dimensionality; and it cannot exhibit 
transience without exhibiting directedness. Building on these insights, Evans (2013) 
proposes that transience is not, in fact, a discrete parameter; rather, time is 
manifested in terms of the parameters magnitude, directionality and dimensionality, 
each of which gives rise to a different type of transience: duration, succession and 
anisotropicity, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 2. Specifically, duration relates 
to the felt experience of the passage constituting an elapse; succession relates to the 
ability to assess the sequential order of temporal events and distinguish earlier 
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events from later ones; and anisotropicity relates to the egocentric experience of 
now, i.e. the conscious experience of the subjective present, which provides a basis 
for distinguishing between the anticipation of events (the future) and the memory of 
events (the past). As such, Evans (2013) argues that the striking feature of 
transience is that it does not exist as a monolith but, instead, forms part of a more 
complex set of temporal experiences which ground distinct types of temporal 
representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Types of transience and their parameters (Evans 2013: 67) 
 
To this end, Evans (2013) proposes that, although an application of spatial frames 
of reference to time is insightful, such an application fails to recognise the essential 
nature of temporal reference—transience—a hallmark feature which is specific to 
the domain of time.  Thus, his claim follows that reference strategies in space are 
fundamentally different to reference strategies in time and, hence, fulfil different 
purposes. Other lines of research lend support, in part, to this assumption. For 
instance, recent research conducted by Bender et al. (2012) has undermined the 
proposal made in earlier research that it is possible, and indeed desirable to provide 
a unified approach to FoRs in the spatial and temporal domains (Bender et al. 
2010). In one experiment, the extent to which interpretations of moved forward co-
vary across time and space was examined. Bender et al. (2012) hypothesised that, if 
s-FoRs map onto and structure t-FoRs, the preferences for specific FoRs in spatial 
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contexts would be carried over to corresponding temporal contexts. To test this, 
participants completed two tasks: one for assessing the preferred temporal 
interpretation of moved forward and another for assessing the preferred spatial 
interpretation. The temporal task consisted of two ambiguous temporal questions, 
including the Next Wednesday’s meeting question and the spatial task entailed 
participants moving forward a game piece on a board game. Based on their 2010 
taxonomy for t-FoRs (Bender et al. 2010), responses for both tasks were classified 
in terms of FoR preferences in which entities (spatial or temporal) were moved 
away from or towards the participant. Contrary to their predictions, the findings 
revealed that, in the spatial tasks, participants showed a clear preference for moving 
the game pieces further away from themselves, whereas in the temporal tasks, 
participants preferences were about evenly split between moving the events further 
away from the present (futurewards; Friday) and closer the present (pastwards; 
Monday). Thus, in contrast to the assumption that spatial schemas can be used to 
organise events in time, Bender et al.’s (2012) findings failed to demonstrate a link 
between referencing preferences in time and space. In discussing the implications of 
their findings, Bender et al. (2012) propose that this lack of cross-domain 
consistency might be attributed to FoR preferences being domain-specific and, 
perhaps, task-specific. For instance, earlier research investigating spatial 
representations of time has typically required participants to complete a variety of 
temporal tasks that were embedded within spatial contexts, such as arranging 
pictures depicting temporal sequences of events or making rapid temporal order 
judgments about pairs of images (e.g. Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010; Tversky et al. 
1991). Thus, it might be expected that the FoR preferences exhibited by responses 
to temporal tasks that also contain a shared spatial element would, by their very 
nature, be consistent with their corresponding FoR preferences in spatial contexts. 
By contrast, since the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting question is not 
embedded within a spatial context per se but, instead, taps into a person’s mental 
representation of time, the FoR adopted for disambiguating the question might be 
less dependent than other temporal tasks on the spatial representation of time and 
more dependent on an online metaphor interpretation. Hence, while the preferred t-
FoR in response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question may be influenced by 
spatial schemas, it is not dependent on them in the same way that arranging pictures 
depicting temporal sequences is dependent on them.  
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Taken together, the reviewed research provides an important foundation for the 
understanding of reference strategies in the domain of time, demonstrating that 
while space is often useful and necessary to support temporal thinking (e.g. Lakoff 
1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1999), it does not necessarily follow that temporal FoRs 
pattern after, and hence should be modelled using, spatial FoRs (Evans 2013). 
Instead, it appears that the conceptual link between time and space may vary across 
levels of representation and processing (Bender et al. 2012). Thus, having assessed 
the similarities and differences between the domains of time and space, as well as 
the suitability of using s-FoRs to develop t-FoRs, in the following section, the focus 
will be turned to the nature of temporal reference. 
 
2.3. The nature of temporal reference 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, in earlier research on temporal reference, most notably 
Moore (2006) and Núñez et al. (2006), attempts were made to extend beyond 
temporal perspectives (Moving Time and Moving Ego), by integrating them with 
referencing systems (Ego-RP and Time-RP). However, a limitation of this particular 
approach has been highlighted by Zinken (2010), who argues that the terminology 
Reference-Point is somewhat ambiguous due to the fact that there is a secondary 
reference point in temporal reference—the origo—which provides the origin of the 
coordinate system. This follows, as temporal reference strategies arise from a 
number of distinct coordinates and, in the context of temporal cognition, are 
typified by the distinctions between the underlying coordinate systems that 
delineate a temporal scene (cf. Levinson 2003; Talmy 2000). In particular, Evans 
(2013) proposes that a t-FoR, as encoded linguistically, makes use of three 
coordinates: the target event, i.e. the event being fixed in time; the reference point, 
i.e. the event against which the temporal event is fixed; and the origo, i.e. the 
anchor of the coordinate system. As such, a t-FoR provides a means of fixing an 
event in time with respect to a temporal reference point which, in turn, is anchored 
by a temporal coordinate system.  
 
To this end, by drawing on and building upon recent lines of research, in particular 
Evans’ (2013) pioneering work, the following section provides a detailed account of 
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t-FoRs. While Evans (2013) provides evidence for the existence of three distinct t-
FoRs that comes from modalities other than language, linguistic evidence provides 
the primary tool he deploys for exploring the nature of temporal representation. 
However, there are many aspects of our causal conceptual system of time that are 
not self-evident, such as, does time move forwards or backwards, left or right, up or 
down? Although language answers these questions, in part, in instances such as 
when we leave times of regret behind us, or look forward to the week in front of us, 
a fuller picture can be gained via non-linguistic evidence, such as spontaneous co-
speech gestures, which verify the underlying embodiment of metaphorical thought 
and provide a window into the mental representations that underlie language 
(Goldin-Meadow 1999; McNeill 2000). Thus, in an attempt to consolidate the 
existing evidence for three distinct reference strategies in the domain time, this 
section will elaborate upon the non-linguistic evidence for deictic, sequential and 
extrinsic t-FoRs. 
 
2.3.1. Deictic t-FoRs 
 
Deictic t-FoRs make use of a coordinate system that is egocentric in nature, serving 
as a means of fixing an event in time (the target event) in relation to the ego (the 
RP) which, in turn, is anchored by the cogniser’s awareness of now (the origo). As 
such, the temporal relation that is captured by deictic t-FoRs is that of past/future, 
whereby a temporal event is fixed in relation to the ego by virtue of being in the 
past, present or future (Evans 2013). In addition, linguistic evidence indicates that 
deictic t-FoRs also make use of spatial information, such that events that are fixed 
at different moments in time exhibit different properties depending on where they 
are situated: (i) imminence describes events that are fixed in the future; (ii) 
synchronous describes events that are fixed coincident with the present; and (iii) 
occurrence describes events that are fixed in the past, as illustrated by the 
expressions below: 
 
 Imminence  Summertime is approaching   
 Synchronous  The moment of truth has arrived    
 Occurrence  The deadline has passed 
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In this series of expressions, the target event, Christmas, is fixed in time with 
respect to the implicit RP, the ego’s location. Notably, the temporal scene encoded 
by deictic temporal reference can be depicted from two perspective points: one in 
which the target event receives focal prominence, as shown above, and one in 
which an explicitly encoded RP receives focal prominence, as demonstrated by the 
expressions below: 
 
 Imminence  We’re approaching summertime 
 Synchronous  We’ve arrived at the moment of truth   
 Occurrence  We’ve passed the deadline    
 
As such, deictic t-FoRs provide a method of fixing events in such a way that is 
grounded in the human perceptual experience of future/present/past, which 
corresponds to tri-fold distinction between current perceptual processing (present), 
memory (past) and anticipation (future) (Evans 2013; cf. Gell 1992). 
 
2.3.1.1. Non-linguistic evidence for deictic t-FoRs 
Research on temporal gestures also provides evidence for deictic t-FoRs. For 
instance, speakers of English often make use of the sagittal axis for producing co-
speech gestures to signal deictic temporal reference: future events are mapped onto 
locations in front of the ego, present events are co-located with the ego and past 
events are mapped onto locations behind the ego (Casasanto and Jasmin 2012; 
Cooperrider and Núñez 2009). While these well-established patterns have been 
attested in many languages, recent cross-cultural research has highlighted variation 
in the ways in which the sagittal axis is deployed for signalling deictic temporal 
reference. For instance, a range of linguistic and gestural evidence indicates that the 
Amerindian language of Aymara, which is spoken in the Andean region of Peru, 
Chile and Bolivia, elaborates past concepts (‘front time’) in terms of locations in 
front of the ego and future concepts (‘behind time’) in terms of locations behind the 
ego (Núñez and Sweetser 2006). This conceptualisation of time appears to be 
motivated, in part, by the significance that Aymara places on visual perception as a 
source of knowledge. Specifically, Aymara possesses a rich evidential system 
which grammatically marks whether a described event has been witnessed directly 
or via hearsay (Miracle and Yapita 1981). As such, it appears that the value 
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assigned to visual evidence may have consequences for the elaboration of deictic 
temporal concepts. Specifically, one proposal is that the conceptualisation of time in 
Aymara is experientially motivated by the metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS VISION: as the 
past has been directly experienced and hence witnessed, it lies to the front of the 
ego, whereas the future, which has not yet been experienced and hence seen, is 
located behind the ego (Johnson 1999; Sweetser 1990). 
 
Evidence for deictic temporal reference strategies also comes from sign language 
research, which shows that different timelines facilitate distinct temporal functions 
(Emmorey 2001). For instance, the deictic timeline is generally adopted for 
describing events with respect to a particular time (by default, the time of the 
utterance). In American Sign Language (ASL), the deictic timeline extends forward 
from the signer’s dominant shoulder and, concordant with the deictic t-FoR 
framework, the signer’s body provides the reference point for the timeline. To refer 
to next Friday, signers would produce the sign FRIDAY with the arm extended, 
whereas to indicate this Friday, signers would point to a location on the timeline 
that is closer to the body and hence, closer to the present (Emmorey 2001). 
Moreover, similarly to cross-linguistic gestural research, it has also been observed 
that the representation of the deictic timeline varies between sign languages. For 
example, in Danish Sign Language (DSL), an event that took place in the past can 
be signalled as a location behind the signer (Engberg-Pedersen 1993). However, in 
ASL, a deictic reference to a location behind the signer cannot be temporal; it can 
only possess a spatial meaning (e.g. a location, person or object that is behind the 
signer). As such, if an ASL signer was referring to event in the past, such as last 
Friday, they would do so by producing the sign PAST FRIDAY in its citation form, 
which is approximately in the middle section of the (anterior) timeline (Emmorey 
2001). In other lines of sign language research, it has also been observed that the 
coronal axis may be deployed for representing the deictic timeline. For instance, in 
Urubu Kaapor Sign Language (UKSL), which is used among the indigenous Urubu 
Kaapor Indians of Amazonian Brazil, the past is located in front of the signer and 
the future is located above the signer (Ferreira Brito 1983). 
 
Taken together, the research reviewed demonstrates a widespread pattern in which 
deictic temporal reference is typically represented along a linear axis and grounded 
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in the front/back asymmetries of the body. However, recent research investigating 
the spatial representation of time among a number of indigenous communities has 
shown that this is not the case for all languages. A case in point is the Yupno, an 
indigenous community from the mountain range of Papua New Guinea, whose 
language makes extensive use of topographic contrasts (uphill/downhill) for 
describing spatial relations. In addition, a recent study conducted by Núñez et al. 
(2012) has shown that the topographic system the Yupno use for calculating spatial 
relations may also carry over into their construals of temporal relations. 
Specifically, by studying the spontaneous temporal gestures of the Yupno, Núñez et 
al. (2012) observed that speakers construe deictic temporal reference spatially in 
terms of allocentric topography, by gesturing downhill to signal events in the past 
and gesturing uphill to indicate events in the future. Converging linguistic evidence, 
such as omoropmo bilak (down-there-other-side year), which can be glossed as “a 
few years ago”, substantiates the gestural evidence. Furthermore, Núñez et al.’s 
(2012) observations also show that when the Yupno are reasoning about deictic 
temporal reference, they gesture in approximately the same direction, irrespective of 
the orientation of their bodies: if they are facing downhill, the past is conceptualised 
as being in front of them and if they are facing uphill, the past is construed as being 
behind them. 
 
In other lines of research, it has been shown that the Mayan language Tzeltal 
similarly makes use of topographic contrasts (uphill/downhill), as well as 
orthogonal crossways (sunrise/sunset), for spatial descriptions (Brown 2012). In 
addition, while topographic contrasts also carry over to the domain of time, with 
time extending uphill into the future, Brown’s (2012) findings suggest that deictic 
temporal reference in Tzeltal is open to a variety of alternative construals, including 
ego-centred time (e.g. towards/away from the body) and time as a change-of-state 
or location (e.g. entering/exiting July). 
 
2.3.2. Sequential t-FoRs 
 
Sequential t-FoRs depict a temporal scene in which one temporal event (the target 
event) is fixed in relation to another temporal event (the RP) within a sequence of 
events (the coordinate system) which, in turn, is anchored by the origo. As such, the 
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temporal relation that is captured by sequential t-FoRs is that of earlier/later, 
whereby one event in time is established as being earlier or later than another event 
(Evans 2013). Moreover, the earlier/later relation holding between the events is an 
inherent feature of their sequence, such that the relation remains ordered and fixed, 
irrespective of when in time the temporal scene is viewed (by an egocentric viewer) 
or when in time it occurs (against an extrinsic temporal reference system). 
 
Similarly to deictic t-FoRs, the temporal scene encoded by sequential temporal 
reference can be depicted from two perspective points (Evans 2013). The first 
relates to a temporal scene in which the perspective point is fixed at the earlier 
event, for example: 
 
 Earlier Christmas is before New Year’s Eve  
 
In this expression, the target event, Christmas, is fixed in time with respect to the 
later event, New Year’s Eve, which constitutes the RP. Moreover, as the earlier 
event, Christmas, receives focal prominence by virtue of being in the subject 
position, the perspective point is prospective: the earlier/later relation is viewed 
from the perspective point of the earlier event. The second temporal scene is of one 
in which the perspective point is fixed at the later event, for example: 
 
 Later  New Year’s Eve is after Christmas  
 
In this expression, the target event, New Year’s Eve, is fixed in time in relation to 
the earlier event, Christmas, which constitutes the RP. As the later event, New 
Year’s Eve, receives focal prominence by virtue of being in the subject position, the 
perspective point is retrospective: the earlier/later relation is viewed from the 
perspective point of the later event. 
 
Similarly to intrinsic s-FoRs, which employ the orientational properties of a spatial 
landmark for describing a spatial scene (e.g. the ball is in front of the cat), 
sequential t-FoRs employ the orientational properties of a temporal landmark for 
describing a temporal scene (e.g. Christmas is before New Year’s Eve). This 
similarity is well-motivated; the reason for this being that an extensive body of 
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research shows that the temporal concepts before and after are synchronically 
associated with the spatial concepts in front and behind, respectively, in a range of 
languages throughout the world (e.g. Clark 1973; Haspelmath 1997; Traugott 1975, 
1978 for English; Hill 1982 for Hausa; Yu 1998 for Chinese; Shinohara 2000 for 
Japanese; Moore 2006 for Wolof; Núñez and Sweetser 2006 for Aymara). 
According to Haspelmath (1997), earlier/later relations are not sensitive to the 
deictic past/future distinction; indeed, no language is known to invert its before and 
after adpositions in past situations. Although before and after denote static 
relations, the same conceptualisation of spatial time can also be expressed in 
English using terms that relate to the motion of events (Zinken 2010). For example, 
the expression Christmas precedes New Year’s Eve expresses an anteriority 
relation, which is achieved by locating Christmas ‘in front of’ New Year’s Eve, in 
the form of precedes. Similarly, the expression New Year’s Eve follows Christmas 
expresses a posteriority relation, which is accomplished by locating New Year’s 
Eve ‘behind’ Christmas, in the form of follows. 
 
2.3.2.1. Non-linguistic evidence for sequential t-FoRs 
Similarly to deictic t-FoRs, evidence for sequential t-FoRs comes from research on 
temporal gestures (Casasanto and Jasmin 2012; Cooperrider and Núñez 2009). In 
particular, it has been observed that speakers of English often make use of the 
lateral axis for producing co-speech gestures to signal sequential temporal 
reference. Indeed, Casasanto and Jasmin assert that: 
 
Despite the total absence of left-right metaphors in spoken language, there is 
strong evidence that English speakers have an implicit mental timeline that 
runs along the lateral axis, with earlier times on the left and later times on 
the right of body-centered space. (2012: 4) 
 
This pattern of organisation is also evident in signed languages. As discussed, 
different timelines in sign language appear to have distinct temporal functions. For 
instance, in ASL, the sequence timeline that runs parallel to the body, extends from 
left to right and corresponds to earlier to later periods or moments in time 
(Emmorey 2001). This timeline is generally adopted when signers converse about 
the temporal order of events, such as The following Friday. Emmorey (2001), for 
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instance, reports an instance of discourse in which a signer associates the year 1960 
with a location on the left and the year 1980 with a location on the right. 
Subsequently, the signer uses the sequence timeline to refer to specific events over a 
period of time—such as marriage, divorce, re-marriage—by articulating signs at the 
relevant location along the timeline. 
 
Other lines of research have shown that the left-to-right orientation of the sequential 
timeline in English, as observed in gestural and sign language research, does not 
derive from patterns in language (e.g. *Monday is to the left of Tuesday) but, 
instead, from culturally specific spatial representations. As a result, the direction in 
which time flows along people’s mental timeline has been shown to differ 
systematically across cultures (see Boroditsky et al. 2010 for Mandarin; Casasanto 
and Bottini 2014 for Dutch; Bergen and Chan Lau 2012 for Taiwanese; Fuhrman 
and Boroditsky 2010 for Hebrew; Tversky et al. 1991 for Arabic). For example, in 
one study, Tversky et al. (1991) instructed English participants (who read left-to-
right) and Arabic participants (who read right-to-left) to graphically lay out a 
sequence of events, such as the meals of the day. The results showed that, whereas 
English participants organised the sequence from left-to-right, positioning breakfast 
to the left of lunch and dinner to the right, Arabic participants showed the opposite 
arrangement, consistent with the direction of orthography in both of these 
languages. Likewise, in sign language research, the orientation of the sequence 
timeline has been shown to differ across cultures, with earlier/later times extending 
from left-to-right in ASL and from right-to-left in Jordanian Sign Language 
(Emmorey 2001). 
 
Similar patterns have also been found in reaction time tasks comparing English and 
Hebrew literates (Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010), as well as Spanish and Hebrew 
literates (Ouellet et al. 2010). For example, Fuhrman and Boroditsky (2010) sought 
to examine whether culturally-specific spatial representations exist only with highly 
conventional temporal sequences (e.g. days of the weeks; months of the year), or 
whether these spatial representations could be extended to a range of temporal 
sequences that are not traditionally laid out on timelines, such as pictures depicting 
everyday actions and events. To test this, participants were instructed to make rapid 
temporal order judgments about pairs of images (e.g. a person at different stages in 
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life; filling a cup of coffee) that were presented one after the other by deciding 
whether the second image depicted a conceptually earlier or later time-point in 
relation to the first image. Their findings showed that English participants were 
consistently faster when making earlier judgments using the left response key and 
later judgments using the right response key. By contrast, Hebrew participants 
showed the reverse pattern. Moreover, instructing participants to use a space-time 
mapping that was inconsistent with the direction of orthography in their native 
language created interference, causing participants’ response times to slow down. 
Taken together, Fuhrman and Boroditsky (2010) concluded that people 
automatically access culturally specific representations of space when making 
judgments about time. 
 
The research reviewed demonstrates a widespread pattern in which languages 
appear to make use of the lateral axis for signalling sequential temporal reference. 
To examine the universality of this pattern, Boroditsky and Gaby (2010) 
investigated the representation of sequential time among the remote Australian 
Aboriginal community of Pormpuraaw, whose languages make use of absolute 
terms (e.g. cardinal points) for everyday spatial descriptions. For instance, to ask 
someone to move an object, a person might assert Move your cup over to the north-
northwest a little bit. As such, in everyday parlance, it is necessary for speakers to 
conduct a background computation of orientation and direction, which is made 
possible by members of the Pormpuraaw community being adept at dead-reckoning 
(cf. Levinson 1996, 2003; Majid et al. 2004). To this end, as the Pormpuraawns 
make use of absolute space in everyday parlance, Boroditsky and Gaby (2010) 
sought to investigate whether these representations of space might also be used to 
arrange time. To test this, participants completed a series of temporal-ordering 
tasks, such as a card-arrangement activity, which required them to position sets of 
cards depicting temporal progression (e.g. a man at different ages) in the correct 
sequential order. Half-way through the task, participants were asked to reposition 
themselves at a different angle, typically 90° or 180° apart, before continuing with 
the task. The findings revealed that, as opposed to representing time spatially with 
respect to the body, the Pormpuraawns arranged sequential time from east to west, 
with time flowing from left to right when the person is facing south, from right to 
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left when the person is facing north, towards the body when the person is facing 
east and away from the body when the person is facing west. In discussing the 
implications of their findings, Boroditsky and Gaby (2010) hypothesised that the 
east-to-west orientation of time does not derive from patterns in temporal 
language—indeed, the Pormpuraawans possess a rich temporal vocabulary, yet do 
not use absolute direction terms to describe temporal relationships. Instead, they 
propose that the east-to-west orientation of time stems from the apparent motion of 
the sun. 
 
In other lines of research, it has been shown that the Mianmin of Papua New Guinea 
similarly make use of absolute space in their representations of time (Fedden and 
Boroditsky 2012), suggesting that these representations are not restricted to a 
particular geographical location, physical environment or lifestyle. Moreover, 
Fedden and Boroditsky’s (2012) findings indicate that when representations of 
space with respect to the landscape (as opposed to the body) become culturally 
salient, it also encourages people to create representations of time with respect to 
the landscape.  
 
2.3.3. Extrinsic t-FoRs 
 
Extrinsic t-FoRs serve as a means of fixing an event in time (the target event) with 
respect to a temporal matrix (the coordinate system) which, in turn, is anchored by 
the origo. According to Evans (2013), extrinsic t-FoRs exhibit a variety of systems 
for measuring periods of time, which can broadly categorised as event-reckoning 
systems, e.g. calendars and time-reckoning systems, e.g. clocks. In this respect, 
extrinsic temporal reference strategies arise, in part, as a cultural and intellectual 
achievement that is grounded in pre-existing spatial abilities and knowledge. 
Moreover, within both types of systems, further distinctions can be made between 
systems that are repeatable, open-ended, and closed, as shown in the following sub-
sections: 
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2.3.3.1. Event-reckoning systems 
An event-reckoning device is a cultural artefact7 that provides a means of framing 
events in time. A key property of cultural artefacts is that they may be motivated by 
natural facts and the human phenomenological experience of these facts (Sinha et 
al. 2011). Evidence for the earliest event-reckoning devices dates back to the Upper 
Paleolithic Period (c. 40 000–10 000 BC). In particular, scholars have claimed that 
the notches carved onto a Taï bone plaque (c. 10 000 BC) correspond with the 
synodic month, i.e. the average time taken by the Moon to run through a complete 
cycle of phases (Marshack 1972). 
 
As noted, event-reckoning systems can be sub-divided into different types of 
systems (Evans 2013). A repeatable event-reckoning system is a system that 
measures a naturally-recurring periodicity, such as the alteration of day and night, 
which marks the passage of a day (except at certain times of the year in the polar 
regions). An open-ended event-reckoning system measures periods of time from a 
specific point in time, such as the Anno Domini year-numbering system, which 
counts the years in relation to the traditional incarnation of Jesus Christ, AD 1. A 
closed event-reckoning system measures a finite period of time, such as an Advent 
Calendar, which counts down from the 1st December to the 25th December. In 
addition, event-reckoning systems often exhibit a recursive structure, which entails 
one system being embedded within another system. For instance, the Gregorian 
calendar, in conjunction with the Anno Domini year-numbering system have been 
adopted throughout most of the world for the pragmatic interests of international 
trade and communication; thereby, providing a universal civil standard. 
 
2.3.3.2. Time-reckoning systems 
Throughout the ages, humankind has devised many different methods of capturing 
and measuring intervals of time. A time-reckoning device is a cultural artefact 
which either embodies or symbolises the passage of time (Evans 2013). The earliest 
time-reckoning devices are likely to have been sundials and shadow clocks, for 
which there is evidence dating back from Egypt and China to the second 
                                                 
7
 Cultural artefacts (or in other parlance, cultural technologies, cognitive artefacts or material 
artefacts), can be defined as “artefacts that support symbolic and conceptual processes in abstract 
conceptual domains” (da Silva Sinha et al. 2012: 32; cf. Evans 2013; Núñez and Cooperrider 2013; 
Tversky 2011; Williams 2004). 
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millennium BC. Subsequently, water clocks also came into fruition, an early 
example of which survives from Egypt and dates back to the fifteenth century BC. 
Other time-reckoning devices include the hourglass, the candle clock, the pendulum 
clock and most recently, the quartz crystal and the atomic clock (Richards 1999). 
 
Similarly to event-reckoning systems, time-reckoning systems can also be sub-
divided into different types of systems (Evans 2013). A repeatable time-reckoning 
system is a system that recurrently measures a specific period of time, such as the 24 
hour clock which, once it reaches midnight, resets and starts again. Furthermore, a 
closed time-reckoning system measures a finite period of time, such as a countdown 
to the launch of a space rocket. Theoretically, an open-ended time-reckoning system 
that measures the elapse of time from a specific moment in time is also possible, 
such as a stopwatch that is left to run indefinitely. 
 
2.3.3.3. Non-linguistic evidence for extrinsic t-FoRs 
One claim that Evans (2013) makes about extrinsic temporal reference strategies is 
that they appear to make use of non-body-based two-dimensional representational 
space. For instance, the analogue clock-face depicts the minute and hour ‘hands’ 
rotating around a circular dial, which metonymically represents the elapse of time. 
Furthermore, a modern day calendar, such as the 12 month calendar, depicts 
horizontal rows of days that are sequenced in vertical rows of weeks, with earlier 
weeks sequenced above later weeks. Similarly to deictic and sequential temporal 
reference strategies, the extrinsic t-FoRs that people deploy vary considerably 
between language and culture. For instance, an English calendar depicts temporal 
linearity from left-to-right, whereas an Arabic calendar depicts temporal linearity 
from right-to-left, which is consistent with the direction of orthography in both of 
these languages (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 A comparison of temporal linearity on an English calendar (left) and 
  an Arabic calendar (right) 
 
In addition to the sources of evidence highlighted by Evans (2013), arguably, 
extrinsic t-FoRs can also make use of three-dimensional representational space. For 
example, water clocks and hourglasses measure time via the regulated flow of a 
substance from an upper vessel into a lower vessel, whereby the depth of the 
substance is correlated with the passage of time (Richards 1999).  
 
Furthermore, similarly to deictic and sequential reference, extrinsic temporal 
reference appears to lend itself to representation in gesture. Specifically, in addition 
to the deictic and sequence timeline, signers have been shown to also make use of a 
calendar plane, which is a two dimensional plane in front of the signer, parallel to 
the body (Engberg-Pedersen 1993). The calendar plane is modelled on the calendar, 
as the signs for the days of the week are associated with locations on the plane, akin 
to labelling the columns on a calendar. For example the sign EVERY-FRIDAY is 
made by drawing the FRIDAY F-handshape down a column of Fridays. In Danish 
Sign Language, the calendar plane is used primarily for describing events within the 
year, but in ASL, it is generally used for describing the general structure of weeks 
within the month (Emmorey 2001).  
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2.3.4. Multiple t-FoRs 
 
The notion of Frame of Reference takes account of the fact that a number of 
possible perspectives are available for describing a scene. Similarly to spatial 
scenes, temporal scenes can be viewed from a number of possible perspectives. To 
illustrate, the Next Wednesday’s meeting question does not include a commitment to 
a specific t-FoR, but the respondent must commit to a specific t-FoR in order to 
provide a response. Because the question does not entail a specific t-FoR, the 
respondent is free to choose from all compatible t-FoRs and individual respondents 
will make different choices. This offers an explanation as to why research has 
demonstrated that deictic, as well as non-deictic spatial schemas can be used to 
influence how people reason about events in time and their concomitant 
interpretation of a temporally ambiguous utterance (e.g. Boroditsky and Ramscar 
2002; Kranjec 2006; Núñez et al. 2006). Specifically, by engaging in particular 
types of spatial-motion thinking, different construals of time can be primed by 
activating the relevant t-FoR. In the case of the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, 
the event in question is both an event in the future and an event that forms part of a 
large-scale time interval; hence, deictic (Moving Time), as well as non-deictic 
‘linked’ sequential spatial schemas, have been shown to prime Monday responses 
and deictic (Moving Ego), as well as non-deictic ‘path’ extrinsic spatial schemas, 
have been shown to prime Friday responses. 
 
In addition to this, there are instances in which temporal overlapping occurs, in 
which two equally valid mental timelines may be activated at once. By way of 
illustration, consider the following sequence: This here is today. Where would you 
put yesterday? Where would you put tomorrow?  (Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010). 
This sequence can be conceptualised as an example of deictic reference, as the 
sequence is established in relation to the ego by virtue of being in the present, past 
or future. However, the sequence can also be conceptualised as an example of 
sequential reference, as the days within the sequence are also established in relation 
to one another by virtue of being earlier or later, i.e. yesterday, today, tomorrow. 
This offers one possible explanation as to why instances have been observed in 
which speakers spontaneously gesture on the lateral axis to signal deictic reference 
(as opposed to the sagittal axis, which is the customary axis deployed for deictic 
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reference): essentially, two timelines are being activated at once. For instance, in 
one experiment investigating how speakers gesture about time spontaneously, 
Casasanto and Jasmin observed a participant gesturing using the lateral axis when 
talking about “what it would have been like to live back then... and... even farther 
back” (2012: 14). Similarly to the previous example, the utterance could be 
conceptualised an example of deictic reference, in which the two past events are 
situated in relation to the ego, or as an example of sequential reference, whereby 
back then is situated sequentially in relation to farther back. As such, two temporal 
reference strategies appear to be simultaneously activated: deictic and sequential. 
 
2.4. Summary 
 
In sum, by drawing on and building upon recent lines of research, this chapter has 
evaluated the nature of temporal reference. In particular, this chapter has been 
focused on expanding the non-linguistic evidence for sequential, deictic and 
extrinsic t-FoRs; thereby, consolidating the existing evidence for three distinct t-
FoRs. In the context of temporal cognition, a FoR provides a means of fixing an 
event in time with respect to a temporal reference point which, in turn, is anchored 
by a temporal coordinate system. As such, each t-FoR fulfils a different function: 
deictic t-FoRs serve to fix a temporal event in relation to the ego, giving rise to a 
past/future relation; successive t-FoRs serve to fix one event in time with respect to 
another event in time, facilitating an earlier/later relation; and extrinsic t-FoRs serve 
to fix an event in time with respect to the matrix system being used; thus, the 
temporal relations captured by this t-FoR are event iteration (in repeatable event-
reckoning systems), dating (in open-ended event-reckoning systems) and durational 
elapse (in time-reckoning systems). Extending beyond the nature of temporal 
reference, in order to gain a greater understanding of the existence of time as an 
entity of and unto itself, the following chapter will explore the nature of time. In 
particular, the focus will be turned to the primary temporal experiences that 
underpin the human perceptual process, as well the ways in which the 
conceptualisation of time differs in inter-subjectively reliable ways. 
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3. The nature of time 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
How do we conceive of concepts that we cannot see or touch; concepts like time? 
While evidence from language, as well as other modalities, demonstrates that 
spatial concepts largely constitute our conceptions of temporality, such that space is 
often useful and, arguably, necessary to structure how people think about time (e.g. 
Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1999), this does not provide the whole picture. 
We do not possess apparatus specially designed for the processing of temporal 
experience in the same way that our sensory-perceptual apparatus enables the 
processing of spatial experience; yet, we can conceive of temporal experience in 
much the way that we can conceive of any other worldly experience—we are aware 
of its passage (Evans 2004). Indeed, a robust range of experimental research 
conducted by cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists gives support to the claim 
that, although subjective in nature, the experience of time is a phenomenologically 
real experience—the manifestation of which is often independent of our experience 
of motion in space (Kranjec and Chatterjee 2010; Kranjec et al. 2012). Not only do 
we perceive time in such a way that we can make systematic judgments about it but 
our sense of time is also a function of specific cognitive functions involving 
different processes and regions of the brain (Wittmann 2009). Thus, in attempting to 
achieve a more fully explanatory framework for theories of the temporal 
representation, this chapter will examine the existence of time as an entity of and 
unto itself—one that we can experience, as well as perceive. 
 
3.2. The perception of time 
 
What is the perception of time? This question has been addressed by researchers in 
the fields of neuroscience and psychology, who have, in turn, identified a number of 
temporal experiences that are fundamental to the human perceptual process. These 
can be broadly categorised in terms of three primary aspects of time: the specious 
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present, succession and duration (cf. Block 1990; Pöppel 1978) and are considered 
in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
  
3.2.1. The specious present 
 
Arguably, the most basic time experience of all is that of the specious present, the 
experience of ‘nowness’, or the duration of time for which we are “immediately and 
incessantly sensible” (James 1890: 631). The specious presence is underpinned by 
the smallest unit of temporal experience, the perceptual moment, which is 
embedded in time on two hierarchically related levels (Pöppel 1994). The first level 
operates within a time interval of 30 milliseconds and is a necessary condition for 
constructing the basic building blocks of conscious activity, primordial events. The 
second level, which sequentially links primordial events, is implemented in a 
temporal window of 2–3 seconds. Moreover, it is this operational level that provides 
the basis for conscious representation and thus, our experience of the phenomenal 
present (Pöppel 1994). Evidence in support of this claim comes from a variety of 
observations and experimental paradigms. For instance, in ambiguous visual 
stimuli, such as Rubin’s vase, or the Necker cube, an automatic change in 
perspective will occur every 2–3 seconds. Similar patterns have also been observed 
with ambiguous auditory stimuli. For instance, when presented with sounds of 
similar syllables, such as ku-ba-ku (/kuba/ and /bacu/), the interpretation will alter 
every 3 seconds (Radilova et al. 1990). Furthermore, experiments investigating the 
temporal structure of the spoken line in poetry, as well as the intonation of 
spontaneous speech, indicate that spoken language is embedded in temporal 
windows of up to 3 seconds, which thus gives rise to its rhythmic structure 
(Vollrath et al. 1992; Turner and Pöppel 1983; see Pöppel 2009 for a review). Other 
lines of research have shown that when participants are instructed to synchronise 
finger taps to sequences of auditory stimuli with different inter-stimulus onset 
intervals, they are able to tap in anticipation of the subsequent stimulus if it occurs 
within 3 seconds; however, when stimuli are paced further apart, the sequence 
appears to be irregular and participants tend to react to the stimulus instead of 
anticipating it (Mates et al. 1994; Miyake et al. 2004). In addition, ethological 
research investigating the durations of overt behaviour shows similar temporal 
patterns across cultures, not only in conscious and intentional acts such as 
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handshakes or embraces and ritualised behaviour such as dances, but also in less 
conscious activities (Nagy 2011; Schleidt et al. 1987; Schleidt and Kien 1997). 
Indeed, Schleidt and colleagues observed that when people are engaged in a pattern 
of repeated simple movements, such as nodding or wiping, they either change their 
repetitive behaviours after about 3 seconds, or stop altogether. Similarly, when 
people are engaged in more complicated repeatable movements of behaviour, such 
as weaving a net or stirring a pot of soup, repetitions last for approximately 3 
seconds. Taken together, these observations provide evidence of a temporal 
integration in the range of 2–3 seconds—one which provides a logistical basis for 
conscious representation, a working platform for our phenomenal present (Pöppel 
2009). 
 
3.2.2. Succession 
 
Another basic time experience pertains to our ability to make judgments about the 
sequence of events, which is underpinned by two temporal thresholds. The fusion 
threshold is the minimum interval at which two events occurring in close 
succession, such as flashes of light or pulses of sound, can be perceived as 
temporally separate (Pöppel 1978). Psychophysical studies demonstrate that this 
threshold differs between sensory systems with, for instance, a lower threshold of 
detection being observable in the auditory system compared to the visual system 
(Pöppel 1978, 1988). The detection of non-simultaneity of two events is not, 
however, perceptually sufficient to reliably detect which event occurred first. A 
longer interval, the temporal order threshold, is necessary for determining the 
temporal order of events. Research shows that this threshold is comparable across 
sensory systems, suggesting a central time-organising system that is independent of 
purely sensory mechanisms (Hirsh and Sherrick 1961; Fink et al. 2006; Szymaszek 
et al. 2009). In addition, the association between an event, its time of occurrence 
and its relation to other events is retained in memory by virtue of a time tag—a 
process that does not require conscious intent (Pöppel 1978). Research investigating 
temporal memory judgments shows that people can make reasonably accurate 
temporal dating judgments about the serial position of an event, e.g. a word in a 
sequence of words, without being forewarned that they will be required to do so 
(Hintzman and Block 1971, 1973; Hintzman et al. 1973). However, other lines of 
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research on autobiographical memory show that while people may show relatively 
good accuracy in remembering, for instance, the time of day at which an event 
occurred, they may encounter difficulties in remembering other temporal aspects, 
such as the month or the year of the event (Friedman and Wilkins 1985), suggesting 
that the memory of an event is contextual in nature (Block 1990). 
 
3.2.3. Duration 
 
A period of time lasting for less than a few milliseconds is perceived as 
instantaneous, without duration. Beyond these few milliseconds, however, periods 
of time become framed in temporal units of perceived duration about which people 
can make subjective judgments. Psychologist Richard Block (1979) distinguishes 
between two fundamentally different experiences of duration: experienced duration, 
i.e. the duration of time in passing, which pertains to the present and remembered 
duration, i.e. the duration of time in retrospect, which relates to the past and relies 
primarily on the retrieval of information from memory. A body of research suggests 
that the experience of perceived duration is also variable in nature. In particular, 
social psychologist Michael Flaherty (1999) has identified three elementary forms 
of variation in the perceived passage of duration. The first of these, protracted 
duration, refers to the experience of time passing at a slower rate than usual, which 
arises in contexts when the density of conscious information processing is high. 
That is, when individuals are consciously attending to aspects of the self and their 
situation that would ordinarily be overlooked. Time is perceived to pass slowly in 
situations with abnormally high or abnormally low levels of stimulus complexity; 
thus, protracted duration may emerge within the context of uneventful, ‘empty’ 
intervals (e.g. solitary confinement) as well as eventful, ‘full’ intervals (e.g. a near-
death encounter). In contrast, temporal compression refers to the experience of time 
passing at a quicker rate than usual, which arises in contexts when the density of 
conscious information processing is low. That is, time appears to speed up when an 
individual’s attentional resources are not directed towards the self and their 
situation; hence, people can lose track of time when they are immersed in exciting 
situations. Other experiences in which the demands on the density of conscious 
information processing are low, and thus in which time appears to pass quickly, 
include those which involve ‘routine complexity’. This relates to the notion that 
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activities that are performed habitually give rise to an abnormally low level of 
stimulus complexity brought on by the near absence of attention to self and 
situation (Flaherty 1999: 108). As such, familiarity through repetition can lead to 
the experience of time passing quickly. When time is not perceived to be passing 
slowly or quickly, it mostly goes unnoticed; thus, normal duration is marked by the 
absence of a person’s attention to the passage of time. Flaherty (1999) terms this 
type of temporal experience synchronicity, as it is roughly synchronised with the 
intersubjective time of clocks and calendars. 
 
3.3. The distortion of time 
 
Studies investigating people’s abilities to judge the passage of time have 
consistently shown that people find it difficult to accurately judge the duration of 
time intervals (e.g. Aschoff 1985; Campbell 1986; Lavie and Webb 1975; Loftus et 
al. 1987; Siffre 1964). For instance, in one experiment conducted by Campbell 
(1986), participants were confined to an isolation unit and instructed to estimate the 
time of day at various intervals throughout a 60 hour period. The results showed 
that, without access temporal cues, participants tended to underestimate the elapsed 
time, with the average subjective hour being judged at 1.12 hours in real time. The 
distortion of perceived duration has also been observed under more extreme 
conditions. For instance, when geologist Michel Siffre confined himself to live 
alone in an underground cave, he found that his judgments of short and long time 
periods were drastically distorted. Moreover, when he was returned to the surface 
after two months, he estimated that only 33 days had passed (Siffre 1964). Research 
has also shown that the perceived duration of shorter time intervals can be distorted. 
For example, in one experiment, memory researcher Elizabeth Loftus and 
colleagues (1987) showed participants a 30-second videotape of a bank robbery 
before later asking them to estimate the duration of the event. Their findings 
showed that, on average, participants overestimated the event as having lasted 150 
seconds—five times longer than in reality. Personality research also suggests that 
the accuracy of time perception may differ between different personality types, with 
extroverts being more accurate time estimators than introverts (Veach and Touhey 
1971). 
 
43 
 
In addition to this, other lines of research have shown that judgments of time may 
vary according to the internal temperature of the body. In the 1930s, psychologist 
Hudson Hoagland (1933) conducted a series of experiments investigating the effects 
of increased body temperature on time perception. Observing that the increasing 
temperature caused by his wife’s fever appeared to be affecting her sense of time, 
he asked her to estimate the passage of a minute by counting what she believed to 
be 60 seconds at a rate of one per second. Simultaneously, the actual duration of a 
minute was monitored using a stopwatch. Hoagland observed that the higher his 
wife’s temperature, the sooner she judged a minute to have passed. For instance, at 
97°F, Hoagland’s wife estimated that a minute had passed after 52 seconds; 
however, when her temperature increased to 103°F, she judged a minute as having 
passed after just 34 seconds. In other words, the higher her fever, the more likely 
she was to overestimate the duration of a minute—judging time as passing quicker 
than in reality. Building on Hoagland’s findings, psychologist Alan Baddeley 
(1966) conducted a series of experiments to explore the effects of reduced body 
temperature on time estimation. In one experiment, divers were submerged in the 
sea off the west coast of Wales and were asked to estimate the length of a minute 
before and after their dives. The findings showed that, in comparison to before the 
dive, the divers were more likely to underestimate the duration of a minute after the 
dive, when they were colder—judging time as passing slower than in reality. A 
follow up study conducted in warm waters off the coast of Cyprus showed that the 
difference in estimates of a minute before and after the dive was negligible, thus 
supporting the initial finding that change in body temperature affected the 
perception of time among the divers (Baddeley 1966). Taken together, the findings 
indicate that, whereas increased body temperature tends to leads to an 
underestimation of time (Hoagland 1933; cf. Fraisse 1963, 1984), reduced body 
temperature can lead to an overestimation of time (Baddeley 1966). 
 
3.4. The assessment of time 
 
A variety of different methods have been employed for investigating the perception 
of time, the most common of which include tasks involving temporal estimation, 
production, reproduction and discrimination (Zakay 1990). In time estimation tasks, 
participants are presented with an interval of time, e.g. 10 seconds, and are required 
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to verbally estimate its perceived duration. In time production tasks, participants are 
required to produce the duration of a specified time interval by, for instance, 
tapping a pencil to signify the beginning and end of the interval. In time 
reproduction tasks, which combines both time estimation and time production, 
participants are presented with a time interval by a certain means, for example, by 
turning a light on and off. They are then required to replicate the duration of the 
interval, usually using the same means by which the sample duration was presented. 
In time discrimination tasks, participants are asked to determine the relative 
duration of two sequentially presented time intervals, such as a target duration of 
400 ms versus a comparison duration of 600 ms. 
 
Using these experimental paradigms, researchers have uncovered impairments in 
basic timing mechanisms in people with ADHD. For instance, in one study, Meaux 
and Chelonis (2003) investigated time perception skills in children with ADHD. 
Using a series of time intervals, children were instructed to watch a light, verbally 
estimate how long the light was illuminated and reproduce the time period by 
pressing a lever. The results showed that, for the time estimation component, there 
were no significant differences between children with ADHD and the control group; 
however, for the time reproduction component, children with ADHD were less 
accurate and made greater reproduction errors than the control group, particularly as 
time intervals increased. Meaux and Chelonis (2003) concluded that the similarities 
in time estimation scores but differences in time reproduction scores suggest that 
time perception deficiencies in children with ADHD is an impairment of 
behavioural performance, as opposed to being a deficit of knowledge or skill. In 
another study investigating the abilities of children with ADHD in skills of time 
perception, Smith et al. (2002) devised a time discrimination task for determining 
the idiosyncratic threshold at which two time intervals differing by several 
milliseconds could be distinguished. To do this, participants had to determine which 
of two coloured circles that were presented consecutively on a computer screen 
lasted the longest. The results showed that children with ADHD performed below 
the control group, exhibiting higher time discrimination thresholds; thus, indicating 
that children with ADHD exhibit a deficit in their ability to discriminate between 
brief intervals of time, which is only detectable in brief durations differing by 
several hundred milliseconds. 
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3.5. Summary 
 
In sum, the reviewed research provides an important foundation for the 
understanding of the nature of time, demonstrating that while there are a number of 
commonalities that underpin the human experience of time, this multifaceted 
experience is also the consequence of a variety of factors, ranging from cognitive 
function and physiological mechanisms to momentary mood states (cf. Evans 
2013). Taken together, these findings give rise to the question: what are the 
implications of these research findings for metaphorical representations of time? 
While much research in the cognitive sciences has been dedicated to the exploration 
of metaphors for time across languages and cultures, relatively little is known about 
the ways in which the conceptualisation of time and, in particular, how the 
interpretation of metaphorical language about time in prescribed contexts, differs in 
inter-subjectively reliable ways. This issue will be addressed empirically in Part II 
of the thesis.  
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Part II: 
 
Investigation 
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4. Individual differences 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
As discussed previously, English exhibits three distinct reference strategies for 
framing events in time: deictic t-FoRs situate events in relation to the ego; 
sequential t-FoRs position events in relation to one another, as part of a sequence; 
and extrinsic t-FoRs fix events in relation to a temporal matrix. By adapting 
McGlone and Harding’s (1998) Next Wednesday’s meeting disambiguation 
paradigm, scholars in the cognitive sciences have provided evidence for the 
psychological reality of these three temporal frames of reference, with 
demonstrations that deictic spatial schemas (Boroditsky 2000; Boroditsky and 
Ramscar 2002), sequential spatial schemas (Núñez 2007; Núñez et al. 2006) and 
extrinsic spatial schemas (Kranjec 2006) can be used to influence how people 
reason about events in time. While spatial schemas may exert an important 
influence on the structure and representation of time, a person’s conceptualisation 
of time is not merely dependent on their experiences of motion in space but rather, a 
complex of factors. Indeed, in addition to time, other abstract domains, such as 
emotion, can be understood in terms of motion in space, with certain emotions 
metaphorically eliciting particular types of movement, e.g. jumping for joy; 
exploding in anger; scared stiff (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980); thus, giving rise to 
the possibility that other abstract domains may be connected to time via shared 
spatial schemas. Although the majority of empirical research investigating space-
time metaphors has hitherto been focused primarily on examining the effects of 
spatial priming on temporal reasoning, recent lines of research have extended 
beyond this, providing initial evidence that emotional differences, as well as 
personality differences, may also influence people’s perspectives on the movement 
of events in time. For example, Hauser et al. (2009) investigated the link between 
the seemingly unrelated but similarly embodied abstract domains of anger and time. 
Emotion and cognition research suggests that anger, both as an emotion and as a 
personality trait, is spatially grounded in approach-related motivations, which drive 
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the active self to approach a goal or situation (Harmon-Jones 2003). Similarly, in 
the Moving Ego metaphor, the self is represented as an active agent who moves 
forward through time, approaching events in the future. Thus, drawing on aspects of 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory—namely, that abstract domains, such as anger or 
time, are conceptualised in terms of more concrete or perceptually rich domains, 
such as space, and that multiple abstract concepts can borrow from the same source 
domain—Hauser et al. (2009) hypothesised an embodied cognitive link between 
anger and the Moving Ego perspective, with the activation of one domain guiding 
the other through a shared approach-related spatial motivation. To test this 
hypothesis, in one experiment, participants completed a series of questionnaires for 
measuring trait anger (that is, anger as part of their personality) before responding 
to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. The results showed that participants who 
averaged higher trait anger (that is, anger as a part of their personality) were more 
likely to respond Friday (consistent with the Moving Ego perspective) than to 
respond Monday (consistent with the Moving Time perspective), thus providing 
initial evidence for a relationship between anger and metaphorical perspectives of 
time. 
 
Probing this relationship further, Hauser et al. (2009) sought evidence of a potential 
bi-directional relationship between the two domains. That is, whether manipulating 
representations of time could affect feelings of anger, much in the way that feelings 
of anger affect representations of time. To test this, a scheduling task was devised in 
which participants were forced to adopt either a Moving Ego perspective or Moving 
Time perspective for rescheduling a series of events on a timeline. In the Moving 
Ego condition, participants ‘moved forward’ the rescheduled events away from 
themselves and in the Moving Time condition, participants ‘moved forward’ the 
rescheduled events towards themselves. After completing the task, participants 
were asked to rate how angry they were feeling at the current moment. The results 
showed that participants in the Moving Ego condition averaged significantly higher 
scores for self-reported anger than participants in the Moving Time condition, thus 
providing initial evidence for a bi-directional relationship between anger and 
metaphorical perspectives of time. 
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More recently, Richmond et al. (2012) investigated the relationship between level 
of perceived personal agency and metaphorical perspectives of time, reasoning that 
people who exhibit higher levels of perceived personal agency would be more likely 
to view themselves as approaching an event. To test this, participants responded to 
the Next Wednesday’s meeting question before completing the Behaviour 
Identification Form (Vallacher and Wegner 1989) for measuring individual 
differences in level of perceived personal agency. Consistent with their predictions, 
the results showed that participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective 
(responding Friday) averaged significantly higher agency scores compared to 
participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday). 
Probing this relationship further, in another study, Richmond et al. (2012, Study 3) 
sought to investigate whether this relationship might also extend to emotional 
experiences. On the assumption that feeling in control and proactively approaching 
a positive future is more likely to induce feelings of happiness, it was hypothesised 
that higher levels of self-reported happiness would encourage the adoption of the 
Moving Ego perspective (indicated by a Friday response). By contrast, waiting for 
time to exert control over the passive self is more likely to be depression-inducing; 
hence, higher levels of self-reported anxiety and depression would encourage the 
adoption of the Moving Time perspective (indicated by a Monday response). To test 
this, participants responded to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question before 
completing a series of questionnaires for measuring anxiety, happiness and 
depression. The results showed that, in line with their predictions, participants who 
adopted the Moving Ego perspective reported significantly higher scores for 
happiness than participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective. 
Furthermore, participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective reported 
significantly higher scores for anxiety and depression than participants who adopted 
the Moving Ego perspective. Taken together, these findings extend the range of 
individual differences that may influence how people think about time, 
demonstrating that people’s conceptualisation of time likely results from a 
culmination of factors, rather than a single factor. 
 
Thus, while the majority of research on space-time metaphors has hitherto been 
focused primarily on investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning, recent 
research findings have shed light on a number of additional influences on people’s 
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perspectives on the movement of events in time and their resolution of temporal 
ambiguity. Taken together, these findings give rise to the question: which other 
individual differences might influence how people reason about events in time? To 
address this question, six studies were conducted, investigating whether previously 
unexplored personality differences (Studies 1 and 3), lifestyle differences (Study 2) 
and behavioural differences (Studies 4–6) may influence a person’s 
conceptualisation of time and their concomitant interpretation of an ambiguous 
temporal question. Taken together, the results of the studies in this chapter provide 
converging evidence that individual differences in lifestyle and personality may 
combine with context to influence the ways in which people resolve linguistic 
ambiguities concerning the movement of events in time. 
 
4.2. Personality differences: Extroversion-introversion 
 
One personality dimension that has been highlighted as a fundamental dimension of 
personality and which is included in most personality inventories is that of 
extroversion-introversion (e.g. Briggs-Myers and Briggs 1985; Costa and McCrae 
1985; Eysenck 1947; John 1990). Extroverts tend to be characterised as assertive, 
energetic and gregarious, exhibiting a more active approach towards the social and 
material world (John 1990; John and Srivastava 1999; John et al. 2008)—much in 
the way that in the Moving Ego metaphor, the self actively approaches events in the 
future. By contrast, introverts tend to be characterised as withdrawn, reserved and 
retiring, exhibiting a more passive perspective towards the social and material 
world—much in the way that in the Moving Time metaphor, the self passively 
observes the arrival of events. Building on insights from earlier lines of research, 
which demonstrate that individual factors which share an embodied cognitive link 
with the Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors may likewise influence the 
resolution of temporally ambiguous language (Hauser et al. 2009; Richmond et al. 
2012), it is hypothesised that there will be differences in temporal reasoning 
between extroverts and introverts, with extroverts being more likely to adopt an 
active approach to time, viewing themselves as approaching future events and 
introverts being more likely to adopt a passive approach to time, viewing future 
events as approaching themselves. 
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To this end, the aim of Study 1 is to examine further the role that spatially grounded 
individual differences play in influencing people’s perspectives on the movement of 
events in time. Specifically, Study 1 investigates whether individual differences in 
extroversion (John 1990) might influence how people think about time and hence 
their resolution of the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting question. It is 
predicted that the more active, assertive personalities of extroverts should 
encourage the adoption of the Moving Ego perspective (indicated by a Friday 
response) and the more passive personalities of introverts should encourage the 
adoption of the Moving Time perspective (indicated by a Monday response). 
 
4.2.1. Study 1: Extroversion-introversion 
 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
46 adults with an age range of 18 to 73 years and a mean age of 42 years 
participated in this study. 14 participants were male and 32 were female. The 
occupations of participants ranged from unemployed to professional (academics, 
lawyers) and the highest level of qualification ranged from no qualifications to PhD 
level. All participants were native speakers of English from the UK.  
 
4.2.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants were approached in libraries, coffee shops, sports centres and social 
clubs in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Following informed consent, participants completed 
the study using a pen while sitting down at a table. To begin with, participants 
provided demographical information (age, gender, native language, nationality, 
occupation and highest level of education) before completing a three-part 
questionnaire. For Part 1 of the questionnaire, participants completed an 
acceptability judgment task which consisted of 9 pairs of temporal expressions, 
such as We’ve passed the deadline (Moving Ego) and The deadline has passed 
(Moving Time). Participants were presented with a 5-point Likert scale for each 
pair of expressions, with each expression anchoring one end of the scale, “more 
preferable” appearing underneath and “equally good” in the middle. The left/right 
ordering of the Moving Ego/Moving Time expressions was counterbalanced 
throughout. The purpose of including this task was to test whether, in unambiguous 
temporal expressions, the syntactic framings of the Moving Ego perspective and the 
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Moving Time perspective were equally acceptable to the participant population. For 
Part 2 of the questionnaire, extroversion was measured using the eight extroversion 
statements, e.g. I see myself as someone who has an assertive personality, from the 
Big Five Inventory (BFI; John 1990) and a five-point Likert scale with “Very true” 
anchoring the left-hand side of the scale, “Neutral” in the middle and “Very untrue” 
anchoring the right-hand side of the scale. For Part 3 of the questionnaire, 
participants then provided a response to the ambiguous temporal question: Next 
Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days. What day has the meeting 
been rescheduled to?  
 
4.2.1.3. Results and discussion 
The average extroversion score for each participant was calculated by using the BFI 
Scoring Key (John and Srivastava 1999). The scale ranged from 1–5, with 1 
representing a low extroversion score and 5 representing a high extroversion score. 
Mean extroversion scores for each participant were calculated by adding the scores 
for each statement and dividing by the total number of statements, i.e. 8. The results 
showed that, consistent with the predictions, participants who adopted the Moving 
Ego perspective (answering Friday) reported significantly higher extroversion 
scores (M = 3.739; SD = 0.554) in comparison to participants who adopted the 
Moving Time perspective (answering Monday) (M = 3.353; SD = 0.721), t(44) = 
2.036, p = 0.048, d = 0.600. To determine participant’s preferences for the syntactic 
framing of the Moving Ego perspective and the Moving Time perspective in 
unambiguous temporal expressions, numerical values were assigned to the Likert 
scales, with -2 corresponding to the Moving Time end of the scale, 0 corresponding 
to the centre of the scale (i.e. both statements equally good), and 2 corresponding to 
the Moving Ego end of the scale. The results showed that there was no preference 
for either perspective in unambiguous temporal expressions (M = -0.056, SD = 
0.601). 
 
Building on earlier findings regarding the interplay between personality factors and 
temporal reasoning (Hauser et al. 2009; Richmond et al. 2012), Study 1 provides 
converging evidence that personality differences may influence people’s 
perspectives on the movement of events in time. Specifically, as predicted, 
participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (answering Friday) averaged 
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higher extroversion scores than participants who adopted the Moving Time 
perspective (answering Monday). The results, however, require further probing. 
While recent research has provided evidence of additional influences on the 
resolution of temporal ambiguity, these studies have focused primarily on the role 
of individual differences in personality, raising the question of which other 
individual differences may influence how people reason about the movement of 
events in time. As discussed previously, people’s conceptualisations of time are a 
consequence of a numerous factors, ranging from those more tightly bound to the 
individual, e.g. body temperature and emotional states of being, to those relating to 
the situations in which people find themselves, e.g. whether or not a task is familiar 
and how engaging a particular activity is deemed to be. Thus, in addition to 
examining personality differences among respondents, additional insights into 
factors that influence the ways in which people think about time might be gained by 
probing other variables. Noting that hitherto the majority of studies investigating the 
metaphoric representation of time have sampled student populations, but that the 
lifestyle of a student is not representative of the general population, one line of 
enquiry is whether lifestyle plays a role in influencing a person’s conceptualisation 
of time and their concomitant interpretation of an ambiguous temporal expression. 
To test this, in Study 2, university students’ responses to the Next Wednesday’s 
meeting question were compared against those from a sector of the population 
operating under quite different time pressures: university administrators. 
 
4.3. Lifestyle differences: Students and administrators 
 
A large body of empirical research from the cognitive sciences has provided 
evidence that our experience of time is grounded in our understanding of space, 
such that different ways of thinking about motion in space can influence the ways in 
which people reason about events in time (e.g. Boroditsky 2000; Boroditsky and 
Ramscar 2002; Kranjec 2006; Matlock et al. 2005, 2011; Núñez et al. 2006; 
Ramscar et al. 2010). While the priming-induced effects on temporal reasoning are 
indeed noteworthy, people’s perspectives on the movement of events in time in a 
‘neutral’ unprimed context has received little attention—the assumption being that 
in the absence of priming, the two responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question are equally likely: “In a neutral context, people are equally likely to think 
54 
 
of themselves as moving through time as they are to think of time as coming toward 
them” (Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002: 185). However, a closer inspection of 
responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question in the absence of spatial 
priming shows that only student participants have been sampled in a ‘neutral’ 
context and these respondents have demonstrated a preference for responding 
Friday: Boroditsky (2000), Núñez (2007) and Sullivan and Barth (2012) report 
these figures to be 54%, 61% and 77%,8 respectively. To put these numbers in 
perspective, Boroditsky and Ramscar’s (2002, Study 1) research reports that people 
primed to imagine moving through space towards a stationary object (in line with 
the Moving Ego perspective) responded Friday 57% of the time. Thus, as rates of 
Friday responses that differ little from the ‘neutral’ context baselines have been 
taken as evidence for the adoption of the Moving perspective, it gives rise to the 
possibility that there is something specific to the population sampled that favours a 
particular direction in the resolution of temporal ambiguity.  
 
Thus, one issue that warrants further investigation is whether, as the lifestyle of a 
student is not representative of the general population, the results from earlier 
research may have arisen, in part, due to the particular lifestyle typical of the 
participant population. To demonstrate, in UK universities, the average academic 
year is 24 weeks and students receive an average of 13.4 contact hours per week 
(NUS-HSBC 2011; The Guardian 2011); thus, in general, students are relatively in 
control of the structuring of their time. By contrast, UK administrators, managers 
and professionals (who represent 66% of the UK labour market) and UK full-time 
employees work on average 41.4 hours per week and receive 28 days annual paid 
leave (BBC News 2008; Directgov 2012; Office for National Statistics 2010); thus, 
full-time employees have more external constraints and less control over the 
structuring of their time than students. In addition, whereas workers are paid for 
their time and have little choice over turning up for work, students pay to attend 
university; they are the consumers, which gives them the choice of whether or not 
to turn up to a lecture. The flexibility of time inherent in the student lifestyle thus 
stands in stark contrast to the rigid structure of time characterising the lifestyle of 
employees. In view of these differences and drawing on insights from Richmond et 
                                                 
8
 Sullivan and Barth’s (2012) sample consisted of a mostly (~98%) student population (Hilary Barth, 
personal communication, August 2013). 
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al. (2012), who found that people who report higher levels of perceived personal 
agency were more likely think of themselves as approaching an event (adopting the 
Moving Ego perspective), it is hypothesised that people who have control over their 
time and temporal flexibility in their daily lives, such as students, may perceive 
time quite differently to those who require high degrees of time management on a 
daily basis and are regimented by external demands, such as administrators. To test 
this hypothesis, students and university administrators (such as personal assistants, 
secretaries, university timetable coordinators), who deal with the daily management 
of events and activities, as well as the scheduling of meetings, were presented with 
the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. It is predicted that students, with their 
flexible schedules and relative control over the structuring of their time, will be 
more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective, moving the meeting later in time, 
to Friday. In contrast, it is predicted that university administrators, who are more 
cognisant of external pressures and for whom time is relatively controlled by 
external demands, will be more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective, 
moving the meeting earlier in time, to Monday.  
 
4.3.1. Study 2: Students and administrators 
 
4.3.1.1. Participants. 123 adults from Northumbria University participated in this 
study. 90 participants were administrators, with an age range of 23 to 62 years and a 
mean age of 40 years. 33 participants were full-time students (undergraduate and 
postgraduate), with an age range of 19 to 61 years and a mean age of 30 years. All 
participants were native speakers of English from the UK.  
 
4.3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants were approached on the Northumbria University campus in offices, 
coffee shops and the university library. Following informed consent, all participants 
completed a questionnaire using pen and paper while sitting down at a table. For the 
questionnaire, participants provided demographical information (age, gender, native 
language and nationality) before providing a response to the ambiguous temporal 
question: Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days. What day 
has the meeting been rescheduled to?  
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4.3.1.3. Results and discussion 
In line with the predictions, the results showed that, whereas administrators were 
more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday), students 
were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective (responding Friday). 
Specifically, 28.9% of administrators responded Friday in comparison to 60.6% of 
students. A chi-square test revealed a reliable difference in responses between 
administrators and students: χ21,123 = 10.375; p < 0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.290.9 
Indeed, the tendency among students for responding Friday response in an 
unprimed context is in line with the responses of control group participants in the 
studies conducted by Boroditsky (2000), Núñez (2007) and Sullivan and Barth 
(2012). In addition, the effect size is also comparable with that of Núñez (2007): 
Cramer’s V = 0.239.10 In contrast, the administrators showed a preference for 
disambiguating the question in line with a Monday response, consistent with the 
predictions based on lifestyle differences between the two groups of participants. 
 
Taken together, the results demonstrate that lifestyle may play a role in influencing 
how people think about time and hence their resolution of a temporal ambiguity: as 
predicted, students, with their relative control over the structuring of their time and 
fewer external constraints, tended to think in a more egocentric way and hence 
tended to adopt Moving Ego perspective, moving the meeting later in time, to 
Friday. In contrast, university administrators, who are more cognisant of external 
pressures and for whom time is relatively controlled by external demands, were 
more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective, moving the meeting earlier in 
time, to Monday. Study 2 thus provides initial evidence that individual differences 
in lifestyle may play a role in influencing how people reason about the movement of 
events in time and their concomitant interpretation of an ambiguous temporal 
question. 
 
                                                 
9
 For completeness, an additional analysis for an age-matched sub-group of students and 
administrators was conducted (N = 30; R = 23 to 57 years; M = 37 years; SD = 13.100). In line with 
the overall findings, 26.7% of administrators responded Friday compared to 66.7% of students. A 
chi-square test revealed a reliable difference in responses between administrators and students: χ21,30 
= 4.821; p = 0.028; Cramer’s V = 0.401. 
10
 Due to insufficient information, it was not possible to calculate the effect size for Boroditsky 
(2000) and Sullivan and Barth (2012). 
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Drawing on these findings, there are additional reasons to believe that students and 
administrators may also differ along certain personality variables relating to time 
management. For instance, research shows that procrastination is widespread in the 
academic domain, with up to 95% of students procrastinating habitually with 
academic tasks such as writing assignments, studying for examinations and keeping 
up-to-date with weekly seminar reading (Ellis and Knaus 1977; Ferrari and Beck 
1998; see also Solomon and Rothblum 1984; Steel et al. 2001). In addition, Rivera 
(2007) claims that procrastination is likely to be the single most common time 
management problem, with students ranking highly as a group most vulnerable to 
procrastination. Particularly relevant to the issue of how students organise their 
time, however, are the reasons for procrastination: (i) the amount of time a person 
spends studying is completely down to the individual—there is always more that 
could be done; (ii) for most students, contact hours are minimal and the majority of 
time is unstructured; thus, the onus is on the student to decide what to do and when 
to do it; and (iii) the university environment often offers a wide range of activities 
which could easily be prioritised over study time. Although relatively few studies 
have examined procrastination among the nonstudent population, procrastination 
has been found to chronically affect 15–20% of adults, with the lowest rates of 
procrastination reported by professional, business and educational employees, such 
as university administrators (Harriott and Ferrari 1996). In line with this tendency, 
the essential job criteria for Northumbria University administrators, like those in 
Study 2, state that applicants should possess “Excellent organisational skills” and 
the “Ability to prioritise workload and manage conflicting priorities” 
(Work4Northumbria 2012). Thus, if the preferences observed in Study 2 may be 
attributed, in part, by the tendency for students to procrastinate and for 
administrators not to procrastinate, it gives rise to the possibility that people who 
exhibit high degrees of procrastination may also disambiguate the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question in line with the Moving Ego perspective, showing a 
preference for interpretations in which the meeting has been moved later in time, to 
Friday. To test this, Study 3 directly investigates the relationship between 
procrastination and metaphorical perspectives of time.  
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4.4. Personality differences: Procrastination and conscientiousness 
 
In Study 2, it was shown that a population that is prone to procrastination tended to 
disambiguate the Next Wednesday’s meeting question in line with the Moving Ego 
perspective (responding Friday). This tendency is reflected in the definition of the 
term procrastination: 
 
 To defer action, delay; to postpone until another day; to defer; to put off; to 
be dilatory. Often with the sense of deferring through indecision, when early 
action would have been preferable. (OED 2007) 
 
By contrast, a population that tends to prioritise, rather than procrastinate, were 
more likely to disambiguate the Next Wednesday’s meeting question in line with the 
Moving Time perspective (responding Monday). Taken together, these observations 
give rise to the question of how a tendency to procrastinate, or resist 
procrastination, might influence how people reason about events in time. 
 
Personality research suggests that procrastinators tend to avoid, delay or postpone 
action (Milgram et al. 1998; Milgram and Tenne 2000). In contrast, conscientious 
individuals tend to prioritise action (Back et al. 2006; John and Srivastava 1999). 
That is, whereas the deferment associated with procrastination entails the movement 
of tasks ‘forward’ into the future, in a direction concordant with the ego’s 
movement through time (in line with the Moving Ego perspective), the prioritisation 
associated with conscientiousness entails the movement of tasks ‘forward’ towards 
the present, ergo towards the ego (in line with the Moving Time perspective). As 
such, if the habitual movement of tasks plays a role in influencing how people think 
about events in time, this should be reflected by responses to the Next Wednesday’s 
meeting question, with procrastinators showing a preference for deferment, moving 
forward the meeting later in time, to Friday and conscientious individuals showing 
a preference for prioritisation, moving forward the meeting earlier in time, to 
Monday. 
 
In addition to this, personality research proposes that our personalities are made up 
of both higher-order and more general personality factors—such as the Big Five: 
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conscientiousness, neuroticism, extroversion, agreeableness and openness—and 
lower-order and more specific traits, such as procrastination (e.g. Eysenck 1947; 
Allport 1963; Comrey 1988). Of particular interest to the current study is the 
negative correlation between procrastination and conscientiousness: researchers 
have shown than task avoidance procrastination and dilatory behaviour might be 
attributed to lack of conscientiousness (Milgram and Tenne 2000; Schouwenburg 
and Lay 1995). This negative correlation provides an additional means by which to 
strengthen the relation between procrastination and metaphorical perspectives of 
time: because procrastination tends to operate in parallel to (lack of) 
conscientiousness in predicting behaviour, the relation between procrastination and 
dilatory behaviour should be matched by an inverse relation between 
conscientiousness and dilatory behaviour (cf. Johnson and Bloom 1995; Lay 1997; 
Schouwenburg and Lay 1995), which would be reflected through temporal 
reasoning. 
 
To this end, the aim of Study 3 is to examine further the role that individual 
differences play in influencing how people reason about events in time by 
investigating whether individual differences in conscientiousness (John 1990) and 
procrastination (Lay 1986) contribute to their conceptualisation of time and 
resulting resolution of the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting question. It is 
predicted that people who adopt the Moving Ego perspective (answering Friday) 
will report higher procrastination scores, as well as lower conscientiousness scores, 
whereas participants who adopt the Moving Time perspective (answering Monday) 
will report higher conscientiousness scores, as well as lower procrastination scores. 
 
4.4.1. Study 3: Procrastination and conscientiousness 
 
4.4.1.1. Participants 
28 full-time undergraduate students from Northumbria University participated in 
this study, with an age range of 18 to 27 years and a mean age of 20 years. 8 
participants were male and 20 were female. All participants were native speakers of 
English from the UK.  
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4.4.1.2. Materials and procedure 
A two-part questionnaire was distributed to a first year English literature class. 
Following informed consent, participants completed the study using a pen while 
sitting down at a table. To begin with, participants provided demographical 
information (age, gender, native language and nationality) before undertaking the 
questionnaire. For Part 1 of the questionnaire, procrastination was measured using 
the Student Procrastination Scale (Lay 1986) and conscientiousness was measured 
using the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John 1990). Sample items included: I generally 
delay before starting on work I have to do (procrastination) and I see myself as 
someone who does things efficiently (conscientiousness). A five-point Likert scale 
was used with “Very true” anchoring the left-hand side of the scale, “Neutral” in the 
middle and “Very untrue” anchoring the right-hand side of the scale. For Part 2 of 
the questionnaire, participants then provided a response to the ambiguous temporal 
question: Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days. What day 
has the meeting been rescheduled to?  
 
4.4.1.3. Results and discussion 
The average procrastination score for each participant was calculated by using the 
Student Procrastination Scale Key (Lay 1986). The scale ranged from 1–5, with 1 
representing a low procrastination score and 5 representing a high procrastination 
score. Mean procrastination scores for each participant were calculated by adding 
the scores for each statement and dividing by the total number of statements, i.e. 20. 
The results showed that, consistent with the predictions, participants who adopted 
the Moving Ego perspective (answering Friday) reported significantly higher 
procrastination scores (M = 3.541; SD = 0.337) in comparison to participants who 
adopted the Moving Time perspective (answering Monday) (M = 2.978; SD = 
0.499), t(26) = 3.446, p = 0.002, d = 1.322. Next, the average conscientiousness 
score for each participant was calculated by using the BFI Scoring Key (John and 
Srivastava 1999). The scale ranged from 1–5, with 1 representing a low 
conscientiousness score and 5 representing a high conscientiousness score. Mean 
conscientiousness scores for each participant were calculated by adding the scores 
for each statement and dividing by the total number of statements, i.e. 9. In line 
with the predictions, the findings revealed that participants who adopted the Moving 
Time perspective (responding Monday) averaged higher conscientiousness scores 
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(M = 3.695; SD = 0.552) compared to participants who adopted the Moving Ego 
perspective (responding Friday) (M = 3.153; SD = 0.697), t(26) = 2.299, p = 0.030, 
d = 0.862. Moreover, in line with earlier research, which indicates that 
procrastination operates in parallel to (lack of) conscientiousness in predicting 
behaviour (Johnson and Bloom 1995; Lay 1997; Schouwenburg and Lay 1995), 
there was a significant inverse correlation between self-reported conscientiousness 
and procrastination (Spearman’s rho = 0.801, p <  0.0001). 
 
In sum, Study 3 provides converging evidence that individual differences in 
personality play a role in influencing how people reason about the movement of 
events in time. Specifically, in line with the predictions, participants who adopted 
the Moving Ego perspective (answering Friday) averaged higher procrastination 
scores and lower conscientiousness scores in comparison to participants who 
adopted the Moving Time perspective (answering Monday). The findings, however, 
raise further questions. Although recent research has shown that individual 
differences in personality may influence the ways in which comprehenders resolve 
temporal ambiguities, all of these studies, to date, have relied on participants’ self-
reported assessments of personality variables (e.g. Hauser et al. 2009; Richmond et 
al. 2012). While most personality inventories encompass a range of items for 
tapping behaviours, feelings and thoughts and have been shown to provide a valid 
means of assessing personality (Roberts et al. 2007), one question that remains 
unanswered is whether these relationships have force in real life. To test this, three 
studies were conducted to examine whether, in addition to self-reported 
conscientiousness and procrastination, there is a relationship between conscientious 
and procrastinating behaviours and temporal perspective. Across three studies, the 
resolution of temporal ambiguity was compared against three measures of real life 
conscientious and procrastinating behaviours: the extent to which a worker was on 
schedule for work (Study 4); how close to the deadline a student submitted their 
assignment (Study 5); and the time at which a person arrived for a scheduled 
appointment (Study 6). 
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4.5. Behavioural differences: Procrastination and conscientiousness 
 
While conscientiousness and procrastination may be related to various types of 
behaviour, one measure that has been demonstrably related to both of these 
personality variables throughout a number of studies is that of punctuality (e.g. 
Ashton 1998; Back et al. 2006; Díaz-Morales et al. 2006; Roberts et al. 2004; 
Solomon and Rothblum 1984). For instance, in one study investigating 
procrastination among students, lack of punctuality was shown to be the measure of 
behaviour that correlated most significantly with self-reported procrastination 
(Solomon and Rothblum 1984). Furthermore, in another study investigating the 
correlations between personality factors and self-reported workplace delinquency, 
self-reported lateness was found to be negatively correlated with conscientiousness 
(Ashton 1998). In other lines of research examining the influence of personality on 
punctuality in a real life setting, Back et al. (2006) found that participants who 
reported higher conscientiousness scores tended to arrive earlier for a scheduled 
appointment in comparison to participants who reported lower conscientiousness 
scores. As such, punctuality provides an observable real life measure of 
procrastination and conscientiousness. 
 
In sum, these findings provide a way to address the question of whether the 
relationship between metaphorical perspectives of time and self-reported 
procrastination and conscientiousness have force in real life using a measure of real 
life behaviour: it is hypothesised that there would be differences in temporal 
reasoning between people who are efficient time-keepers and those who are not. To 
test this, Study 4 investigated whether the extent to which a person was on schedule 
for work would influence the temporal perspective they adopted in response to the 
Next Wednesday’s meeting question. It is predicted that people who are running 
early would be more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective, moving the 
meeting earlier in time, to Monday, whereas people who are running late would be 
more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective, moving the meeting later in time, 
to Friday. 
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4.5.1. Study 4: Travelling to work 
 
4.5.1.1. Participants 
104 adults with an age range of 18 to 59 years and a mean age of 33 years 
participated in this study in exchange for a small reward.11 40 participants were 
male and 65 were female. All participants were native speakers of English.  
 
4.5.1.2. Materials and procedure 
People waiting for a bus were approached individually by an experimenter at 
Newcastle Haymarket bus station and greeted before being asked if they were 
travelling to work. People who responded Yes were then asked if they would be 
willing to participate in a short survey. To begin with, participants provided 
demographical information (age, gender and native language). Participants then 
provided responses to two test questions and the Wednesday’s meeting. For the first 
test question—Are you on time for work?—participants answered using one of the 
three options: Yes, No, or Not applicable.12 For the second test question—If yes or 
no which applies most to you?—participants rated the extent to which they were on 
schedule for work using one of five options: Very late, Late, On time, Early or Very 
early. The order of the options was counterbalanced across participants. Participants 
then answered the ambiguous temporal question: Next Wednesday’s meeting has 
been moved forward two days. What day has the meeting been rescheduled to? All 
questions were administered orally and all responses were written down by the 
experimenter throughout the exchange. 
 
4.5.1.3. Results and discussion 
Responses to the two test questions were compared against the response to the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question for each participant. For the first test question, 
which assessed whether each participant was on schedule for work, all participants 
responded either Yes or No. The results showed that, in line with the predictions, 
participants who were on schedule were more likely to disambiguate the meeting 
question in line with the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday), whereas 
                                                 
11
 12 participants were unwilling to disclose their age; thus, the range and mean is calculated on the 
basis of the remaining 92 participants. 
12
 The Not applicable option was not selected by any of the participants. 
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participants who were not on schedule were more likely to disambiguate the 
meeting question in line with the Moving Ego perspective (responding Friday). 
Specifically, 62.7% of participants on schedule responded Monday in comparison to 
17.2% of participants who were not. To determine whether the difference in the 
proportion of Monday and Friday responses was reliable, a chi-square test for 
independence was used, revealing a significant relationship: χ21,104 = 17.262, p < 
0.0001 Cramer’s V = 0.407. For the second question, which assessed the 
participant’s perception of the extent to which they were on schedule for work, 
responses were coded using a number from 1–5, in which 1 denoted I am very late 
and 5 denoted I am very early. The results showed that, consistent with the 
predictions, the Moving Time perspective (indicated by a Monday response) was 
more frequently adopted by people who were running earlier (M = 3.279; SD = 
0.760), whereas the Moving Ego perspective (indicated by a Friday response) was 
more prominent among people who were running later (M = 2.635; SD = 0.908), 
t(102) = 3.279, p < 0.001, d = 0.643. 
 
Building on the findings regarding the interplay between temporal disambiguation 
and self-reported measures of conscientiousness and procrastination observed in 
Study 3, Study 4 provides initial evidence that these relationships have force in real 
life contexts. That is, in addition to self-reported conscientiousness and 
procrastination, there is a relationship between conscientious and procrastinating 
behaviours and temporal perspective. The results, however, raise additional 
questions. One shortfall is that behaviour was measured using participants’ self 
perceptions of the extent to which they were on schedule for work. However, 
additional value can also be gained by using other methods which do not rely on the 
individual, such as observer ratings or experimentally derived measures for directly 
assessing specific behaviours (Connelly and Hülsherger 2012; Vazire 2006). Thus, 
to examine whether the effects have observable, real world consequences, in Study 
5, a more objective measure of procrastinating and conscientious behaviour was 
used: the timely submission of assignments. 
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4.5.2. Study 5: The assignment submission 
 
As discussed, research shows that procrastination is especially common in the 
academic domain, with up to 95% of students procrastinating habitually with 
academic tasks, such as studying for examinations, keeping up-to-date with weekly 
seminar reading, as well as the submission of assignments (e.g. Ellis and Knaus 
1977; Ferrari and Beck 1998; see also Solomon and Rothblum 1984; Steel et al. 
2001). Many universities still use the traditional paper-based submission procedure, 
which requires students to submit their assignments to the school office by a 
designated time on deadline dates. There is a wide range of penalties for lateness 
across the university sector and although students are often aware that they might be 
penalised for the late submission of their work, this will often not deter them from 
submitting their assignments with little time to spare (Stoneham 2009). As such, 
research investing psychological explanations for procrastination among students 
has made use of the times taken by students to submit assignments as a method for 
assessing procrastinating behaviour (Beswick et al. 1988). Similarly, research 
investigating the relationship between professionalism and conscientiousness 
among medical students has assessed conscientious behaviour using the timely 
submission of assignments (Finn et al. 2009; McLachlan et al. 2009). As such, the 
timely submission of assignments provides an objectively observable means of 
assessing whether the relationship between temporal perspective and self-reported 
procrastination and conscientiousness is matched by the relationship between 
temporal perspective and procrastinating/conscientious behaviours. To this end, 
Study 5 sought to investigate whether there would be differences in temporal 
reasoning between students who submit their assignment further in advance of the 
deadline and students who submit their assignments closer to the deadline, as 
demonstrated by their response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. It is 
predicted that students submitting their essay earlier would be more likely to adopt 
the Moving Time perspective, moving the meeting earlier in time, to Monday, 
whereas students submitting their essay later would be more likely to adopt the 
Moving Ego temporal perspective, moving the meeting later in time, to Friday. 
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4.5.2.1. Participants 
60 undergraduate students from Northumbria University, with an age range from 19 
to 30 and a mean age of 21 years, participated in this study. 21 participants were 
male and 39 were female. All participants were native speakers of English.  
 
4.5.2.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants were approached individually and greeted by an experimenter at the 
Student Advice and Support Centre on the Northumbria University campus, where 
students based in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences are required to submit 
their assignments for formal assessment. After agreeing to take part in a short 
survey, participants provided demographical information (age, gender and native 
language) before providing responses to the test question How far in advance of the 
deadline did you submit your assignment?  and the ambiguous temporal question 
Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days. What day has the 
meeting been rescheduled to? All questions were administered orally and all 
responses were written down by the experimenter throughout the exchange. 
 
4.5.2.3. Results and discussion 
Responses to the test question were compared against the response to the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question for each participant.13 Consistent with the 
predictions, the results showed that the Moving Time perspective (indicated by a 
Monday response) was more frequently adopted by participants who were 
submitting their assignment further away from the deadline (M = 208 minutes prior; 
SD = 116 minutes), whereas the Moving Ego perspective was more prominent 
among participants who were submitting their assignment closer to the deadline 
(indicated by a Friday response) (M =  145 minutes prior; SD = 82 minutes), t(58) = 
2.495, p = 0.015, d = 0.635. Building on the findings from Study 4, these results 
provide consolidating evidence that, in addition to self-reported conscientiousness 
and procrastination, there is a relationship between conscientious and 
procrastinating behaviours and temporal perspective.  
 
                                                 
13
 Similarly to the findings in Experiment 2, this student population showed a preference for 
answering Friday (58.3%) in comparison to Monday (41.7%) (cf. Boroditsky 2000; Núñez 2007; 
Sullivan and Barth 2012). 
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As demonstrated, despite the question consisting of a single measure, McGlone and 
Harding’s (1998) ambiguous meeting question has been used extensively in 
research investigating metaphorical representations of time. However, two issues 
that arise from using a single experimental question are that, firstly, it is not 
possible to assess the internal consistency of single-item measures and secondly, 
measures comprising of a single item are potentially unreliable (e.g. Oshagbemi 
1999; Pollard 1996; but see Wanous et al. 1997). Thus, if the Next Wednesday’s 
meeting question is a robust and reliable measure of temporal perspective, a similar 
pattern of findings should be found using other ambiguous temporal questions that 
make use of different temporal units, e.g. hours within the day, Tomorrow’s noon 
meeting has been moved forward two hours and months within the year, The 
October meeting has been moved forward two months (cf. Kranjec et al. 2010; Lai 
and Boroditsky 2013; Núñez et al. 2006).14 Indeed, other lines of research have 
demonstrated that people tend to be consistent in their representations of time, such 
that people who imagine moving forward a meeting scheduled for Wednesday by 
two days to Monday (as opposed to Friday) are also more likely to imagine moving 
forward a meeting scheduled for noon by two hours to 10am (as opposed to 2pm) 
(Núñez et al. 2006; cf. Richmond et al. 2012). However, as with much related 
research, these measures have yet to be used in the assessment of real-life 
behaviours. 
 
Thus, to address the issue of whether similar effects would be observable using 
different dependent variables for measuring temporal perspective or whether the 
original effects are attributable to the specific item being used, Study 6 investigated 
whether people arriving earlier for a scheduled appointment would think about time 
differently to people arriving later for a scheduled appointment, comparing the 
participant’s time of arrival (cf. Back et al. 2006) against the resolution of two 
different temporal reasoning questions. Specifically, extending on from the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question, temporal perspective was measured using the Noon 
meeting question and the October meeting question. Building on insights from 
earlier findings, it is predicted that people arriving earlier for their appointment 
                                                 
14
 Concordant with the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, the Noon meeting question and the 
October meeting question are ambiguous, giving rise to two possible answers: 10am or 2pm (the 
Noon meeting question) and August or December (the October meeting question). 
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would be more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective (indicated by 10am and 
August responses), while people arriving later would be more likely to adopt the 
Moving Ego perspective (indicated by 2pm and December responses). 
 
4.5.3. Study 6: The scheduled appointment 
 
4.5.3.1. Participants 
45 adults with an age range of 19 to 65 years and a mean age of 38 years 
participated in this study in exchange for a gift voucher. 18 participants were male 
and 27 were female. All participants were native speakers of English.  
 
4.5.3.2. Materials and procedure 
To recruit participants, flyers were distributed in local shops and restaurants, as well 
as through an online advertising website. Participants were then instructed to 
contact the experimenter via email to take part in the study. Each participant was 
allocated with an appointment time and instructed that they should arrive at a 
specified meeting point—namely, the entrance of the Lipman coffee shop on the 
Northumbria University campus—at the time allocated. As participants arrived, the 
experimenter recorded their arrival time. Lateness was calculated by the number of 
minutes between the appointment time and the arrival time of the participants and 
earliness was calculated by the number of minutes between the appointment time 
and the arrival time of the participants multiplied by -1 (cf. Back et al. 2006); hence, 
positive scores indicate late arrival and negative scores indicate early arrival (e.g. 5 
minutes late; 0 minutes on time; -5 minutes early). Following informed consent, 
participants completed the study using a pen while sitting down at a table. 
Participants provided demographical information (age, gender and native language) 
before completing a study consisting of six tasks that were unrelated to the current 
study. The two ambiguous meeting test questions appeared on separate pages and 
were interspersed between the different tasks (cf. Boroditsky 2000). The first test 
question appeared after task 3 (a vocabulary task) and the second test question 
appeared after task 5 (an author recognition task). Participants read each test 
question before providing their responses. The order in which the two test questions 
were presented was counterbalanced across participants. 
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4.5.3.3. Results and discussion 
Participants arrived, on average, 2.89 minutes before their appointment time (SD = 
9.14), with the time of arrival ranging from 22 minutes early to 25 minutes late. In 
particular, 30 participants were early, 0 were exactly on time, and 15 were late. 
Concordant with predictions, the Moving Time perspective (indicated by a 10am 
and August response) was more frequently adopted by people who arrived early for 
their appointment, whereas the Moving Ego perspective (indicated by a 2pm and 
October response) was more prominent among people who arrived late. 
Specifically, for the Noon meeting question, 63.3% of participants who arrived early 
responded 10am in comparison to 36.7% of participants who arrived late. To 
determine whether the difference in the proportion of 10am and 2pm responses was 
reliable, a chi-square test for independence was used, revealing a significant 
relationship: χ21,45 = 4.132, p = 0.042 Cramer’s V = 0.303. Similarly, for the 
October meeting question, 66.7% of participants who arrived early responded 
August in comparison to 33.3% of participants who arrived late. Again, a chi-square 
test showed a reliable difference in the proportion of August and October responses: 
χ21,45 = 4.500, p = 0.034 Cramer’s V = 0.316. In line with earlier research findings 
(Núñez et al. 2006; cf. Richmond et al. 2012), participants were also highly 
consistent in their representations of time, such that those who imagined moving the 
noon meeting forward earlier to 10am also moved the October meeting earlier to 
August (88.0%) and those who imagined moving the noon meeting later to 2pm also 
moved the October meeting later to December (95.0%): χ21,45 = 30.633, p < 0.0001 
Cramer’s V = 0.825. In addition, for the Noon meeting question, participants who 
adopted the Moving Time perspective arrived earlier on average (M = -6.130; SD = 
8.465) compared to participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (M = 
0.750; SD = 8.744), t(45) = 2.585, p = 0. 013, d = 0.799. Also, for the October 
meeting question, participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective arrived 
earlier on average (M = -5.800; SD = 8.367) in comparison to participants who 
adopted the Moving Ego perspective (M = 0.750; SD = 8.944), t(45) = 2.531, p = 0. 
015, d = 0.756. 
 
Taken together, the results provide further evidence of a relationship between 
naturally-occurring conscientious and procrastinating behaviours and metaphorical 
perspectives of time. Furthermore, by using additional measures of adopted 
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temporal perspective, Study 6 extends earlier findings to temporal questions using 
different time scales, suggesting that the original effects were not merely 
attributable to the specific item being used, i.e. the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question. 
 
4.6. General discussion 
 
Hitherto, the vast majority of research investigating abstract thinking about time has 
been focused primarily on investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning; 
however, recent lines of research have extended beyond this and have begun to 
consider extra-linguistic influences on people’s perspectives of the movement of 
events in time and their resolution of temporal ambiguity (e.g. Hauser et al. 2009; 
Richmond et al. 2012). As people’s conceptualisations of time are not merely 
dependent on their experiences of motion in space but, instead, are shaped by a 
complex of factors, six studies were conducted to examine further the range of 
individual differences that may influence how people think about time and their 
concomitant interpretation of an ambiguous temporal expression. 
 
To begin with, Study 1 sought to examine further the role that personality 
differences play in influencing people’s preferred temporal perspective, focusing 
specifically on the personality dimension of extroversion-introversion. It was shown 
that, in line with an active approach to time, participants who adopted the Moving 
Ego perspective (answering Friday) exhibited higher degrees of extroversion 
compared to participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective (responding 
Monday). 
 
Noting that hitherto the majority of studies investigating the metaphoric 
representation of time have sampled student populations, but that the lifestyle of a 
student is not representative of the general population, Study 2 investigated whether 
lifestyle may play a role in influencing how people think about time, comparing 
students’ responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question against those of 
administrators. It was shown that students, with their relative control over the 
structuring of their time and fewer external constraints, were more likely to adopt 
the Moving Ego perspective (answering Friday), whereas administrators, who are 
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more cognisant of external pressures and for whom time is relatively controlled by 
external demands, were more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective 
(answering Monday).  
 
Reasoning that the habitual movement of tasks may be a contributor to the temporal 
perspective adopted in response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, with 
procrastinators tending to postpone action (Milgram et al. 1998; Milgram and Tenne 
2000), and conscientious individuals tending to prioritise action (Back et al. 2006; 
John and Srivastava 1999), Study 3 examined whether individual differences in 
conscientiousness (John 1990) and procrastination (Lay 1986) may influence how 
people think about the movement of events in time. The findings revealed that, in 
line with the predictions, participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective 
(answering Friday) averaged higher procrastination scores and lower 
conscientiousness scores in comparison to participants who adopted the Moving 
Time perspective (answering Monday). 
 
Next, observing that recent research investigating the effects of personality 
differences on temporal reasoning have relied on participants’ self-reported 
assessments of personality variables, three studies were conducted to examine 
whether, in addition to self-reported conscientiousness and procrastination, there is 
a relationship between conscientious and procrastinating behaviours and 
metaphorical perspectives of time. To begin with, Study 4 probed whether the 
extent to which a person was on schedule for work would influence the temporal 
perspective they adopted in response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. In 
line with the assumption that punctuality provides an observable real life measure of 
conscientiousness (Ashton 1998; Back et al. 2006) and that self-reported 
conscientiousness is demonstrably related to the Moving Time perspective (Study 
3), it was shown that the Moving Time perspective (indicated by a Monday 
response) was more frequently adopted by people who were running earlier, 
whereas the Moving Ego perspective (indicated by a Friday response) was more 
prominent among people who were running later. 
 
Extending on from participants’ self-reported measures of timeliness, Study 5 and 6 
examined whether the earlier effects have observable, real world consequences 
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using more objective measures of procrastinating and conscientious behaviours. To 
begin with, Study 5 tested whether there would be differences in temporal reasoning 
between students who submit their assignment further in advance of the deadline 
and students who submit their assignments closer to the deadline, as demonstrated 
by their response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. Study 6 then 
investigated whether people arriving earlier for a scheduled appointment would 
think about time differently to people arriving later for a scheduled appointment, 
comparing the participant’s time of arrival against the resolution of temporal 
ambiguity, using two new temporal reasoning questions: the Noon meeting question 
and the October meeting question. Concordant with earlier findings, participants 
who adopted the Moving Time perspective were more likely to exhibit 
conscientious behaviours, while those who adopted the Moving Ego perspective 
were more likely to procrastinate, suggesting that the earlier effects have 
observable, real world consequences. 
 
In sum, building on recent research findings (e.g. Hauser et al. 2009; Richmond et 
al. 2012), the results from these studies provide further evidence of the range of 
individual differences that may influence how people reason about time, while also 
providing initial evidence that individual differences in time management as 
observed in real-life contexts may influence how people resolve temporal 
ambiguities. In addition, by using additional variables for measuring temporal 
perspective, these studies generalise earlier findings to temporal questions using 
different time scales, suggesting a consistency between temporal reasoning and the 
movement of events in time. While individual differences in personality and 
lifestyle may exert an influence on the interpretation of a temporally ambiguous 
utterance, these findings raise the question of whether different types of factors may 
also play a role in influencing the ways in which people think about time. Indeed, 
other lines of research on the Next Wednesday’s meeting question have uncovered at 
least one aspect of what is encoded in the question that may influence temporal 
reasoning; namely, the ambiguous question refers to the rescheduling of a 
‘meeting’, the nature of which is unspecified to the comprehender (Lee and Ji 2014; 
Margolies and Crawford 2008). Preliminary findings suggest that the valence of the 
event and specifically the comprehender’s affective orientation towards the event 
may influence people’s perspectives on the movement of events in time. To this 
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end, extending one step further, the following chapter will explore the ways in 
which temporal language interpretation may arise from an interaction between the 
valence of an event and aspects of the life experiences and personality of the 
comprehender. 
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5. Event valence  
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Thus far, a range of factors that are directly tied to the individual have been shown 
to contribute to a person’s conceptualisation of time and their concomitant 
resolution of temporal ambiguity. However, other lines of research investigating the 
relationship between spatial construals of time and affect indicate that the valence 
of an event (positive or negative) may also influence how people reason about the 
movement of events in time. Reasoning that, typically, positive affect is spatially 
represented by approach motivations and negative affect, by avoidance motivations 
(Cacioppo et al. 1993; Chen and Bargh 1999; Neumann et al. 2003),15 Margolies 
and Crawford (2008) hypothesised that emotional states may provide a spatial 
context for thinking about time, with people symbolically moving towards positive 
events and passively observing the arrival of negative events. As such, they 
predicted that positively valenced events might encourage the use of the Moving 
Ego perspective and negatively valenced events might encourage use of the Moving 
Time perspective. To test this, in one experiment, participants were asked to 
imagine an event in the future, scheduled for next Wednesday, for which they might 
feel either enthusiasm (e.g. seeing a distant loved one) or dread (e.g. a stressful 
exam) before answering a number of task-related questions, such as: (i) What day is 
the event now that it has been rescheduled? ; (ii) How does this news change how 
you feel about the event? (a . Worse; b. Better); and (iii) Which statement best 
expresses how you feel? (a . I am approaching this event; b. The event is 
approaching me.). Consistent with their predications, the results showed that 
participants in the enthusiasm (positive) condition were more likely to describe 
themselves as approaching the event (in line with the Moving Ego perspective), 
whereas participants in the dread (negative) condition were more likely to describe 
the event as approaching themselves (in line with the Moving Time perspective). In 
addition, participants in the enthusiasm condition were more likely to feel better 
                                                 
15
 An exception to this is the negative emotion and trait anger which, as discussed earlier, is 
characterised by approach-related motivations (Harmon-Jones 2003). 
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about the rescheduling of the event to Monday than participants in the dread 
condition. However, the valence of the event did not significantly affect whether the 
participants responded Monday or Friday. Margolies and Crawford (2008) offer 
two possible explanations for this apparent inconsistency, the first being that 
although people might have a tendency to imagine themselves approaching positive 
events (in line with the Moving Ego perspective), this effect is undermined by the 
tendency to want positive events to occur sooner (in line with the Moving Time 
perspective). The second possible explanation relates to the different nature of the 
two questions: whereas the ‘approach question’ relates to a spatial scene and may 
tap into a person’s underlying representations of space, McGlone and Harding’s 
(1998) ‘days question’ relates to a temporal scene and may tap into a person’s 
underlying representations of time. Although related, the two representations may 
remain somewhat distinct (cf. Evans 2013). 
 
Extending their findings, in a second experiment, Margolies and Crawford (2008) 
sought to examine whether the language of Moving Time and Moving Ego 
metaphors could be used to infer the valence of an event, reasoning that the 
metaphoric correspondences between motion and emotion should not only tacitly 
affect how interlocutors encode statements about time but also how they interpret 
encodings produced by others. To test this, participants were presented with a third-
person narrative of a scenario in which an event had either been explicitly moved 
forward to Monday (the Moving Time condition) or Friday (the Moving Ego 
condition) before rating how they imagined the protagonist would feel about the 
rescheduling of the event. The results showed that participants in the Moving Ego 
condition rated the rescheduling of the event more positively than participants in the 
Moving Time condition, indicating that space-time metaphors also convey 
information about the valence of an event, with the language of Moving Ego being 
more associated with positivity than the language of Moving Time—at least in 
Western cultures.16 
                                                 
16
 Noting that Monday and Friday differ in valence, with Friday generally being viewed more 
positively than Monday, Margolies and Crawford (2008) conducted a follow-up study to determine 
whether the observed effect was driven by valence difference or metaphor difference. In 
concordance with their earlier findings, they found that even when the event was rescheduled to a 
less positive day (Monday) using the language of Moving Ego, participants still viewed the event 
more positively than when it was rescheduled to a more positive day (Thursday) using the language 
of Moving Time. 
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Taken together, Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) findings provide initial evidence 
of a bi-directional relationship between affect and spatial construals of time. 
Specifically, people are more likely to imagine themselves approaching a positive 
event (in line with the Moving Ego perspective), whereas they are more likely to 
imagine a negative event approaching themselves (in line with the Moving Time 
perspective). In addition to this, encoding temporal passages using the Moving Ego 
language, rather than Moving Time language, invites comprehenders to infer that 
the speaker is more positively disposed towards an event. In discussing the 
implications of their findings, Margolies and Crawford concluded that: 
 
 Our embodied knowledge and perceptions are a result of an accumulation of 
sensorimotor experiences, including emotional reactions and spatial 
movements that influence each other in shaping thought. Abstract thought 
capitalises on more concrete domains and thus is subject to influences from 
both physical and affective experience. (2008: 1412) 
 
Probing further the interrelations between affect and metaphorical perspectives of 
time, recent research by Lee and Ji (2014) suggests that temporal reasoning is not 
only influenced by the feelings evoked by an event but also whether the focal event 
is situated in the past or future. On the assumption that people typically approach 
what they like and avoid what they dislike in space (Cacioppo et al. 1993; Chen and 
Bargh 1999; Neumann et al. 2003), Lee and Ji (2014) hypothesised that similar 
tendencies might exist in time that enable people to dictate their psychological 
distance from different temporal events by minimising the distance from pleasant 
experiences and maximising the distance from unpleasant experiences. As such, 
they predicted that anticipating pleasant events in the future or recalling unpleasant 
events from the past, though differing in valence, should encourage the notion of 
actively moving away from the past and towards the future (in line with the Moving 
Ego perspective). Conversely, recalling pleasant events from the past or anticipating 
unpleasant events in the future should foster a preference for remaining closer to the 
past and further away from the future (in line with the Moving Time perspective). 
To test this, in one experiment, participants were instructed to write about a past 
experience in which they had felt either embraced or rejected by their friends before 
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responding to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. As predicted, participants’ 
responses to the question were influenced by the valence of the recalled event with 
participants in the rejection condition more likely adopting the Moving Ego 
perspective than participants in the embraced condition. In another experiment, 
participants were instructed to write about an event in the future which would make 
them feel either happy or unhappy before completing a seemingly unrelated word 
puzzle, developed for assessing their preferred temporal perspective. Specifically, 
the task was to unscramble seven words (deadline, we, the, is, are, approaching, 
and us) that were presented randomly on a page into a grammatically correct five-
word sentence by discarding two words, which resulted in two possibilities: We are 
approaching the deadline (reflecting the Moving Ego perspective) or The deadline 
is approaching us (reflecting the Moving Time perspective). The findings showed 
that, in line with their predictions, participants in the happy condition were more 
likely to solve the word puzzle using the Moving Ego perspective than participants 
in the unhappy condition. In concordance with Margolies and Crawford (2008), Lee 
and Ji’s (2014) findings show that, whereas the anticipation of pleasant events 
prompted use of the Moving Ego perspective, the anticipation of unpleasant events 
encouraged participants to adopt the Moving Time perspective. However, extending 
one step further, Lee and Ji (2014) observed a reverse tendency for events in the 
past. Specifically, whereas the recollection of unpleasant emotions prompted use of 
the Moving Ego perspective, the recollection of pleasant emotions encouraged 
participants to adopt the Moving Time perspective. Taken together, Lee and Ji’s 
(2014) findings provide further evidence of the ways in which life experiences, 
emotions and metaphorical perspectives of time are interrelated, demonstrating that 
how people reason about events in time is not only influenced by the feelings 
associated with an event but also whether the event is located in the past or the 
future. 
 
The body of research reviewed thus extends the range of factors that may influence 
the ways in which people reason about events in time, providing new insights on 
metaphor and its ability to reflect people’s thinking and feelings. Thus, to examine 
further the ways in which the valence of an event, aspects of the life experiences 
and personality of the comprehender and metaphorical perspectives of time are 
interrelated, two studies were conducted to investigate whether the interpretation of 
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a temporally ambiguous question may arise from an interaction between the valence 
of the event and aspects of the personality (Study 7) and lifestyle (Study 8) of the 
comprehender. In sum, the findings provide further evidence that temporal language 
interpretation may arise from an interaction between the valence of an event and the 
life experiences of the comprehender which may, in turn, also affect the 
comprehender’s affective orientation towards the event. 
 
5.2. Event valence and personality 
 
As discussed, recent research suggests that the valence of an event may influence 
how people reason about events in time, with the anticipation of positively valenced 
events encouraging use of the Moving Ego perspective (Lee and Ji 2014: Margolies 
and Crawford 2008). Moreover, as shown in Study 1, a similar preference for 
adopting the Moving Ego perspective has been observed among people who exhibit 
high degrees of extroversion. In addition to this, research from the field of 
personality demonstrates that extroverts tend to actively seek positive encounters 
with others and are more likely to enjoy and participate in social activities, such as 
parties and sororities, or in physical activities, such as team sports (Ashton et al. 
1995; Furnham 1981; Emmons and Diener 1986). By contrast, introverts tend to 
withdraw from social situations and are more likely to engage in solitary activities, 
such as reading a novel or gardening (Argyle and Lu 1990). Tying these findings 
together, as positive affect and extroversion are represented by approach-related 
motivations and negative affective and introversion are represented by avoidance-
related motivations (cf. Elliot and Thrash 2002; Hauser et al. 2009; Margolies and 
Crawford 2008), it raises the possibility that affect and extroversion-introversion 
may be connected to time via a shared spatial schema. Specifically, on the 
assumption that people are more likely to imagine themselves approaching a 
positive event (in line with the Moving Ego perspective) and to imagine a negative 
event approaching themselves (in line with the Moving Time perspective), it is 
hypothesised that extroverts would be more likely to imagine themselves 
approaching a social event (viewing it positively) (cf. Lucas et al. 2000), which 
would lead to a higher likelihood of adopting the Moving Ego perspective. By 
contrast, introverts would be more likely to imagine a social event approaching 
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themselves (viewing it negatively), which would lead to a higher likelihood of 
adopting the Moving Time perspective. 
 
To this end, the aim of Study 7 is to probe the interaction between individual 
differences in extroversion-introversion and event valence on the interpretation of a 
temporally ambiguous question. Specifically, Study 7 investigates whether 
differences between the social-seeking behaviours of extroverts and the social-
withdrawing behaviours of introverts would be reflected in the resolution of the 
ambiguous question: Next Wednesday’s party has been moved forward two days. 
What day has the event been rescheduled to?  In line with an active approach to 
positive encounters, it is predicted that people who adopt the Moving Ego 
perspective (answering Friday) will exhibit higher self-reported extroversion scores 
than participants who adopt the Moving Time perspective (answering Monday). 
 
5.2.1. Study 7: Next Wednesday’s party 
 
5.2.1.1. Participants 
40 full-time undergraduate students from Northumbria University participated in 
this study, with an age range of 19 to 55 years and a mean age of 23 years. 18 
participants were male and 22 were female. All participants were native speakers of 
English from the UK.  
 
5.2.1.2. Materials and procedure 
A two-part questionnaire was distributed to a second year English literature class. 
Following informed consent, participants completed the study using a pen while 
sitting down at a table. To begin with, participants provided demographical 
information (age, gender, native language and nationality). For Part 1 of the 
questionnaire, extroversion was measured using the eight extroversion statements, 
e.g. I see myself as someone who is outgoing, sociable, from the BFI (John 1990) 
and a five-point Likert scale with “Very true” anchoring the left-hand side of the 
scale, “Neutral” in the middle and “Very untrue” anchoring the right-hand side of 
the scale. For Part 2 of the questionnaire, participants then provided a response to 
the ambiguous temporal question: Next Wednesday’s party has been moved forward 
two days. What day has the event been rescheduled to?  
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5.2.1.3. Results and discussion 
The average extroversion score for each participant was calculated by using the BFI 
Scoring Key (John and Srivastava 1999). The scale ranged from 1–5, with 1 
representing a low extroversion score and 5 representing a high extroversion score. 
Mean extroversion scores for each participant were calculated by adding the scores 
for each statement and dividing by the total number of statements, i.e. 8. The results 
showed that, contrary to prediction, the difference in self-reported extroversion 
scores between participants adopting the Moving Ego perspective (responding 
Friday; M = 3.833; SD = 1.033) and those adopting the Moving Time perspective 
(responding Monday; M = 3.412; SD = 0.876) was marginal: t(38) = 1.060, p = 
0.296, d = 0.440. One possible explanation for this null effect is that although 
extroverts might be more likely to imagine themselves approaching events (in line 
with the Moving Ego perspective), particularly social situations (Lucas et al. 2000), 
this effect is undermined by the tendency to want an enjoyable and sociable event, 
such as a party, to occur sooner (in line with the Moving Time perspective) (cf. 
Margolies and Crawford 2008). 
 
While there was no significant effect between responses to the Next Wednesday’s 
party question and self-reported extroversion, an interesting finding to emerge from 
Study 7 is that 85.0% of the student population adopted the Moving Time 
perspective, moving Next Wednesday’s party forward to Monday in comparison to 
39.4% of the student population sampled in Study 2, who moved Next Wednesday’s 
meeting forward to Monday. A post-hoc analysis reveals a reliable difference in 
response across the two groups: χ21,73 = 16.401; p < 0.0001; Cramer’s V = 0.474; 
thus, further demonstrating that the type of event may influence people’s 
perspectives on the movement of events in time, with a population of students 
prioritising a party, moving it earlier in time (in line with the Moving Time 
perspective) and deferring a meeting, moving it later in time (in line with the 
Moving Ego perspective). Moreover, this difference re-emphasises the role that 
lifestyle plays in influencing people’s conceptualisations of time, suggesting that 
temporal language interpretation may arise from an interaction between the valence 
of an event and the life experiences of the comprehender. Probing this interaction 
further, Study 8 sought to investigate further the effects of event valence on 
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students’ interpretation of an ambiguous temporal question using a focal event that 
features on all academic calendars: the assignment deadline. 
 
5.3. Event valence and lifestyle 
 
In recent years, there has been a growth in interest concerning stress experienced by 
students studying in higher education. Stress can be viewed as “an imbalance 
between perceived demands and perceived resources” (Matheny et al. 2008: 50; cf. 
Lazarus and Folkman 1984). While research examining sources of stress among 
students has shown that stress may be attributed to a range of factors, such as 
financial difficulties, health problems and social strains, research shows that 
academic-related activities rank frequently as the most potent causes. More 
specifically, examinations and meeting deadlines for assignments have been 
reported as the two most common causes of academic stress (e.g. Abouserie 1994; 
Kohn and Frazer 1986). In addition to this, it has been reported that 75% to 80% of 
university students exhibit moderate levels of stress and 10% to 12% exhibit serious 
levels of stress (Abouserie 1994; Pierceall and Keim 2007).17 A significant positive 
correlation has also been shown to emerge between stress and negative affect, as 
well as lack of perceived control (e.g. Abouserie 1994; Clark and Watson 1991; 
Watson 1988). Indeed, according to Abouserie, “students who believe in their 
abilities and in their control of their situations are less stressed than those who 
believe that things happen by luck or outside agents” (1994: 329). On the 
assumption that assignment deadlines are one of the most frequent causes of stress 
among students, it is hypothesised that students would feel negatively disposed 
towards the arrival of an assignment deadline, especially if it was rescheduled 
earlier in time. Furthermore, as stress is correlated with negative affect, as well as 
lack of perceived control—two factors that are demonstrably related to the Moving 
Time perspective (e.g. Margolies and Crawford 2008; Richmond et al. 2012)—it is 
also hypothesised that students would be more likely to imagine a stressful event, 
such as an assignment deadline, approaching themselves (in line with the Moving 
Time perspective) than to imagine themselves approaching it. 
                                                 
17
 It should, however, be noted that in some situations stress can be beneficial. Indeed, distinctions 
have been made between eustress (positive stress) (Brown and Ralph 1999) and distress (Bush et al. 
1985). 
82 
 
 
To this end, the aim of Study 8 is to examine further the ways in which the valence 
of an event, the life experiences of the comprehender and metaphorical perspectives 
of time are interrelated by focusing specifically on the participant’s affective 
orientation towards the event. To do this, students were presented with the question 
Next Wednesday’s assignment deadline has been moved forward has been moved 
forward two days. What day has the event been rescheduled to? before being asked 
whether they perceived themselves as approaching the event or whether they 
imagined the event approaching themselves and also whether the rescheduling of 
the event made them feel better or worse. In line with the findings that assignment 
deadlines are one of the most prominent causes of stress among students (Kohn and 
Frazer 1986) and that people tend to feel worse about the rescheduling of a negative 
event when it is moved earlier in time (Margolies and Crawford 2008), it is 
predicted that participants who report feeling worse about the rescheduling of the 
assignment deadline will be more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective 
(indicated by Monday and The event is approaching me responses) compared to 
participants who adopt the Moving Ego perspective (indicated by Friday and I’m 
approaching the event responses). Furthermore, building on insights from earlier 
findings which demonstrate that people are more likely to imagine a negative future 
event approaching themselves (Lee and Ji 2014; Margolies and Crawford 2008), it 
is predicted that the Moving Time perspective will be more prominent than the 
Moving Ego perspective among the student population. 
 
5.3.1. Study 8: Next Wednesday’s assignment deadline 
 
5.3.1.1. Participants 
39 full-time undergraduate students from Northumbria University participated in 
this study, with an age range of 18 to 24 years and a mean age of 21 years. 13 
participants were male and 26 were female. All participants were native speakers of 
English from the UK.  
 
5.3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
A questionnaire was distributed to a third year English literature class. Following 
informed consent, participants completed the study using a pen while sitting down 
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at a table. To begin with, participants provided demographical information (age, 
gender, native language and nationality). Next, adopting the methodology used by 
Margolies and Crawford (2008), participants read the ambiguous temporal 
statement below before answering three related questions: 
 
Next Wednesday’s assessment deadline has been moved forward two days 
 
1. What day has the event been re-scheduled to?  
2. Which statement best expresses how you feel?    
 a. I am approaching this event 
 b. The event is approaching me 
3. How does this news change how you feel about the event?  
 a. Worse 
 b. Better     
 
5.3.1.3. Results and discussion 
For the purpose of this discussion, question one is referred to as the Days question 
and question two is referred to as the Approach question. In line with the 
predictions, the results showed that participants who felt better about the 
rescheduling of the event were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective 
(indicated by Friday and I am approaching the event responses), whereas 
participants who felt worse about the rescheduling of the event were more likely to 
adopt the Moving Time perspective (indicated by Monday and The event is 
approaching me responses). Concretely, for the Days question, 85.2% of 
participants who felt worse about the rescheduling of the meeting responded 
Monday in comparison to 0% of participants who felt better about it. A chi-square 
test revealed a reliable difference in response: χ21,39 = 21.231; p < 0.0001; Cramer’s 
V = 0.768. Similarly, for the Approach question, 74.1% of participants who felt 
worse about the rescheduling of the meeting responded The event is approaching 
me in comparison to 11.1% of participants who felt better about it. Again, a chi-
square test revealed a reliable difference in response: χ21,39 = 11.010; p < 0.001; 
Cramer’s V = 0.553. Participants were also highly consistent in their answers. 
Those who responded Friday also viewed themselves as approaching the event 
(84.7%), and those who responded Monday also viewed the event as approaching 
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themselves (82.7%): χ21,39 = 15.442, p < 0.0001; Cramer’s V = 0.655. Furthermore, 
in line with the predictions, the student population demonstrated a preference for 
adopting the Moving Time perspective for the Days and the Approach questions, 
with (63.9%) participants responding Monday and (58.3%) of participants 
responding The event is approaching me. 
 
Taken together, the results from Study 8 provide further evidence that temporal 
language interpretation may arise from an interaction between the valence of an 
event and the life experiences of the comprehender, which may, in turn, also 
influence the comprehender’s affective orientation towards the event. Specifically, 
as predicted, participants who felt better about the rescheduling of the event were 
more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective (indicated by Friday and I am 
approaching the event responses), whereas participants who felt worse about the 
rescheduling of the event were more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective 
(indicated by Monday and The event is approaching me responses). Furthermore, in 
line with earlier findings demonstrating that people are more likely to imagine a 
negative future event approaching themselves (Lee and Ji 2014; Margolies and 
Crawford 2008), the student population demonstrated a preference for 
disambiguating the Next Wednesday’s assignment deadline question in line with the 
Moving Time perspective, as evidenced by Monday and The event is approaching 
me responses. 
 
5.4. General discussion 
 
Building on earlier observations that individual differences in personality and 
lifestyle may influence people’s perspectives on the movement of events in time, 
two studies were conducted to investigate a number of additional factors that may 
also play a role in influencing the resolution of temporally ambiguous language. 
Drawing on preliminary lines of research, which suggest that the valence of an 
event and specifically the comprehender’s affective orientation towards the event 
may also influence people’s conceptualisations of time, the studies aimed to 
investigate whether the interpretation of a temporally ambiguous utterance may 
arise from an interaction between the valence of the event and aspects of the 
personality (Study 7) and lifestyle (Study 8) of the comprehender. 
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To begin with, Study 7 sought to examine further the interaction between individual 
differences in personality and event valence on the interpretation of a temporally 
ambiguous question, focusing specifically on the personality dimension of 
extroversion-introversion. Specifically, the aim was to investigate whether 
differences between the social-seeking behaviours of extroverts and the social-
withdrawing behaviours of introverts would be reflected in their resolution of the 
ambiguous Next Wednesday’s party question. It was shown that, contrary to the 
prediction that extroverts would be more likely to imagine themselves approaching 
a social event (viewing it positively) and introverts would be more likely to imagine 
a social event approaching themselves (viewing it negatively), the difference in self-
reported extroversion scores between participants adopting the Moving Ego 
perspective (responding Friday) and those adopting the Moving Time perspective 
(responding Monday) was marginal; thus, suggesting that although extroverts might 
be more likely to imagine themselves approaching events (in line with the Moving 
Ego perspective), particularly social situations (Lucas et al. 2000), this effect is 
undermined by the tendency to want an enjoyable and sociable event, such as a 
party, to occur sooner (in line with the Moving Time perspective) (cf. Margolies 
and Crawford 2008). 
 
Probing further the ways in which the valence of an event, the life experiences of 
the comprehender and metaphorical perspectives of time are interrelated, Study 8 
examined the effects of event valence on students’ interpretation of an ambiguous 
temporal question using a focal event that features on all academic calendars: the 
assignment deadline. To do this, students were presented with the Next 
Wednesday’s assignment deadline question before being asked to rate whether the 
rescheduling of the event made them feel better or worse. In line with the findings 
that assignment deadlines are one of the most prominent causes of stress among 
students (Kohn and Frazer 1986) and that people tend to feel worse about the 
rescheduling of a negative event when it is moved earlier in time (Margolies and 
Crawford 2008), the results showed that participants who felt better about the 
rescheduling of the event were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective 
(indicated by Friday and I am approaching the event responses), whereas 
participants who felt worse about the rescheduling of the event were more likely to 
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adopt the Moving Time perspective (indicated by Monday and The event is 
approaching me responses). Furthermore, in line with earlier findings 
demonstrating that people are more likely to imagine a negative future event 
approaching themselves (Lee and Ji 2014; Margolies and Crawford 2008), the 
student population demonstrated a preference for disambiguating the Next 
Wednesday’s assignment deadline question in line with the Moving Time 
perspective. In sum, the results from Study 8 provide additional evidence that the 
interpretation of an ambiguous temporal question may arise from an interaction 
between the valence of an event and the life experiences of the comprehender which 
may, in turn, also influence the comprehender’s affective orientation towards the 
event. 
 
Hitherto, a range of factors that are directly tied to the individual have been shown 
to play a role in resolution of temporally ambiguous language. Furthermore, recent 
lines of research have also uncovered at least one aspect of what is encoded that 
may influence temporal reasoning; namely, the valence of the event (Lee and Ji 
2014; Margolies and Crawford 2008). However, while much research has made use 
of McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous question (and more recently, various 
permeations of their question), very little research has been conducted to probe the 
linguistic contributors to the different interpretations of the question, thus leaving 
unanswered questions regarding the factors that may contribute to its ambiguity. To 
this end, in order to gain further insight into the nature of the ambiguity in the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question, in the following chapter, the focus of the 
investigation will be turned to the linguistic properties of individual elements in the 
question; probing factors that may contribute to the question’s inherent ambiguity. 
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6. Grammatical differences 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Spatial concepts largely constitute our conceptions of temporality, such that space is 
often useful and, arguably, necessary to structure how people think about time 
(Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Indeed, the relationship between space 
and time is reflected in the language people habitually use when talking about 
events in time: durations can be expressed in terms of distance (a long meeting; a 
short vacation); events can be moved (the party was brought forward; the deadline 
was pushed backward); and instances in time can be conceived as points (the 
middle of the year; the end of the film). In addition, the spatial representation of 
time makes use of prescribed prepositions for conveying different types of temporal 
concepts: at is often used in conjunction with small temporal units (at midday); on 
usually co-occurs with intermediate temporal units (on Monday); and in tends to be 
used with larger temporal units (in May). Noting this pattern of usage, Wierzbicka 
(1993) has proposed that the choice between different prepositions across different 
types of temporal concepts is semantically motivated and not merely the result of 
idiosyncratic grammatical rules. Building on insights from this research, Kranjec et 
al. (2010) conducted an experiment to investigate whether the semantics of 
prescribed prepositions could be used to influence how people think about time. 
Specifically, by adapting McGlone and Harding’s (1998) Next Wednesday’s 
meeting question, participants responded to one of six possible ambiguous temporal 
questions: the Preposition condition comprised of three questions, using three 
distinct scales of temporal units (hour, day, and month) and their prescribed spatial 
preposition (at, on and in, respectively) and the No Preposition condition consisted 
of analogous questions, using the same three temporal scales but without the 
prescribed prepositions, resulting in the following six test questions: 
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Preposition condition 
The meeting at noon has been moved forward two hours. At what hour is the 
meeting now that it has been rescheduled? 
The meeting on Wednesday has been moved forward two days. On what day 
is the meeting now that it has been rescheduled? 
The meeting in June has been moved forward two months. In what month is 
the meeting now that it has been rescheduled? 
 
No Preposition condition 
The noon meeting has been moved forward two hours. What hour is the 
meeting now that it has been rescheduled? 
The Wednesday meeting has been moved forward two days. What day is the 
meeting now that it has been rescheduled? 
The June meeting has been moved forward two months. What month is the 
meeting now that it has been rescheduled?  
 
The results showed that in the No Preposition condition, the proportions of earlier 
and later responses were not reliably different from chance for all time scales; thus, 
suggesting that differences in time scale alone did not influence how participants 
disambiguated the questions. By contrast, in the Preposition condition, the 
proportions of earlier and later responses differed reliably from chance for all time 
scales, indicating that spatial prepositions do indeed influence temporal thinking. In 
addition, responses for the same time scale across the Preposition and No 
Preposition conditions differed, with particular prepositions (at and in but not on) 
encouraging participants to respond in an opposite manner to their no preposition 
counterpart questions. 
 
In discussing the implications of their findings, Kranjec et al. (2010) suggest that 
the dimensional complexity of at, on and in may have influenced temporal thinking 
in particular ways: the ‘zero-dimensional’ preposition at biased thinking towards 
small points of time; the ‘two-dimensional’ on, towards intermediate lengths of 
time; and the ‘three-dimensional’ in, towards large volumes of time. To illustrate, 
consider the following: on a timeline, positions closer to the beginning convey 
smaller extensions of time and correspond with earlier times, whereas positions 
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towards the end represent larger extensions and correspond with later times. Thus, if 
spatial language influences participants to visualise a timeline extending from 
smaller (and earlier) times to larger (and later) times, then prepositions of different 
dimensional complexity might influence temporal thinking with respect to the 
corresponding segment of the mental representation. As such, questions using the 
zero-dimensional preposition at should result in a greater number of earlier 
responses; questions containing the two-dimensional preposition on should give rise 
to an intermediate pattern of results; and questions with the three-dimensional 
preposition in should produce a greater number of later responses—a pattern that is 
reflected in their results. Taken together, Kranjec et al. (2010) concluded that the 
dimensional characteristics of prescribed prepositions retain semantic content and 
modulate how people think about time. 
 
Taken together, the research reviewed importantly extends the range of factors that 
may influence people’s representations of time, demonstrating that the linguistic 
properties of individual elements of an ambiguous temporal question may also 
influence its interpretation. Thus, to examine further the linguistic contributors to 
the different interpretations of McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous meeting 
question, a further two studies were conducted. Study 9 sought to investigate 
whether the locus of the ambiguity is centred on the adverb, centred on the verb or 
distributed across the utterance. The results indicate that the interpretation of the 
ambiguous temporal question results from an interplay of verb and adverb. In Study 
10, the focus is turned to grammatical agency, comparing responses to the question 
in active or passive voice, and responses with an explicit first, second or third 
person agent. The findings indicate that the role of the grammatical person, but not 
grammatical voice, may also influence the interpretation of the ambiguous temporal 
question. 
 
6.2. Disambiguating the ambiguity: Verb vs. adverb 
 
The assumption has often been made by scholars that the ambiguity of the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question stems from the interpretation of the adverb forward, 
which can be interpreted either as indicating the direction of motion of the ego 
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through time or as indicating the direction of motion of time towards the ego: 
 
If the above statement is interpreted using the ego-moving schema, then 
forward is in the direction of motion of the observer, and the meeting should 
now fall on a Friday. In the time-moving interpretation, however, forward is 
in the direction of motion of time, and the meeting should now be on a 
Monday. (Boroditsky 2000: 8) 
 
The answer to the question about Wednesday’s meeting is ambiguous 
because it depends on how the word forward is interpreted in the context of 
one’s mental representation of the timeline. (Kranjec and McDonough 2011: 
737) 
 
More recently, however, it has been claimed that the ambiguity may in fact be 
rooted in the use of the directionally neutral verb move:  
 
...simply substitute the word push for move and the sentence becomes 
disambiguated: 
    Next Wednesday's meeting has been pushed forward by two days 
While moved can refer to movement in several different directions 
depending on one’s perspective, pushed nearly always implies movement in 
a forward direction. When we push something, we use the muscles of our 
arms and trunk to propel the object away from us in a forward direction.18 
(Restak 2011: 44, italics added) 
 
A further possibility is that the ambiguity may arise from a combination of both the 
verb (move) and the adverb (forward), indicating a distributed semantics of 
temporal expressions, analogous to the distributed semantics found in spatial 
expressions (Sinha and Kuteva 1995). 
 
                                                 
18
 Notably, Restak presumes a lack of ambiguity stemming from the adverb forward. 
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While earlier research has probed the temporal ambiguity arising from constructions 
other than moved forward, a number of discrepancies make it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions from their findings. Specifically, in addition to the Next Wednesday’s 
meeting disambiguation task, McGlone and Harding (1998) devised two additional 
test questions, using the constructions advanced and pushed back: 
 
i.  The reception originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been advanced 
 two days 
ii. The party originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been pushed back 
 two days 
 
To determine whether the target sentences were in fact ambiguous with respect to 
the direction of temporal movement, McGlone and Harding (1998) conducted a 
brief materials-check. Participants were instructed to read each sentence carefully 
before circling the day (Monday or Friday?) to which the fictitious event had been 
rescheduled. Problematically, as opposed to investigating the ambiguity of the test 
questions, their experiment setup created ambiguity at the time of response by 
providing two possible options: Monday or Friday? Thus, if the participant had not 
realised that the question was ambiguous, providing two possible responses overtly 
draws attention to this fact. Furthermore, instructing participants to “read each 
sentence carefully” increases the likelihood of participants over-thinking their 
response. The findings revealed that, unsurprisingly, all three test questions were 
considered ambiguous, giving rise to both Monday and Friday responses. As the 
design of McGlone and Harding’s (1998) materials check may have masked 
differences in ambiguity across the variants of the question, it is difficult to 
determine, on the basis of their findings, whether the locus of the ambiguity is 
centred on the adverb, centred on the verb or distributed across the utterance.  To 
address this, Study 9 sought to investigate the source of the ambiguity in the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question, examining whether the ambiguity of the question 
stems from the verb (move), the adverb (forward), or indeed a combination of both. 
To do this, responses to the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting question using 
nine verbs (move, pull, bring, rush, draw, push, shift, take, and carry) and two 
adverbs (forward and backward) were compared. The first aim of Study 9 is to 
investigate how people interpret the Next Wednesday’s meeting question when 
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adverb is altered. It is predicted that if the adverb contributes to the ambiguity of the 
question (cf. Boroditsky 2000; Kranjec et al. 2010), then responses to [verb]  
forward constructions should differ from their [verb]  backward counterparts. Next, 
the second aim of Study 9 is to investigate how people interpret the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question when the verb is altered. It is predicted that if the 
verb contributes to the ambiguity of the question (cf. Restak 2011), then altering the 
verb should influence participants’ concomitant responses to the question. Finally, 
the third aim of Study 9 is to investigate whether the interpretation of the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question arises from the interplay of verb and adverb, 
indicating a distributed semantics of temporal expressions, analogous to the 
distributed semantics found in spatial expressions (Sinha and Kuteva 1995). 
 
6.2.1. Study 9: Verb vs. adverb 
 
6.2.1.1. Participants 
320 administrators from two universities in Newcastle-upon-Tyne participated in 
this study, with an age range of 18 to 67 years and a mean age of 46 years. All 
participants were native speakers of English from the UK.  
 
6.2.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants were approached on the university campuses in offices, coffee shops 
and the university libraries. Following informed consent, all participants completed 
the questionnaire using a pen while sitting down at a table. For the questionnaire, 
participants provided demographical information (age, gender, native language and 
nationality) before providing a response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. 
18 variants of the question were created by combining one of nine verbs (move, 
bring, pull, rush, draw, push, shift, carry or take)19 and one of two adverbs (forward 
or backward): 
 
Next Wednesday’s meeting has been [verb] adverb two days. 
What day has the meeting been re-scheduled to? 
                                                 
19
 Using the Global Web-Based English (GloWbE; Davies 2013) corpus, which demonstrated the co-
occurrence of each of the nine verbs with the noun meeting, it was verified that these verbs are, in 
principle, compatible with the movement of events in time. 
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Each participant responded to only one variant of the question. 
 
6.2.1.3. Results 
In accordance with the predictions, the results showed that the adverb contributes to 
the interpretation and, hence, the ambiguity of the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question, with responses to [verb]  forward constructions differing from their [verb]  
backward counterparts. Concretely, overall, 72.8% of participants answered 
Monday in response to the [verb]  forward constructions, whereas 53.9% of 
participants answered Monday in response to the [verb]  backward constructions 
(Figure 4).  A logistic regression revealed a reliable effect of the adverb: χ2 (df = 1) 
= 30.00, p < .0001. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Percentage of Monday responses for [verb] forward and [verb] 
  backward questions, averaged across verbs 
 
Again, in line with the predictions, the results showed that the verb also plays a role 
in the interpretation of the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, with responses to 
the question differing across the set of verbs (Figure 5). A logistic regression 
revealed a reliable effect of the verb: χ2 (df = 8) = 56.50, p < .0001. Moreover, as 
shown in Figure 5, rush elicited the most Monday responses (87.5%) and carry 
elicited the fewest Monday responses (37.5%). In addition, the verb used in 
McGlone and Harding’s (1998) Next Wednesday’s meeting question, move, elicited 
a Monday response rate of 62.5%, demonstrating its perceived ambiguity; however, 
take and shift are depicted as the most ambiguous verbs, with the rate of Monday 
responses (50%) being matched by the rate of Friday responses (50%). 
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Figure 5 Percentage of Monday responses to questions employing different 
  verbs, averaged across adverbs (the results for  move are shown in 
  grey) 
 
Finally, the results showed an interaction between the verb and the adverb, whereby 
the difference in response to the forward and backward versions of the question 
varied depending on the choice of verb (Figure 5). This co-dependence of the verb 
and the adverb suggests a distributed semantics of temporal expressions, analogous 
to the distributed semantics found in spatial expressions (Sinha and Kuteva 1995). 
A logistic regression revealed a reliable interaction of the verb and the adverb: χ2 (df 
= 8) = 37.86, p < .0001. Moreover, as seen in Figure 5, the most dramatic difference 
in response occurs with bring and push, which elicited a Monday response rate of 
100% and 80%, respectively, for the [verb]  forward constructions and 55% and 
35%, respectively, for the [verb]  backward constructions. By contrast, for shift, the 
rate of Monday responses (50%) in the [verb]  forward construction is matched by 
the rate of Monday responses (50%) in the [verb]  backward construction. 
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Figure 6 Percentage of Monday responses to the 18 [verb] adverb 
  constructions 
 
6.2.1.4. Discussion 
A number of scholars have made the assumption that the ambiguity of the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question stems from the interpretation of the adverb forward 
(Boroditsky 2000; Kranjec and McDonough 2011), while others have suggested 
that the ambiguity may in fact be rooted in the use of the verb move (Restak 2011). 
A third possibility is that the ambiguity may arise from a combination of both the 
verb (move) and the adverb (forward). To this end, Study 9 sought to investigate the 
source of the ambiguity in the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, examining 
whether the ambiguity of the question arises from the verb (move), the adverb 
(forward), or indeed a combination of both. By comparing responses to the 
ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting question using nine verbs (move, pull, bring, 
rush, draw, push, shift, take, and carry) and two adverbs (forward and backward), it 
was shown that the interpretation of the question likely results from the interplay of 
verb and adverb. Specifically, the results showed that responses to [verb]  forward 
constructions differed significantly from their [verb]  backward counterparts, thus 
demonstrating that the adverb contributes to the interpretation and, hence, the 
ambiguity of the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. Furthermore, the results also 
show that the verb plays a role in the interpretation of the question, with responses 
to the question differing across the set of verbs. Finally, the results showed an 
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interaction between the verb and the adverb, whereby the difference in response to 
the forward and backward version of the question varied depending on the choice 
of verb. This co-dependence of the verb and the adverb suggests that individual 
lexical items do not influence the interpretations of the question in isolation. 
Instead, the locus of the ambiguity is distributed across the utterance, suggesting an 
interplay of the semantics of the verb and the semantics of the adverb. Taken 
together, this finding is consistent with the idea that, similarly to the domain of 
space, temporal expressions also demonstrate a distributed semantics. Probing 
further some additional linguistic features of the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question that may also play a role in its interpretation, in Study 10, the focus of the 
investigation is turned to that of the conceptual agent. 
 
6.3. Disambiguating the ambiguity: Grammatical agency 
 
While McGlone and Harding’s (1998) original question simply stipulates Next 
Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days. What day has the meeting 
been re-scheduled to? , in recent research, restatements of the original question have 
been devised as investigators have sought to understand additional contributors to 
temporal reasoning. For example, in their study of the effects of emotional state on 
the temporal perspective adopted, Richmond et al. (2012) created scenarios based 
on, but expanding beyond, the original Next Wednesday’s meeting question, such 
as: 
 
 You have planned to meet with your ex-partner next Wednesday whom you 
split up with 3 weeks ago in order to get your things back that you had left at 
their house. [Your ex left you 3 weeks ago and you are still deeply in love 
with them, but you know that your ex wants nothing to do with you 
anymore, and you know that you are going to feel quite depressed after 
having met with them again]. Your ex has had to move meeting up with you 
forward two days. (Richmond et al. 2012: 818) 
  
Specifically, the phrasing of the ambiguous meeting question in Richmond et al.’s 
(2012) study is divergent from McGlone and Harding’s (1998) original question in 
a number of ways. First of all, whereas Richmond et al.’s (2012) question is written 
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in the active voice, the Next Wednesday’s meeting question is written in the passive 
voice. Secondly, Richmond et al.’s (2012) question depicts an explicit third 
person—your ex—as the agent in control of moving the meeting. This contrasts 
with the original Next Wednesday’s meeting question in which an unknown, implicit 
third person agent appears to be responsible for moving the meeting. Taken 
together, these differences give rise to the question of whether altering aspects of 
the question, such as the grammatical voice (active or passive) or the personal 
pronoun (first, second or third), might influence the ways in which people reason 
about events in time. Insights from converging lines of research suggest that they 
might. The Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors both exhibit an implied 
agency: in the Moving Ego metaphor, the active self (the implied agent) moves 
forward through time towards the future, whereas in the Moving Time metaphor, 
time (the implied agent) moves forward through time towards the passive self. 
Building on this observation, Dennis and Markman (2005) sought to examine 
whether thinking about agency or passivity would influence how people think about 
time. To test this, participants were provided with a series of sentences for 
unscrambling which used either the first person subject pronoun, ‘I’ (e.g. Mary I 
bridge under kissed the “I kissed Mary under the bridge”) or the first person object 
pronoun, ‘me’ (e.g.  Mary me kissed the bridge under “Mary kissed me under the 
bridge”) before responding to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question (John 
Dennis, personal communication, July 2013). Dennis and Markman (2005) 
hypothesised that for participants who unscrambled the ‘I’ sentences, the structure 
of the sentence would prime representations of agency and hence would encourage 
the adoption of the Moving Ego perspective (answering Friday), whereas for 
participants who unscrambled the ‘me’ sentences, the structure of the sentence 
would prime representations of passivity and hence would encourage the adoption 
of the Moving Time perspective (answering Monday). The results showed that, in 
line with their predications, participants tended to answer in a prime-consistent 
manner to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, indicating that different ways of 
thinking about agency, and specifically grammatical agency, can influence how 
people reason about events in time.  
 
In addition to grammatical voice (active; passive), another way of linguistically 
indicating agency is through person pronouns (first; second; third). Recent research 
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investigating the role that grammatical person plays in modulating a 
comprehender’s perspective during narrative simulation (Brunyé et al. 2009; Sato 
and Bergen 2013) suggests that comprehenders mentally simulate events from an 
internal perspective (i.e. comprehender as agent) when presented with simple event 
sentences containing second person pronouns, such as ‘you’, and an external 
perspective (i.e. other as agent; comprehender as onlooker) when simple event 
sentences containing third person pronouns, such as ‘he’ are used (the evidence 
concerning sentences with first person pronouns, such as ‘I’ is mixed; cf. Brunyé et 
al. 2009); thus, suggesting that comprehenders may use personal pronouns as an 
indicator of their own agentive involvement in a given context. 
 
Extending these initial findings, the aim of Study 10 is to examine grammatical cues 
to agency to determine which, if any, may play a role in influencing the temporal 
perspective participants adopt in response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question. Firstly, Study 10 will examine grammatical voice as a cue to agency, 
presenting the Next Wednesday’s meeting question in both the active and passive 
voice. Secondly, the role of personal pronouns will be examined by presenting the 
question with a first person, a second person and a third person agent. Thus, in total, 
there will be six experimental conditions: first person active, first person passive, 
second person active, second person passive, third person active and third person 
passive. It is hypothesised that participants in the second person conditions, who are 
positioned as being in control of moving the meeting (e.g. You have moved forward 
next Wednesday’s meeting two days (active voice) or Next Wednesday’s meeting 
has been moved forward two days by you (passive voice)), will reason about time 
differently to participants in the third person conditions, who are positioned as not 
being in control of moving the meeting (e.g. She has moved forward next 
Wednesday’s meeting two days (active voice) or Next Wednesday’s meeting has 
been moved forward two days by her  (passive voice)). In contrast to the second and 
third phrasings of the question, the first person phrasing is ambiguous in terms of 
whether the person in control of moving the meeting refers to the comprehender or 
to the person addressing the comprehender (e.g. I have moved forward next 
Wednesday’s meeting two days (active voice) or Next Wednesday’s meeting has 
been moved forward two days by me (passive voice)) (cf. Brunyé et al. 2009); 
hence, the pattern of responses among participants in the first person condition may 
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fall somewhere between responses among participants in the second person and 
third person conditions. In line with earlier findings, which suggest that different 
ways of thinking about agency may influence how people think about time (Dennis 
and Markman 2005; Richmond et al. 2012), it is predicted that higher degrees of 
perceived agency, as conveyed by either grammatical voice or personal pronoun, 
will encourage participants to adopt the Moving Ego perspective (answering 
Friday), whereas lower degrees of perceived agency will encourage participants to 
adopt the Moving Time perspective (answering Monday). 
 
6.3.2. Study 10: Grammatical agency 
 
6.3.2.1. Participants 
108 full-time undergraduate students from Northumbria University participated in 
this study, with an age range of 19 to 26 years and a mean age of 21 years. 45 
participants were male and 63 were female. All participants were native speakers of 
English from the UK.  
 
6.3.2.2. Materials and procedure 
A questionnaire was distributed to second year undergraduates during a lecture. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions: first person active, 
first person passive, second person active, second person passive, third person 
active or third person passive. Following informed consent, participants completed 
the study using a pen while sitting down at a table. To begin with, participants 
provided demographical information (age, gender, native language and nationality) 
before undertaking the questionnaire. Participants were then instructed to imagine 
the following hypothetical scenario: 
 
First person active condition: 
 I have just emailed a colleague informing her that I have moved forward 
next Wednesday’s meeting two days. For confirmation, what day has the 
meeting been rescheduled to? 
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First person passive condition: 
 I have just emailed a colleague informing her that next Wednesday’s 
meeting has been moved forward two days by me. For confirmation, what 
day has the meeting been rescheduled to? 
 
Second person active condition: 
 You have just emailed a colleague informing her that you have moved 
forward next Wednesday’s meeting two days. For confirmation, what day 
has the meeting been rescheduled to? 
 
Second person passive condition: 
 You have just emailed a colleague informing her that next Wednesday’s 
meeting has been moved forward two days by you. For confirmation, what 
day has the meeting been rescheduled to? 
 
Third person active condition: 
 You have just received an email from a colleague informing you that she has 
moved forward next Wednesday’s meeting two days. For confirmation, what 
day has the meeting been rescheduled to? 
 
Third person passive condition: 
 You have just received an email from a colleague informing you that next 
Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days by her. For 
confirmation, what day has the meeting been rescheduled to? 
 
6.3.2.3. Results 
The results showed that personal pronoun influenced the temporal perspective 
participants adopted in response to the test questions, with 25.0% of participants in 
the third person conditions adopting the Moving Ego perspective (answering 
Friday), in comparison to 55.6% of participants in the second person conditions and 
44.4% of participants in the first person conditions. A logistic regression revealed a 
reliable effect of personal pronoun: χ2 (df = 2) = 7.29, p < .03. However, the results 
showed no effect of grammatical voice, or an interaction between pronoun and 
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voice, suggesting that voice may not have been a reliable indicator of the 
participant’s own agentive involvement in this particular context. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Percentage of Friday responses across personal pronoun conditions 
 
6.3.2.4. Discussion 
Building on insights from earlier lines of research, which suggest that level of 
agency may influence how people reason about time and their concomitant 
interpretation of an ambiguous temporal question (Dennis and Markman 2005; 
Richmond et al. 2012), Study 10 sought to investigate whether grammatical cues to 
agency may also influence the temporal perspective adopted in response to the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question, comparing responses to the question in active or 
passive voice, and responses with an explicit first, second or third person agent. 
While there was no effect of grammatical voice (active or passive) on the 
interpretation of the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, the results showed that 
personal pronoun influenced the temporal perspective participants adopted in their 
responses. Specifically, when the wording of the question indicated that the 
participant had been responsible for rescheduling the meeting (second person 
condition), participants were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective 
(responding Friday), whereas when the wording indicated that a colleague had 
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rescheduled the meeting (third person condition), participants were more likely to 
adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday). These findings are 
consistent with those reported in recent research investigating perspectival mental 
simulation during language comprehension (Brunyé et al. 2009; Sato and Bergen 
2013), which show that during narrative comprehension, second person pronouns 
such as ‘you’ promote mental simulation from an internal perspective (i.e. 
comprehender as agent) and third person pronouns such as ‘he’ encourage mental 
simulation from an external perspective (i.e. other as agent; comprehender as 
onlooker). In contrast to the second and third phrasings of the question, the first 
person phrasing is ambiguous in terms of whether the agent in control of moving 
the meeting (I) refers to the comprehender or to the person addressing the 
comprehender (cf. Brunyé et al. 2009). Consistent with these findings, the pattern of 
Friday responses among participants in the first person condition was mixed. In line 
with the assumption that the Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors each exhibit 
an implied agency, the findings indicate that the conceptual agent, as encoded via 
personal pronoun, may also play a role in the resolution of the Next Wednesday’s 
meeting question. 
 
6.4. General discussion 
 
While much research has made use of McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous 
question (and more recently, various permeations of their question), very little 
research has been conducted to examine the linguistic contributors to the different 
interpretations of the question, thus leaving unanswered questions regarding the 
factors that may contribute to its ambiguity. To this end, in order to gain additional 
insight into the nature of the ambiguity in the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, 
the focus of the investigation was turned to the linguistic properties of individual 
elements in the question; probing factors that may contribute to the question’s 
inherent ambiguity. 
 
Study 9 sought to investigate the source of the ambiguity in the Next Wednesday’s 
meeting question, examining specifically whether the ambiguity of the question 
stems from the verb (move), the adverb (forward), or indeed a combination of both. 
The results showed an effect of the adverb, with responses to [verb]  forward 
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constructions differing significantly from their [verb]  backward counterparts. 
Furthermore, there was an effect of the verb, with responses to the question 
differing across the set of verbs. Finally, there was an interaction between the verb 
and the adverb, whereby the difference in response to the forward and backward 
version of the question varied depending on the choice of verb; thus, suggesting that 
the locus of the question’s ambiguity is distributed across the utterance. This 
finding is consistent with the idea that, similarly to the domain of space, temporal 
expressions also demonstrate a distributed semantics (Sinha and Kuteva 1995). In 
addition, a growing body of psycholinguistic research gives support to the idea of 
‘constraint satisfaction’, which claims that the interpretation of an ambiguous input 
depends on the properties of individual pieces of information and combinations of 
pieces of information within an utterance (e.g. MacDonald and Seidenberg 2006; 
Trueswell and Tanenhaus 1994). The results from Study 9 thus substantiate this 
body of research. 
 
Extending earlier findings, which demonstrate that level of agency may influence 
how people reason about time and their concomitant interpretation of an ambiguous 
temporal question (Dennis and Markman 2005; Richmond et al. 2012), Study 10 
directly investigated whether different ways of thinking about conceptual agency 
may also influence how people reason about events in time by altering the 
grammatical voice (active or passive) and the personal pronoun (first, second or 
third) in the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. The findings showed that when 
the wording of the question indicated that the participant had been responsible for 
rescheduling the meeting (second person condition), they were more likely to adopt 
the Moving Ego perspective (responding Friday), whereas when the wording 
indicated that a colleague had rescheduled the meeting (third person condition), 
participants were more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding 
Monday). Concordant with the assumption that the Moving Ego and Moving Time 
metaphors each exhibit an implied agency, the findings consolidate and extend 
earlier research on the influence of agency on temporal reasoning, demonstrating 
that comprehenders may use personal pronouns as an indicator of their own 
agentive involvement in a given context in order to resolve a temporally ambiguous 
utterance. 
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Across two studies, it was shown that altering individual elements of the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question also affected the ways in which participants resolved 
the ambiguity of the question. In addition to this, the findings of the studies raise 
additional questions concerning the nature of the ambiguity of the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question. One question is why the proportion of Monday 
responses was relatively high in comparison to the proportion of Friday responses 
in Study 9, to the extent that three [verb]  forward constructions were considered 
unanimously to denote rescheduling the meeting to Monday. One possible 
explanation for this is that a frequently used lexical item already exists in English 
for conveying the deferral of an event: postpone. By contrast, there is no single 
lexical item in British English that unambiguously conveys the movement of an 
event to an earlier moment in time; instead, the closest antonym for postpone is the 
phrase bring forward (Widdowson 2003; cf. Cambridge Dictionaries Online 
2013)—one of the [verb]  forward constructions used in Study 9.20 Thus, the 
prevalence of Monday responses may be partly attributed to the fact that the [verb]  
forward constructions tested were assumed to indicate movement to an earlier point 
in time because a more direct means of expressing movement to a later point—
namely, postpone—would have otherwise been used (cf. Grice’s Maxim of Manner, 
“be perspicuous... avoid obscurity of expression” [1989: 27]). A second possible 
explanation relates to participant demographical: all of the participants in Study 9 
were university administrators who, as shown in Study 2, demonstrated a similar 
preference for responding Monday. As such, additional linguistic and lifestyle-
based factors may have also contributed to the interpretation of the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question; thus, reiterating the notion that rather than being 
attributed to a single factor, a person’s conceptualisation of time likely results from 
a culmination of factors. 
 
Secondly, it was shown in Study 10 that, while level of perceived agency may also 
play a role in the resolution of the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, this effect 
was tied to a particular means of encoding grammatical agency; namely, personal 
                                                 
20
 However, this is not the case for all dialects of English. An Indian English neologism of very 
general currency that has been coined as an antonym of postpone is prepone (Oxford English 
Dictionary 2007). The coinage of this verb exploits the morphology of English in an entirely regular 
way, as exemplified by the formation of the related, contrasting words: predate and postdate 
(Widdowson 2003). 
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pronoun. As noted, another way linguistically to indicate agency is through 
grammatical voice (active; passive); however, there was no effect of grammatical 
voice on the temporal perspective adopted. One possible reason for this is that 
expressions invoking the Moving Ego perspective can be written in the active voice 
(e.g. We’re approaching Christmas) or the passive voice (e.g. Christmas is being 
approached by us), much in the way that expressions invoking the Moving Time 
perspective can be written in the active voice (e.g. Christmas is approaching [us] ) 
or the passive voice (e.g. We’re being approaching by Christmas). Thus, the active 
voice is no more associated with the Moving Ego perspective than the Moving 
Time perspective and hence, may not be rooted in a comprehender’s level of 
perceived agency. Conversely, the Moving Ego and Moving Time perspectives 
differ in terms of the assignment of the grammatical agent: in the Moving Ego 
metaphor, the ego (the active agent) moves forward through time towards the 
future, whereas in the Moving Time metaphor, time moves forward relative to the 
stationary self (the passive patient). As such, in terms of event simulation (Brunyé 
et al. 2009; Sato and Bergen 2013), the Moving Ego perspective aligns with the 
internal perspective, whereby the comprehender is positioned as the active agent. 
By contrast, the Moving Time perspective aligns with the external perspective, 
whereby the comprehender is positioned as the onlooker. Consistent with this, the 
findings from Study 10 showed that, in response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question, second person phrasing (e.g. you have moved forward next Wednesday’s 
meeting) encouraged participants to adopt the Moving Ego perspective, whereas 
third person phrasing (e.g. she has moved forward next Wednesday’s meeting) 
encouraged participants to adopt the Moving Time perspective. Taken together, the 
findings suggest that the role of agent as encoded via personal pronoun is an 
important indicator of a comprehender’s level of perceived agency which, in turn, 
influences the adoption of a particular temporal perspective. 
 
In sum, in an attempt to gain further insight into the nature of the ambiguity in the 
Next Wednesday’s meeting question, in this chapter, the focus of the investigation 
was turned to the linguistic properties of individual elements in the question; 
probing factors that may contribute to the question’s inherent ambiguity. By altering 
the adverb, the verb and grammatical indicators of agency, it was shown that 
changes in the language of the question resulted in changes in the temporal 
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perspective adopted; thus, providing support to the notion that language 
comprehension is grounded in constraint satisfaction (e.g. MacDonald and 
Seidenberg 2006; Trueswell and Tanenhaus 1994). 
 
While McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous meeting question has, thus far, 
provided a valuable paradigm for investigating a range of factors that may influence 
how people reason about time, the results, however, raise additional questions. As 
discussed, one issue that arises from using a single experimental question is that 
measures comprising of a single item are potentially unreliable (e.g. Oshagbemi 
1999; Pollard 1996). In addition to this, Richmond et al. (2012) have drawn 
attention to the fact that, as the ambiguous meeting question refers specifically to 
the week (i.e. the calendar), as opposed to the ego, it raises the possibility that 
earlier findings may reflect properties of the English language, as opposed to being 
a function of temporal perspective per se. Thus, in an attempt to address these 
issues, Richmond et al. (2012) conducted an experiment to investigate the general 
reliability of McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous meeting question. To do 
this, they examined the consistency between participants’ responses to the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question and their responses to other ambiguous spatial, clock 
and calendar questions.21 Their findings showed that, while the level of consistency 
varied between questions, with calendar questions demonstrating the highest level 
of consistency with responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, overall, 
responses to all four types of question were consistent in their representations.22 As 
such, Richmond et al. (2012) concluded that, although the responses to the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question might be attributed, in part, to the way in which the 
calendar is used in English, responses to the spatial and clock questions produced 
relatively similar results, thereby demonstrating the robustness of the designation of 
the Moving Ego and Moving Time perspectives. 
                                                 
21
 Examples included: A book will be re-edited so that page 10 will move forward 5 pages (spatial); 
Normally an alarm clock is set for 9am but the alarm has been moved forward ten minutes (clock); 
The winter Olympics normally take place in December but the committee has moved it forward one 
month (calendar). The responses to each question were coded as either ego-moving or time-moving 
in their representation. 
22
 These findings are in line with other research, which, as mentioned previously, have similarly 
demonstrated that people tend to be consistent in their representations of time, such that people who 
imagine moving forward a meeting scheduled for Wednesday by two days to Monday (as opposed to 
Friday) are also more likely to imagine moving forward a meeting scheduled for noon by two hours 
to 10am (as opposed to 2pm) (Núñez et al. 2006). 
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Building on insights from these findings, one question is whether, as opposed to 
simply examining the consistency between responses to the Next Wednesday’s 
meeting question and responses to other ambiguous questions, cultural artefacts, 
such as calendars and clocks, might be used as mediums for directly eliciting 
responses to ambiguous temporal questions. To this end, extending research on 
space-time mappings in a new direction, the following chapter will investigate the 
role of cultural artefacts, namely calendars and clocks, in the interpretation of 
language and specifically how they might be used to resolve ambiguous statements 
about time. 
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7. Cultural artefacts 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
How do we conceive of concepts that we cannot see or touch? As discussed 
previously, one proposal is that the sensory and motor representations that derive 
from interacting in the natural environment are recycled in order to support abstract 
thought (e.g. Gibbs 1994; Kövecses 2000; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In the domain 
of time, for instance, these representations derive from the human experience of 
navigating through, orienting within and observing motion in space. Research 
examining the psychological reality of space-time metaphors has shown that spatial 
schemas may exert an important influence on the representation of time, such that 
engaging in certain types of spatial-motion thinking may influence how people 
reason about events in time and their concomitant interpretation of a temporally 
ambiguous statement (e.g. Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; Kranjec 2006; Núñez et 
al. 2006). 
 
More recently, research has demonstrated that conceptual metaphors are as much 
cultural as they are internally represented in the minds of individuals, with culture 
playing an instrumental role in shaping embodiment and, hence, metaphorical 
thought (cf. Gibbs 1999). Indeed, while the practice of using space to represent time 
may be universal, vast differences have been observed in the ways in which time is 
spatialised across languages and cultures. For instance, the future may be construed 
as in front of us (English), behind us (Aymara), below us (Mandarin), uphill 
(Yupno) or to the west (Kuuk Thaayorre) (Boroditsky et al. 2010; Boroditsky and 
Gaby 2010; Núñez and Sweetser 2006; Núñez et al. 2012). Moreover, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, a body of research lays testament to the ways in which culturally 
specific spatial representations systematically shape how people think about time. 
For instance, it has been shown that people tend to spontaneously create space-time 
mappings that are consistent with the direction of orthography in their native 
language, such that English literates will tend to arrange a sequence of events from 
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left-to-right and Arabic literates, from right-to-left (e.g. Bergen and Chan Lau 2012; 
Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010; Tversky et al. 1991).  
 
Taken together, these lines of research provide an important foundation for the 
understanding of space-time mappings, demonstrating that people’s perspectives on 
the movement of events in time are not only grounded in their experiences of 
motion in space but also in their patterns of interactions with cultural artefacts. 
Combining these two separate lines of research on space-time mappings—namely, 
research investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning and research 
investigating the culturally specific associations between space and time—the next 
step in extending the existing research is to examine whether people access 
culturally specific spatial representations of time in their interpretations of 
ambiguous metaphorical expressions about time. To do this, three studies were 
conducted investigating the use of cultural artefacts, namely calendars and clocks, 
as mediums for directly eliciting responses to ambiguous temporal questions. Study 
11 directly investigates whether responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question may be attributed to the way the calendar is used in English (cf. Richmond 
et al. 2012), comparing the responses to the original question and answer format 
with responses to the question elicited via a calendar. Building on insights from 
earlier research, which suggest that culturally specific spatial representations 
systematically shape how people think about time (e.g. Tversky et al. 1991), Study 
12 examines further the culturally specific associations between space and time and 
the role of orthography direction in temporal reasoning. To do this, responses to the 
Next Wednesday’s meeting question were elicited via a calendar and compared 
against responses elicited via a ‘reverse’ (right-to-left) calendar. Extending the 
findings from Studies 11 and 12, which investigate the role of the calendar in the 
resolution of McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question, Study 13 investigates the role of the analogue clock in the resolution of 
Núñez et al.’s (2006) ambiguous Noon meeting question (Tomorrow’s noon meeting 
has been moved forward two hours. What time is the meeting now that it has been 
rescheduled?), comparing responses elicited via a clock with responses elicited via 
a ‘reverse’ (anticlockwise) clock. Taken together, the results provide initial 
evidence that, in their interpretation of ambiguous metaphorical expressions about 
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time, people automatically access and use culturally specific spatial representations 
of extrinsic temporal reference, whereby moving forward in space corresponds with 
moving later in time. Moreover, asking participants to use a reverse space-time 
mapping causes interference, which is reflected through their temporal reasoning. 
 
7.2. The Multi-tasking challenge 
 
As shown, McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question has been used extensively in research investigating spatial influences on 
temporal thinking. In particular, it has been observed that while the ‘spatial 
schemas’ guiding the responses to the question are assumed to operate below 
awareness, participants often become aware of the ambiguous nature of the question 
immediately upon providing their response (Kranjec and McDonough 2011). This 
might be explained, in part, by the fact that while a number of studies have 
attempted to disguise the purpose of the experiment by embedding the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question within booklets containing filler tasks (e.g. 
Boroditsky 2000; Matlock et al. 2011; Ramscar et al. 2010), the ‘metalinguistic’23 
format of the question enables participants to reflect upon their response with a 
degree of awareness; thus, raising the question of whether it is possible to devise a 
context within which participants might respond to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question with a reduced awareness of the task’s objective than has previously been 
the case.24 To address this, a new study was devised, in which participants were 
recruited to take part in a Multi-tasking challenge, whereby they were instructed to 
schedule a number of events into a calendar while simultaneously watching a video 
clip and answering questions relating to the video clip. Participants’ responses to 
the Next Wednesday’s meeting question were elicited via a calendar (test condition) 
and compared against responses to the original, metalinguistic version of the 
 
                                                 
23
 Metalinguistic awareness involves the ability to think explicitly about aspects of language and 
solve linguistic problems, such as the detection of ambiguity and grammaticality (Galambos and 
Hakuta 1988; Galambos and Goldin-Meadow 1990). This requires an awareness of language as a 
system, as well as an ability to access and manipulate knowledge about the system (Bialystok and 
Ryan 1985). 
24
 It should be noted that while earlier research investigating space-time mappings have made 
deliberate attempts to conceal the objective of the experiment (e.g. Gentner et al. 2002, Experiment 
3), no such attempt has yet been made to conceal the objective of the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
disambiguation task. 
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question (control condition). In light of earlier findings, which suggest that 
responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question might be partly attributed to 
the way in which the calendar is used in English (Richmond et al. 2012, Study 1), it 
is predicted that the proportion of Monday and Friday responses will be parallel 
across the test and control conditions. 
 
7.2.1. Study 11: The Multi-tasking challenge 
 
7.2.1.1. Participants 
65 full-time undergraduate students participated in this study, with an age range of 
18 to 33 years and a mean age of 20 years. 17 participants were male and 48 were 
female. Participants were assigned to either the test or the control conditions. All 
participants were native speakers of English from the UK.  
 
7.2.1.2. Materials and procedure 
A questionnaire was distributed to a first year English language class. Following 
informed consent, participants completed the questionnaire using a pen while sitting 
down at a table. To begin with, participants provided demographical information 
(age, gender, native language and nationality) before undertaking the questionnaire. 
 
Participants were then given a multi-tasking exercise that consisted of two tasks and 
were informed that they would complete the two tasks simultaneously while 
watching a video clip. They were also informed that they would be given until the 
end of the video clip (2 minutes, 25 seconds) to complete both tasks. 
 
For Task 1, participants in the test condition were provided with a 12-month 
university events calendar which was printed on six pieces of paper back-to-back 
and were instructed to schedule three events into the calendar: 
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1. Thursday 19th January 
Kate Smith has cancelled the Solo Exhibition. Cross out the event in the 
calendar. 
 
2. Wednesday 9th May 
The meeting has been moved forward two days. Enter the new date into the 
calendar. 
 
3. Saturday 3rd March 
The Pauline Hughes Workshop has been rescheduled for the following 
Saturday. Enter the new date into the calendar. 
 
In the test condition, responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question were 
elicited by participants scheduling the rearranged date into the calendar provided. In 
the control condition, participants responded to the original, question and answer 
format of the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. 
 
For Task 2, which was a distracter task, all participants answered three multiple-
choice questions relating to the video clip, Matthew’s Day Off,25 which was 
projected onto a screen at the front of the classroom. The purpose of the distracter 
task was twofold. The first aim was to minimise participants’ engagement of 
metalinguistic awareness; thereby, allowing them to process the questions and 
provide answers to them more automatically. The second aim was to ensure that 
participants had attended to the video clip, which was assessed by whether or not 
they had answered at least two out of the three multiple-choice questions correctly. 
 
7.2.1.3. Results and discussion 
Four participants were excluded from subsequent analyses for failure to answer at 
least two of the multiple-choice questions correctly. Of the remaining participants 
(N = 61), participants in the Calendar (test) condition were more likely to respond 
 
                                                 
25
 Matthew’s Day Off is Honda’s 2012 game-day Superbowl commercial for the Honda CRV, in 
which the actor Matthew Broderick parodies his role in the popular film, Ferris Bueller’s Day Off. 
Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mP5l1_s4urU [accessed September 2012]. 
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Friday (83.9%) than participants in the Metalinguistic (control) condition (60.0%). 
Contrary to the prediction that the proportion of Monday and Friday responses 
would be parallel across the test and control conditions, a chi-square test revealed a 
reliable difference in the responses between the two conditions: χ21,61 = 4.322; p = 
0.038; Cramer’s V = 0.266. Thus, while both groups of participants demonstrated a 
preference for answering Friday, this finding raises the question of why participants 
in the Calendar condition were more likely to reschedule the meeting to Friday than 
participants in the Metalinguistic condition. One possible explanation relates to the 
notion that the left-to-right orientation of time in English does not stem from 
patterns in language (e.g. *Monday is to the left of Tuesday), but rather, from the 
left-to-right direction of orthography in Western culture. Indeed, Casasanto and 
Jasmin note that “because graphic conventions in English-speaking cultures have an 
implicit rightward directionality, English speakers have a polarised left-right spatial 
continuum which can be co-opted for time” (2012: 659). To illustrate, the calendar 
instantiates extrinsic temporal reference, whereby days are conventionally 
conceptualised as locations along a calendar’s timeline in ascending order from left-
to-right (e.g. from the 1st to the 7th) and moving rightward in space correlates with 
moving later in time (Casasanto and Bottini 2014; Kranjec 2006). Thus, in contrast 
to participants in the control condition, who ‘mentally visualised’ moving forward 
the meeting, participants in the calendar condition were predisposed to a left-to-
right space-time mapping by means of the calendar, whereby the directionality of 
forward motion is towards later times and hence moving the meeting later to 
Friday.26 
 
The findings from Study 11 thus suggest that as the calendar served to highlight the 
left-to-right orientation of time in English, responses to the Next Wednesday’s 
meeting question might be attributed to the lateral organisation of time on calendars, 
as opposed to temporal perspective per se; therefore, offering an explanation as to 
why Friday responses were more prevalent among participants in the Calendar 
 
                                                 
26
 Indeed, findings from behavioural studies have shown that the left-to-right representation of the 
mental line in Western cultures generalizes to the mental representation of ordinal sequences more 
broadly, such as the arrangement of numbers, letters, days and months. When people are thinking 
about ordinal sequences, they move along the mental line, suggesting a strong coupling between 
external physical space and internal mental space (e.g. Dehaene et al. 1993; Gevers et al. 2003). 
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condition, in comparison to the Metalinguistic condition. Taken together, Study 11 
corroborates and extends the range of research demonstrating that people 
automatically access culturally specific spatial representations that are consistent 
with the direction of orthography in their native language when reasoning about 
time (e.g. Boroditsky et al. 2010; Bergen and Chan Lau 2012; Fuhrman and 
Boroditsky 2010; Ouellet et al. 2010; Santiago et al. 2007; Tversky et al. 1991). 
Building on these findings, Study 12 sought to investigate further the culturally 
specific associations between space and time and the role that the direction of 
orthography plays in shaping people’s conceptualisations of time. 
 
7.3. The Calendar task 
 
Recent research investigating whether orthography can influence the direction and 
orientation of people’s mental timelines has demonstrated that, through exposure to 
a new orthography, it is possible to alter their space-time associations. Specifically, 
in one experiment conducted by Casasanto and Bottini (2014), Dutch speakers 
undertook a series of space-time congruity tasks, in which the instructions and 
stimuli were presented in either standard or mirror-reversed orthography. Their 
findings showed that when participants judged temporal phrases, such as ‘a year 
before’ (een jaar daarvoor) or ‘a decade after’ (een decennium daarna), in standard 
Dutch orthography, they were faster to judge past-oriented phrases by pressing the 
left button and future-oriented phrases by pressing the right button. However, after 
brief exposure to mirror-reversed orthography, their mental timelines reversed, with 
participants judging past-oriented phrases faster using the right button and future-
oriented faster using the left button. In discussing the implications of their findings, 
Casasanto and Bottini (2014) concluded that exposure to a new orthography for a 
period of time is sufficient to transiently weaken people’s culturally preferred 
space-time mapping, hence reversing the flow of time in their minds. 
 
Building on insights from Casasanto and Bottini’s (2014) findings, Study 12 
repeated the calendar rescheduling task used in Study 11, replacing the familiar 
calendar format with a reverse, right-to-left calendar that is incongruent with the 
direction of orthography in English. Specifically, English literates were provided 
with an Arabic calendar, which depicts temporal linearity from right-to-left and 
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instructed to enter the date of the rescheduled Wednesday’s meeting into the 
calendar. On the assumption that asking people to use a space-time mapping that is 
inconsistent with the direction of orthography in their native language causes 
interference (Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010), it is predicted that that there will be a 
mixed response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question among participants in 
the Reverse Calendar condition. Specifically, it is predicted that some participants 
will be guided by the direction of the reverse temporal number line (right-to-left), 
leading to a Friday response, whereas other participants will be guided by the 
direction of orthography in English (left-to-right), leading to a Monday response. To 
provide a comparison group for the results from the Reverse Calendar condition, a 
second group of participants responded to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question 
using a ‘normal’ left-to-right calendar. Concordant with the findings from Study 11, 
it is predicted that participants in the Normal Calendar condition will demonstrate a 
similar preference for responding Friday. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 The reverse calendar used in Study 12 
 
7.3.1. Study 12: The Calendar task 
 
7.3.1.1. Participants 
58 full-time undergraduate students participated in this study, with an age range of 
18 to 21 years and a mean age of 19 years. 34 participants were male and 24 were 
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female. Participants were assigned to either the Normal Calendar or the Reverse 
Calendar conditions. All participants were native speakers of English from the UK.  
 
7.3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
A two-part questionnaire was distributed to a first year history class. Following 
informed consent, all participants completed the questionnaire using a pen while 
sitting down at a table. Part 1 of the questionnaire gathered demographical 
information: age, gender, native language and nationality. For Part 2 of the 
questionnaire, participants were provided with a one-month calendar, which was 
printed on a single side of paper. In the Normal Calendar condition, the days of the 
week were positioned at the top of the calendar and arranged in ascending order 
from left-to-right. In the Reverse Calendar condition, the days of the week in 
Arabic, with an English translation underneath, were positioned at the top of the 
calendar and arranged in ascending order from right-to-left. The only event featured 
on both calendars was the meeting scheduled for Wednesday 9th May. The 
following instructions appeared underneath the calendar: 
 
 Wednesday 9th May 
 The meeting has been moved forward by two days. 
 Enter the new date into the calendar. 
 
7.3.1.3. Results and discussion 
As predicted, in contrast to the participants in the Normal Calendar condition, who 
again showed a preference for answering Friday (82.8%),27 responses among 
participants in the Reverse Calendar condition were mixed, with 51.7% of 
participants responding Friday in comparison to 48.3% of participants responding 
Monday. To determine whether the difference in responses between participants in 
the Normal Calendar condition and Reverse Calendar condition was significant, a 
chi-square test for independence was used. The chi-square test revealed a reliable 
difference in the proportion of Monday and Friday responses across the two 
conditions: χ21,58 = 6.340; p = 0.012; Cramer’s V = 0.331. Taken together, the 
findings suggest that the prevalence of Friday responses among participants in the 
                                                 
27
 Notably, the proportion of Monday and Friday responses without the distracter task is in line with 
the responses reported in Study 11, which included a distracter task. 
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Normal Calendar condition may be attributed to participants using a space-time 
mapping that is consistent with the direction of orthography in English—as found in 
Study 11. By contrast, asking participants to use a (right-to-left) space-time 
mapping that is inconsistent with the (left-to-right) direction of orthography in 
English caused interference (cf. Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010); hence, responses 
among participants in the Reverse Calendar condition were mixed. In sum, Studies 
11 and 12 provide the first studies of their kind into the ways in which people may 
use cultural artefacts, such as calendars, to resolve ambiguous metaphorical 
expressions about time. Developing this area of research, Study 13 sought to 
investigate further the role of cultural artefacts in the resolution of temporally 
ambiguous expressions by means of the clock. 
 
7.4. The Clock task 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a broad distinction that can be made in terms of 
extrinsic temporal reference between event-reckoning systems (e.g. calendars), 
which provide a means of framing events in time and time-reckoning systems (e.g. 
clocks), which either model or represent the passage of time (Evans 2013). Within 
both types of systems, further distinctions can be made between systems that are 
repeatable, open-ended, and closed. For instance, whereas open-ended systems 
relate to linear representations of time, repeatable systems are concerned with 
cyclical representations of time (Evans 2013). While people conceptualise time 
using both types of representations, recent empirical research suggests that people 
are generally biased towards linear thinking—a tendency that has been observed 
among industrialised as well as non-industrialised communities (e.g. Brang et al. 
2010; Kessell 2008; Sinha et al. 2011). For instance, recent experimental research 
on the Amazonian language Amondawa suggests that cyclicity is not relevant to the 
time interval system used in Amondawa culture (Sinha et al. 2011). In one 
experiment, participants took part in an elicitation game, which required them to 
construct schematic representations of different time intervals, e.g. the succession of 
seasons and the 24-hour diurnal cycle, by placing a series of paper plates, each 
representing an interval of time, on the ground. The results showed that all of the 
participants constructed curvilinear representations of the seasonal and diurnal 
cycles on a horizontal axis, in either a left-to-right or right-to-left direction. 
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Moreover, none of the participants produced cyclical representations of the time 
intervals. In discussing their findings, Sinha et al. (2011) posit that in Amondawa, 
the seasonal and diurnal time intervals are conceptualised in terms of ‘happenings’ 
against which other activities and events are indexed, or with which other 
happenings in the natural and social world may coincide. As such, the 
schematisation of time intervals appears to be simply in terms of succession, which 
can be spatially represented as a line (although not necessarily a straight one). 
 
In another series of experiments conducted by Kessell (2008; cf. Kessell and 
Tversky submitted, as cited in Jamalian and Tversky 2012) investigating the 
production and comprehension of cyclical and linear processes, participants were 
instructed to produce diagrams depicting cyclical processes, such as the seasons, 
and linear processes, such as making scrambled eggs. The findings showed that, as 
anticipated, participants tended to depict the linear processes in lines but, 
surprisingly, they also tended to depict the cyclical processes in lines without any 
return to the beginning. In discussing the implications of the findings, namely that 
people tend to produce linear representations of cyclical processes, Kessell (2008) 
reasons that it is easier to conceptualise events progressing forward through time 
with a beginning, a middle and end than it is to imagine events travelling in a circle, 
returning to where they started and initiating the process again. Indeed, time moves 
forward and cannot go back on itself and while each day consists of a morning, 
noon and night, each day is also unique, rather than a replication of the day 
previous. Conceptualising time as a cycle is difficult because it requires thinking 
about a series of events in terms of a general process rather than an individual 
instance (cf. Jamalian and Tversky 2012).28 
 
As research investigating space-time mappings has hitherto been focused primarily 
on linear representations of time (e.g. Casasanto and Bottini 2014; Fuhrman and 
Boroditsky 2010; Tversky et al. 1991), new research investigating cyclical 
representations of time importantly paves the way for further empirical study in this 
                                                 
28
 Notably, other lines of research investigating the ways in which people spatially represent the 
months of the year show that time-space synesthetes are more likely to depict calendars using 
cyclical representations, whereas, consistent with Kessell’s findings (2008), non-synesthetes are 
more likely to use linear rows or rectangular arrangements (Brang et al. 2010). 
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area.29 As such, whereas Studies 11 and 12 focused on linear representations of 
time, in Study 13, the attention will be turned to circular representations of time. 
Notably, calendars are typically represented in terms of horizontal rows of days that 
are sequenced in vertical rows of weeks, with earlier weeks sequenced above later 
weeks; thus, representing linear time. By contrast, an analogue clock measures time 
in cycles of seconds, minutes and hours using hands that trace a cyclic path around 
the dial; thus, it lends itself to capturing cyclical time (Evans 2013). As such, 
whereas McGlone and Harding’s (1998) Next Wednesday’s meeting question 
provides a useful tool for investigating linear representations of time, Núñez et al.’s 
(2006) Noon meeting question would be more apt for examining cyclical 
representations of time. 
 
To this end, whereas Studies 11 and 12 investigated the role of the calendar in the 
resolution of the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting question, Study 13 sought 
to investigate the role of the analogue clock in the resolution of the ambiguous 
Noon meeting question. To do this, participants were provided with a clockwise 
clock (condition 1) or an anticlockwise clock (condition 2) and instructed to 
indicate the time of the rescheduled noon meeting by drawing the minute and the 
hour hands onto the face of the clock—thus, providing a new method for eliciting 
participants’ responses to the question. Similarly to Study 12, which aimed to 
determine how participants would fare with a temporal rescheduling task using a 
reverse calendar, the purpose of the anticlockwise clock is for investigating how 
participants would resolve temporal ambiguity using a clock that is incongruent 
with the customary direction of motion around the clock. In this situation, it is 
predicted that there will be a mixed response to the Noon meeting question: some 
participants will be guided by the direction of the reverse temporal number line 
(anticlockwise), leading to a 2pm, whereas other participants will be guided by the 
customary direction of motion (clockwise), leading to a 10am response. 
 
                                                 
29
 The dearth of research on cyclical representations of time might be attributed to the fact that 
cyclical representations of time are comparatively less diverse than linear representations of time. To 
illustrate, consider the way in which the hands on an analogue clock rotate around the dial in a 
clockwise direction. The explanation for this is quite simple: the first mechanical clocks were built to 
imitate the path of a sundial shadow where, in the northern hemisphere, the shadow on the sundial 
rotates from west to north to east, i.e. clockwise (Sorensen 2011); henceforth, the clockwise rotation 
became quasi-standardised across the globe. 
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Figure 9 The clockwise clock (left) and anticlockwise clock (right) used in 
  Study 13 
 
7.4.1. Study 13: The Clock task 
 
7.4.1.1. Participants 
60 full-time students participated in this study, with an age range of 18 to 27 years 
and a mean age of 20 years. 29 participants were male and 31 were female. 
Participants were assigned to either the Clockwise or the Anticlockwise conditions. 
All participants were native speakers of English from the UK.  
 
7.4.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants were approached on the Northumbria University campus in the 
university library. Following informed consent, all participants completed a two-
part questionnaire using a pen while sitting down at a table. Part 1 of the 
questionnaire gathered demographical information: age, gender, native language, 
and nationality. For Part 2 of the questionnaire, participants were provided with a 
diagram of an analogue clock, without the minute or the hour hands, printed on a 
single side of paper. The following instructions appeared underneath the diagram of 
the clock: 
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 Tomorrow’s noon meeting has been moved forward by two hours. Draw the 
minute and the hour hands onto the face of the clock to indicate the new 
time of the meeting. 
 
7.4.1.3. Results and discussion 
As predicted, in contrast to the participants in the Clockwise condition, who showed 
a preference for depicting 2pm on the face of the clock (73.3%), responses among 
participants in the Anticlockwise condition were mixed, with 46.3% of participants 
depicting 2pm in comparison to 53.3% of participants depicting 10am. To 
determine whether the difference in depictions between participants in the 
Clockwise condition and Anticlockwise condition was significant, a chi-square test 
for independence was used. The chi-square test revealed a reliable difference in the 
proportion of 10am and 2pm depictions across the two conditions: χ21,60 = 4.444; p = 
0.035; Cramer’s V = 0.272. The findings thus suggest that the prevalence of 2pm 
responses among participants in the Clockwise condition may be attributed to 
participants using a space-time mapping that is consistent with the customary 
direction of motion around the clock, whereby moving forward (i.e. clockwise) in 
space corresponds with moving later in time. By contrast, asking participants to use 
an (anticlockwise) space-time mapping that is inconsistent with the customary 
(clockwise) direction of motion around the clock may have caused interference; 
hence, responses among participants in the Anticlockwise condition were mixed. 
 
7.5. General discussion 
 
Across languages and cultures, speakers systematically employ space to represent 
events in time. This strong space-time association is reflected in the language 
people use when talking about time, the actions people use to depict events in time 
and the artefacts cultures use to represent time. Earlier research has shown that 
spatial schemas may exert an important influence on the representation of time, 
such that engaging in certain types of spatial-motion thinking may influence how 
people reason about events in time and their concomitant interpretation of a 
temporally ambiguous expression (e.g. Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; Kranjec 
2006; Matlock et al. 2005, 2011; Núñez et al. 2006). Combining two separate lines 
of research on space-time mappings—namely, research investigating spatial 
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influences on temporal reasoning and research investigating the culturally specific 
associations between space and time—the aim of this chapter was to extend 
research on space-time mappings in a new direction. Specifically, three studies 
investigated the role of cultural artefacts, namely calendars and clocks, in the 
interpretation of metaphorical language in context. 
 
Study 11 directly investigated whether responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question might be attributable, in part, to the way the calendar is used in English (cf. 
Richmond et al. 2012), comparing the responses to the question elicited via a 
calendar with responses elicited metalinguistically. The findings showed a 
significant difference in the proportion of Monday and Friday responses across the 
two conditions, with participants in the Calendar condition more likely rescheduling 
the meeting to Friday than participants in the Metalinguistic condition. On the 
assumption that people automatically access culturally specific spatial 
representations that are consistent with the direction of orthography in their native 
language when reasoning about time (e.g. Boroditsky et al. 2010; Bergen and Chan 
Lau 2012; Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010; Tversky et al. 1991), the results suggest 
that the prevalence of Friday responses among participants in the Calendar 
condition may be attributed to the left-to-right orientation of time in English, 
whereby the directionality of forward motion is towards later times, as opposed to 
temporal perspective per se. 
 
Building on these findings, Study 12 investigated further the culturally specific 
associations between space and time and the role of orthography direction in 
temporal reasoning, comparing responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question 
elicited via an English calendar with responses elicited via a ‘reverse’ (Arabic) 
calendar. The results showed that participants in the Normal Calendar condition 
were more likely to respond Friday than participants in the Reverse Calendar 
condition, for whom the difference in the proportion of Monday and Friday 
responses was marginal. Thus, while the prevalence of Friday responses among 
participants in the Normal Calendar condition may be attributed to participants 
using a space-time mapping that is consistent with the direction of orthography in 
English, asking participants to use a (right-to-left) space-time mapping that is 
inconsistent with the direction of orthography in English caused interference (cf. 
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Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010), resulting in mixed responses among participants in 
the Reverse Calendar condition. 
 
Noting that research investigating space-time mappings has hitherto been focused 
primarily on linear representations of time (e.g. Casasanto and Bottini 2014; 
Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010; Tversky et al. 1991), Study 13 focused on circular 
representations of time, investigating the role of the analogue clock in the resolution 
of the Noon meeting question, by comparing responses elicited via a clockwise 
clock with responses elicited via an anticlockwise clock. It was found that, 
participants in the Clockwise condition were more likely to depict 2pm on the face 
of the clock than participants in the Anticlockwise condition, for whom the 
difference in the proportion of 10am and 2pm depictions was marginal. Thus, while 
the prevalence of 2pm responses among participants in the Clockwise condition 
might be due to participants using a space-time mapping that is consistent with the 
customary direction of motion around the clock, using an (anticlockwise) space-
time mapping that is incongruent with the customary direction of motion around the 
clock may have caused interference; hence, responses among participants in the 
Anticlockwise condition were mixed. 
 
In sum, the findings from this chapter provide further validation that people’s 
perspectives on the movement of events in time are not only grounded in their 
experiences of motion in space but also in their patterns of interactions with cultural 
artefacts. The results also extend prior research by showing that, in their 
interpretation of ambiguous metaphorical expressions about time, people 
automatically access and use familiar spatial representations of extrinsic temporal 
reference, whereby moving forward in space corresponds with moving later in time. 
Furthermore, asking participants to use a reverse space-time mapping causes 
interference, which is reflected through their temporal reasoning. 
 
In addition, the results from this study give rise to the question of why cultural 
artefacts have such an effect on temporal reasoning. Cultural artefacts, such as 
calendars and clocks, externalise thought (cf. Tversky 2011); thus, they provide a 
means of not only mapping temporal paths in space, but also indicating specific 
moments or events along a (linear or circular) temporal path. As such, cultural 
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artefacts simultaneously abstract and depict a model of time, thereby providing a 
more concrete form of temporal representations than purely symbolic speech. 
Cultural artefacts, thus, play a role in the extended cognitive process (e.g. Clark and 
Chalmers 1998), acting as a means of not only aiding embodied cognition, but also 
influencing it. 
 
Furthermore, the findings give support to the Mediated Mapping Hypothesis (Sinha 
et al. 2011), which suggests that time-reckoning is dependent on the cultural 
construction of counting practices based upon large number systems (Pica et al. 
2004), as well as the cultural-cognitive schema of a linear number line (Dehaene et 
al. 2008). As such, direct space-time mappings arise as a result of the combination 
of numeric symbolic cognitive processes with language which, in turn, are 
supported by historically developed cultural artefacts, such as calendars and clocks. 
 
Thus far, the chapters from Part II of the thesis have explored the role that a number 
of factors—namely, individual differences, event valence, grammatical differences 
and cultural artefacts—play in influencing people’s perspectives on the movement 
of events in time and their concomitant interpretation of temporally ambiguous 
utterances. While the findings from each chapter serve to provide greater and richer 
insights into metaphoric representations of time, all of these studies have relied on 
the interpretation of ambiguous temporal language in devised contexts. Thus, the 
aim of the following chapter is to build upon and expand beyond the existing 
research by investigating the occurrence of metaphorical expressions about time in 
natural language. 
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8. Spatial metaphors for time in natural language 
 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
As shown thus far, the nature of the relationship between space and time has been 
scrutinised extensively by researchers in the cognitive sciences. To reiterate 
Casasanto: 
 
Time has become for the metaphor theorist what the fruit fly is for the 
geneticist: the model system of choice for linguistic and psychological tests 
of relationships between metaphorical source and target domains. 
(2009: 128) 
 
Indeed, while the domain of time arguably provides the ideal arena in which to 
probe the claims made by metaphor theorists (e.g. Kövecses 2000; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999), one area that has received comparatively less attention, but 
has not been overlooked entirely, is the frequency and contexts of use of space-time 
metaphors in natural language. Similarly to Margolies and Crawford (2009), 
McGlone and Pfiester (2009) hypothesised a link between time, motion, and 
emotion; however, as opposed to relying on the interpretation of an ambiguous 
temporal question, McGlone and Pfiester (2009) sought to investigate whether the 
metaphoric correspondences between time, motion and emotion may influence the 
ways in which people encode their temporal experiences, as well as how they 
interpret encodings produced by others. Specifically, does the manner in which 
people encode their temporal experiences indicate their affective orientation 
towards events in life, such that communicators assign temporal agency to 
themselves when describing positive events but to events when describing negative 
events? To test this, in one experiment, McGlone and Pfiester (2009) employed a 
corpus-based approach to examine the relationship between event valence and 
agency in temporal communication by exploring the occurrence of Moving Ego and 
Moving Time temporal expressions in natural language and judging whether the 
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valence of the encoded event was positive, negative, or neutral. Consistent with 
their predictions, the results showed that the temporal passage of a positive event 
was more frequently encoded by the Moving Ego perspective, e.g. There is much 
optimism that we might be coming to. By contrast, the temporal passage of a 
negative event tended to be encoded by the Moving Time perspective, e.g. when the 
time comes she can’t do things and she has to be cared for .30 To investigate further 
the relationship between event valence and temporal agency, in a second 
experiment, McGlone and Pfiester (2009) asked participants to write narratives 
about pleasant or unpleasant events that they had experienced recently and rate the 
event’s pleasantness on a scale. The results showed that, while participants made 
use of both types of temporal expressions in their narratives, the Moving Ego 
perspective tended to be more frequent in narratives describing pleasant events, e.g. 
it was great hanging out in the blind and passing the time drinking beer. By 
contrast, the Moving Time perspective was more typically used in narratives 
describing unpleasant events, e.g. practically an entire hour passed while I just sat 
there. Taken together, the results suggest that the valence of an event influences the 
language people use to encode its temporal passage, with the passage of positive 
events more frequently being encoded by the Moving Ego perspective and the 
passage of negative events more often being encoded by the Moving Time 
perspective.31 In a final experiment, McGlone and Pfiester (2009) then investigated 
whether the temporal metaphors used to describe an event would influence people’s 
affective inferences about it. To test this, participants were asked to read a fictitious 
first-person account of a narrative describing the activities of a student over the 
course of a week. Different versions of the narrative were devised in which the 
target event—a conference—was encoded via the Moving Ego perspective (We are 
fast approaching the day of the peer counselling conference) or the Moving Time 
perspective (The day of the peer counselling conference is fast approaching). 
Participants then rated the extent to which the narrator appeared to be excited and 
                                                 
30
 22 space-time metaphors that can be used in Moving Time and Moving Ego expressions were 
selected for analysis, including 15 verbs, e.g. approach; come and 7 prepositions, e.g. ahead; from. 
McGlone and Pfiester’s (2009) corpus search yielded 2069 temporal tokens containing one or more 
of these key terms. 
31
 In line with the assumption that conceptual metaphors operate outside of conscious awareness 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999), debriefing interviews also showed that participants were unaware that 
different perspectives on the movement of events in time were the focus of the study, expressing 
“puzzlement and confusion” about the distinction between the Moving Ego and Moving Time 
perspectives once it had been described (McGlone and Pfiester 2009: 18). 
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worried about the arrival of the conference. The findings showed that excitement 
ratings tended to be higher among readers in the Moving Ego condition, whereas 
worried ratings tended to be higher among readers in the Moving Time condition. In 
discussing the implications of their findings, McGlone and Pfiester (2009) 
concluded that communicators tend to assign temporal agency to themselves when 
describing positive events but to events when describing negative events, such that 
people may draw inferences about a communicator’s feelings about an event based 
on the language they use to describe its temporal passage. 
 
Taken together, McGlone and Pfiester’s (2009) research provides valuable 
preliminary insights into the ways in which space-time metaphors are used in 
natural language, demonstrating that the valence of an event influences the language 
people use to encode its temporal passage, with the passage of positive events more 
frequently being encoded by the Moving Ego perspective and the passage of 
negative events more frequently being encoded by the Moving Time perspective. In 
addition to this, their results showed that when communicators encode the passage 
of events using the Moving Ego language, rather than Moving Time language, it 
invites comprehenders to infer that the speaker is more positively disposed towards 
it (cf. Margolies and Crawford 2008). Despite this, as McGlone and Pfiester’s 
(2009) line of inquiry was concerned solely with the metaphoric correspondences 
between time, motion and emotion, the conclusions that can be made are largely 
limited. To this end, the aim of Chapter 8 is to examine further the relative 
frequency and contexts of use of Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors in 
naturally-occurring temporal expressions by using the linguistic expression of 
motion events in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL MOTION as a testbed for further 
investigation. 
 
8.2. The linguistic expression of motion events 
 
Motion events can be described as situations “containing movement or the 
maintenance of a stationary location” (Talmy 1985: 85). According to Talmy (1985, 
2000), a motion event consists of six basic conceptual elements: FIGURE (the entity 
that is moving), GROUND (the locative reference object against which the Figure 
moves), MOTION (the movement itself), PATH (the direction or trajectory of motion), 
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MANNER (the way in which the Figure moves) and CAUSE (the situation that brought 
about the motion event). Theoretical work on the linguistic encoding of motion 
events has demonstrated that languages differ in the ways in which they represent 
motion events. Indeed, by studying the ways in which different languages lexicalise 
semantic components, Talmy (1985, 2000) has identified two main typological 
groups of languages: satellite-framed languages (or ‘S-languages’, e.g. Germanic 
languages) and verb-framed languages (or ‘V-languages’, e.g. Romance languages). 
These two groups of languages have been shown to differ in the ways they 
linguistically encode the components of a motion event. Specifically, when 
describing a motion event, S-languages and V-languages differ considerably in the 
attention that they pay to MANNER and PATH (Slobin 2003; Talmy 1985, 2000): S-
languages, such as English, tend to use verbs which conflate MANNER and MOTION, 
while PATH is expressed by an element other than a verb, called the satellite, e.g. 
“The man ran (MANNER OF MOTION) across (PATH OF MOTION) the street”. By 
contrast, V-languages, such as Italian, tend to encode PATH in the main verb, while 
MANNER may optionally be expressed as a participial adjunct, e.g. “L’uomo 
attraversò (PATH OF MOTION) la strada correndo (MANNER OF MOTION)” (The man 
crossed [PATH OF MOTION] the street running [MANNER OF MOTION]) (Cardini 2008). 
Notably, in V-languages, manner tends only to be expressed when it is necessary 
for the characterisation of the motion event (McNeill 2000; Özcalışkan and Slobin 
2003; Slobin 1997). 
 
In recent years, much research has been dedicated to examining the different 
lexicalisation patterns of motion events across languages. As lexicalisation patterns 
are reflected in the online use of language, speakers of S-languages and V-
languages have been shown to adopt different rhetorical styles of narratives for 
describing the same motion event (Slobin 2000, 2004). In particular, extensive 
cross-linguistic research has made use of a wordless picture storybook, Frog, Where 
Are You? (Mayer 1969) to elicit oral narratives from speakers aged from three 
through to adulthood in over 70 worldwide languages (e.g. Strömqvist and 
Verhoeven 2004 for a full bibliography of frog stories). The book consists of 24 
pictures depicting a story of a boy who, accompanied by his dog, goes in search for 
his pet frog. Their search involves a variety of different types of motion events, 
which invite a rich array of motion descriptions: the dog falls from a window; the 
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boy climbs and falls from a tree; the dog runs away from a swarm of bees; the boy 
climbs a rock and gets entangled in the antlers of a deer; the deer throws the boy 
and his dog over a cliff into a pond; and the boy and his dog climb out of the water 
and over a log to find the missing frog. According to Slobin (2005), the strength of 
the frog story lies in the wordless presentation of a readily understood plot, with 
enough complexity to allow for the in depth analysis of temporal, causal and spatial 
dimensions of events. It also provides a common content and plotline across age 
and language for comparative linguistic and narrative analysis. Research findings 
have consistently shown that, in comparison to V-languages, speakers of S-
languages use manner verbs more frequently and with greater lexical diversity when 
describing events in the frog story (Slobin 2003). 
 
Languages not only differ in the way they lexicalise the components of motion 
events, but also in the way speakers ‘filter’ their experience through language for 
purposes of speaking (Berman and Slobin 1994; Slobin 2000, 2003; cf. Ibarretxe-
Antuñano 2009). These different patterns have important effects on the relative 
‘codability’32 of the semantic domains that constitute the components of a motion 
event. For instance, as manner of motion is expressed in S-languages in the main 
verb of the clause, it is more economically expressed and thus more codable than in 
V-languages, where manner of motion is generally expressed as an adjunct. As a 
result, speakers of S-languages tend to experience lower cognitive costs when 
accessing manner information in comparison to speakers of V-languages—a 
tendency that has been experimentally observed across numerous separate measures 
of codability (Feist 2013). Thus, as S-languages make habitual use of manner verbs 
for encoding motion events, they typically exhibit larger lexicons with a complex of 
saturated and fine-grained distinctions of manner, contrary to the smaller and less-
differentiated manner lexicons in V-framed languages (Slobin 2003). For instance, 
the French verb bondir does not discriminate between the manners of motion 
encoded by the English verbs jump, leap, bound, spring, skip and gambol. 
Similarly, the Spanish verb escabullirse can be translated into English as creep, 
glide, slide, skip and slither (Slobin 2003: 163). Moreover, Slobin (2004: 251) 
                                                 
32
 Codability denotes the ease of expression of a concept. For instance, concepts expressed by a 
single word (e.g. run) are more codable than those expressed by phrases or clauses (e.g. while 
running) (Slobin 2003). 
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reports that Romance languages, Turkish and Hebrew (V-languages) have no more 
than approximately 75 intransitive manner verbs in regular use, whereas the 
Germanic and Slavic languages, Hungarian and Mandarin (S-languages) each 
contain over 150.  
 
While converging evidence from cross-linguistic research investigating the size, 
diversity of motion verb lexicon and frequency of motion verb usage suggests that 
speakers of V-languages may be less sensitive to manner of motion on the whole, 
diverging patterns have been observed among different sub-domains of motion. For 
instance, recent research has demonstrated that the S-framed Slavic languages, 
Russian and Polish, exhibit significantly fewer manner of motion verbs in the sub-
domain of AQUAMOTION than the V-framed Romance languages, Portuguese, 
Spanish and French (Koptjevskaja-Tamm et al. 2010). Other lines of research have 
also demonstrated intra-typological differences between cognates and non-cognates 
of manner of motion verbs in the sub-domain of ROTATION in Polish (which focuses 
on speed of rotation) and Russian (which differentiates between controlled and 
uncontrolled motion) (Rakhilina 2010). 
 
Thus, considering the amount of attention that the linguistic expression of motion 
events in space has received and in view of the fact that time is lexicalised in terms 
of motion in space—an area that has also been explored extensively—the study of 
the linguistic expression of motion events in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL MOTION 
appears to have been, thus far, overlooked. To address this, a brief corpus study was 
conducted. The aim of the study is twofold. The first aim is to investigate whether 
the path/manner asymmetries observed in the domain of MOTION are also evident in 
temporal metaphorical uses by specifically examining the relative frequency of 
naturally-occuring path and manner verbs in English in the sub-domain of 
TEMPORAL MOTION. The second aim of the study is to examine the relative 
frequency of Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors in naturally-occurring 
expressions denoting temporal motion. The findings of the study, although still 
preliminary, demonstrate a reverse pattern in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL MOTION 
compared to the domain of MOTION, with English exhibiting a higher proportion of 
path verbs than manner verbs for describing motion events in time. The findings 
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also demonstrate a slightly higher propoprtion of Moving Time metaphors, in 
comparison to Moving Ego metaphors, in natural language use. 
 
8.2.1. Study 14: Temporal motion events 
 
8.2.1.1. Materials and procedure 
Data analysis proceeded in four phases. In the first phase, Cifuentes-Férez’s (2008) 
taxonomy of English motion verbs was used to devise a three column table: the first 
column listed the 360 English motion verbs in alphabetical order, the second 
column specified the semantic component of each verb (e.g. ‘manner’, ‘path’) and 
the third column depicted whether the verb expressed translational motion or self-
contained motion (see Appendix 1).33 In the second phase, I used the Brigham 
Young University-British National Corpus (BYU-BNC; Davies 2004–)34 for 
calculating the overall frequency of each English motion verb in natural production, 
using the lemma of each verb, e.g. [fall].[v]35 (see Appendix 1). 60 verbs, including 
the general motion verb, move, were then excluded for encoding a semantic 
component other than ‘manner’ or ‘path’, or additional semantic components, e.g. 
‘emigrate’ (path + ground). 84 verbs involving self-contained motion were then 
excluded due to the fact that in self-contained motion, an object keeps its same or 
‘average’ location, e.g. ‘The butterfly hovered over the flower’. By contrast, in 
translational motion, an object’s basic location shifts from one point to another in 
space, e.g. ‘John entered the room’ (Talmy 2000: 35); thus, translational motion 
aligns more closely to the Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors, whereby an 
entity (ego or event) shifts from one point to another in time. As such, the 
remaining motion verb set comprised of 176 manner verbs and 40 path verbs. The 
15 most frequent manner verbs and the 15 most frequent paths verbs were then 
selected for analysis. In the third phase, I assessed the temporal frequency of each 
motion verb in natural production by extracting 200-token samples for each motion 
verb from the BYU-BNC (Davies 2004–) and identifying tokens in which the 
                                                 
33
 Cifuentes-Férez’s (2008) original codings were maintained; however, for the purpose of this study, 
motion verbs with multiple senses were conflated, an example of which includes the motion verb 
moonwalk (sense one: to walk on the surface of the moon; sense two: to dance the moonwalk). 
34
 The BYU-BNC (Davies 2004–) is an online interface to the 100-million-word British National 
Corpus. 
35
 Specifying the verb in the search input is necessary for ensuring that the search output consists 
solely of verbal forms of the word, e.g. [fall] yields instances in which fall is a noun, as well as a 
verb. 
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motion verb was used in its temporal sense (e.g. A full minute passed before he 
could move again), as opposed to its spatial sense (e.g. As soon as 
she passed the gate she could hear the sirens) or a different sense (e.g. It is not 
pleasant for a human being to pass judgment on another). I then recorded the token 
frequency of temporal tokens for each path and manner of motion verb (see Tables 
2 and 3). In the fourth phase, I examined the temporal perspective implied by each 
temporal token and coded it as either a Moving Ego or a Moving Time expression 
(see Appendix 2). Lastly, I then recorded the token frequency of Moving Ego and 
Moving Time expressions for each motion verb that yielded one or more temporal 
tokens (see Table 4). 
 
8.2.1.2. Results and discussion 
The corpus search yielded a total of 55 temporal expressions involving 12 motion 
verbs. To address the first aim of whether the path/manner asymmetries observed in 
physical motion are also evident in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL MOTION, the 
relative frequency of path and manner verbs were compared. A comparison 
revealed that path verbs were encoded by 91% of the temporal tokens, whereas 
manner verbs were encoded by 9%; thus, demonstrating a reverse pattern in the sub-
domain of TEMPORAL MOTION, with speakers of English more frequently using path 
verbs than manner verbs for describing motion events in time. In line with the 
asymmetry by tokens, the extracted temporal expressions also displayed a greater 
type frequency of path verbs, with eight path verbs (go, come, follow, reach, pass, 
enter, arrive and approach) compared to four manner verbs (travel, race, tear and 
wander). 
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Table 2 English path of motion verbs in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL 
  MOTION 
 
 English motion 
verb 
Overall 
frequency 
Temporal 
frequency* 
1 go 236313 1 
2 come 143322 7 
3 leave 60578 0 
4 follow 40602 7 
5 fall 25843 0 
6 reach 22088 3 
7 return 21364 0 
8 pass 19336 14 
9 enter 13681 1 
10 arrive 13422 2 
11 drop 10021 0 
12 cross 6706 0 
13 approach 6647 15 
14 escape 5135 0 
15 pursue 4512 0 
 
  
                                                 
* Based on the frequency of temporal instances per 200 hits. 
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Table 3 English manner of motion verbs in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL 
  MOTION 
 
 English motion 
verb 
Overall 
frequency 
Temporal 
frequency* 
1 run 38304 0 
2 walk 19882 0 
3 drive 14493 0 
4 throw 10776 0 
5 travel 8410 2 
6 shoot 7203 0 
7 ride 5022 0 
8 slip 4667 0 
9 race 3496 1 
10 rush 3025 0 
11 sweep 2949 0 
12 slide 2798 0 
13 tear 2663 1 
14 sail 2646 0 
15 wander 2306 1 
 
The second aim of the study was to examine the relative frequency of Moving Ego 
and Moving Time metaphors. An examination of the extracted instances revealed a 
slightly higher percentage of Moving Time expressions (54%) than Moving Ego 
expressions (46%) across the set of motion verbs. These numbers are in line with 
McGlone and Pfiester (2009), who similarly reported a slightly higher percentage of 
Moving Time expressions (53%) than Moving Ego expressions (47%) in their 
corpus study. 
 
  
                                                 
*
 Based on the frequency of temporal instances per 200 hits. 
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Table 4 Frequency of Moving Time and Moving Ego metaphors 
 
 English 
motion 
verb 
Semantic 
component 
Temporal 
frequency 
Moving Time 
frequency 
(%) 
Moving Ego 
frequency 
(%) 
1 go path 1 100 0 
2 come path 7 100 0 
3 follow** path 7 N/A N/A 
4 reach path 3 0 100 
5 pass path 14 100 0 
6 enter path 1 0 100 
7 arrive path 2 100 0 
8 approach path 15 53 47 
9 travel manner 2 0 100 
10 race manner 1 100 0 
11 wander manner 1 0 100 
12 tear manner 1 100 0 
 
8.3. General discussion 
 
Extending on from McGlone and Pfiester’s (2009) research investigating the 
frequency and contexts of use of space-time metaphors in natural language, this 
chapter sought to examine further the relative frequency of Moving Ego and 
Moving Time metaphors in naturally-occurring temporal expressions by focusing 
specifically on motion events in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL MOTION. 
 
Taken together, the preliminary findings suggest that, although space-time 
metaphors are attested in natural language, they are not pervasive—at least not 
among expressions denoting the passage of of temporal motion events. In addition, 
the path/manner asymmetries observed in the domain of MOTION were not reflected 
in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL MOTION. Specifically, the results showed an 
                                                 
**
 Temporal expressions containing the motion verb follow were all non-deictic, e.g. In the hours 
that follow. Thus, for the purpose of this analysis, they are not applicable, as they cannot be 
classified as either Moving Time or Moving Ego in their representation. 
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opposite pattern to the domain of MOTION, with path verbs being used more 
frequently than manner verbs for the description of temporal motion events in 
English. Secondly, the results demonstrated a slightly higher percentage of Moving 
Time expressions in comparison to Moving Ego expressions across the set of 
motion verbs. In addition to this, the results also show that, while some verbs were 
found only in Moving Time expressions (go, come, pass, arrive, race and tear; e.g. 
for months to come; a few minutes passed), other verbs were found only in Moving 
Ego expressions (reach, enter, travel and wander; e.g. before reaching pension age; 
as you enter your forties); thus, raising additional questions concerning the 
frequency and contexts of use of space-time metaphors in natural language. 
 
Firstly, one question that arises is why Moving Time expressions and Moving Ego 
expressions tended to select for different verbs. One possible explanation for this 
stems from the idea that lexical concepts36 are associated with a lexical profile, 
which constrains the range of elements that can ‘fill’ the lexical concept of the kinds 
sanctioned by different space-time metaphors. Specifically, these elements, 
captured in the form of selectional tendencies, relate to the vehicle types that can 
encode the lexical concept (the formal selectional tendencies) and the semantic 
arguments that make up the argument-structure of the lexical concept (the semantic 
selectional tendencies). For instance, deictic lexical concepts, each of which exhibit 
a unique lexical profile, can be categorised into clusters, such as [FUTURE], 
[PRESENT], [PAST], [DEGREE OF REMOVE] (Evans 2013). As illustrated by the 
expressions in Appendix 2, [FUTURE] cluster expressions, such as Christmas is 
coming and As the skiing season approaches us capture an ‘imminence’ relation: 
the target events (Christmas; the skiing season) are fixed in the ‘imminent’ future 
with respect to the location of the ego (RP), which is coincident with the experience 
of now (origo). In addition, the temporal scene is depicted from the perspective of 
the target event, which, by virtue, receives focal prominence and, hence, appears in 
the subject position. In terms of selectional tendencies for the [IMMINENCE] lexical 
concept, the VP, which is filled by a motion event, typically selects for a manner-
neutral motion verb that is directional towards an implicit deictic centre. Motion 
that is not deictic, or motion away from the ego tends to produce somewhat 
                                                 
36
 Lexical concepts constitute the semantic units conventionally associated with linguistic forms 
(Evans 2007: 120). 
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unnatural expressions, e.g. #Christmas is leaving. In addition, Evans (2013) notes 
that this lexical concept tends to select for an intransitive argument structure, with a 
subject NP (filled by the target event) and a VP, but no object argument, e.g. As the 
skiing season approaches [us] . Moreover, when the motion described does not 
intrinsically encode directional motion, an oblique, headed by a preposition, tends 
to be selected for serving this function, e.g. Christmas is coming towards us. As 
also demonstrated by the expressions in Appendix 2, [PAST] cluster expressions, 
such as The afternoon was racing by and Time was tearing along, capture an 
‘immediacy of occurrence’ relation: the target events (the afternoon; time) are 
‘occurring’ and are fixed as being past-oriented with respect to the ego (RP), which 
is concordant with the egocentric experience of the presence (origo). In addition, the 
temporal scene is viewed from the perspective of the target event, which receives 
focal prominence and is integrated with the subject NP slot. In terms of selectional 
tendencies for the [IMMEDIACY OF OCCURRENCE] lexical concept, the VP involves 
the ongoing motion of the target event by and away from the ego—that is, the 
transitioning between the presence and past. As such, it selects for the imperfective 
aspect (Evans 2013). Taken together, the findings from this study, although 
preliminary, provide additional evidence from language in natural contexts to 
substantiate Evans’ (2013) claims that there indeed appears to be selectional 
tendencies in the grammatical constructions of metaphorical expressions about time. 
 
A second question concerns the frequency of Moving Time and Moving Ego 
metaphors. Specifically, as noted, McGlone and Pfiester’s (2009) corpus search 
yielded 2069 temporal expressions, in comparison to the 55 temporal expressions 
found in this study. One possible explanation for this disparity relates to the 
difference in method employed. McGlone and Pfiester’s (2009) key terms 
comprised of 22 space-time metaphors that they considered to be both common and 
applicable for both Moving Time and Moving Ego expressions. By contrast, the key 
terms employed in this study consisted of 15 of the most frequent path verbs and 15 
of the most frequent manner verbs in the BNC, as verifed by a corpus search. Of the 
52 key terms used across both studies, there were eight overlaps: seven path verbs 
(approach; arrive; come; enter; go; pass; reach) and one manner verb (run). In 
addition to the differences in key terms, different corpora were also used. Whereas 
McGlone and Pfiester used five smaller-scale American English corpora consisting 
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of no more than 15 million words, the corpus used in this study was a larger-scale 
British English corpus consisting of 100 million words. As such, the frequency of 
Moving Time and Moving Ego metaphors may be influenced by a number or 
combination of factors, such as key terms, corpora and dialect. 
 
In sum, this chapter serves to bridge a gap in the existing literature between two 
areas of research that have received much attention in cognitive linguistics and 
related disciplines; namely, the lexicalisation of space-time metaphors and the 
linguistic expression of motion events in space. Specifically, by investigating the 
linguistic expression of motion events in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL MOTION, this 
chapter demonstrates that greater and richer insights into the metaphoric 
representation of time can be achieved by drawing on separate (but converging) 
lines of research on space-time mappings. It also highlights the value that can be 
gained by studying the frequency and contexts of use of space-time metaphors in 
natural language. 
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Part III: 
 
Evaluation 
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9. Discussion 
 
 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
What factors influence the ways in which people conceptualise time? In English, 
three distinct reference strategies are used for framing events in time: deictic t-FoRs 
situate events in relation to the ego; sequential t-FoRs position events in relation to 
one another, as part of a sequence; and extrinsic t-FoRs fix events in relation to a 
temporal matrix. As discussed, the notion of Temporal Frame of Reference takes 
account of the fact that temporal scenes can be viewed from a number of possible 
perspectives. To illustrate, the Next Wednesday's meeting question does not include 
a commitment to a specific t-FoR, but the respondent must commit to a specific t-
FoR in order to provide a response. As the question does not entail a specific t-FoR, 
the respondent has the option of choosing from all compatible t-FoRs which, in 
turn, leads to individual respondents making different choices. This offers an 
explanation as to why research has demonstrated that deictic, as well as non-deictic 
spatial schemas can be used to influence the resolution of temporally ambiguous 
utterances (e.g. Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; Kranjec 2006; Núñez et al. 
2006). Specifically, by engaging in particular types of spatial-motion thinking, 
different construals of time can be primed by activating the relevant t-FoR. In the 
case of the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, the event in question is both an 
event in the future and an event that forms part of a large-scale time interval; hence, 
deictic (Moving Time), as well as non-deictic ‘linked’ sequential spatial schemas, 
have been shown to prime Monday responses and deictic (Moving Ego), as well as 
non-deictic ‘path’ extrinsic spatial schemas, have been shown to 
prime Friday responses. 
 
While research investigating abstract thinking about time has thus far been focused 
primarily on examining the effects of spatial priming on temporal reasoning, recent 
lines of research have extended beyond this, providing preliminary evidence that 
personality differences, emotional experiences and the valence of an event may also 
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influence people’s perspectives on the movement of events in time and their 
resolution of a temporally ambiguous utterance (e.g. Hauser et al. 2009; Margolies 
and Crawford 2008; Richmond et al. 2012). Building on insights from these 
findings, this thesis extends prior work on the metaphoric representation of time, 
providing new insights into the mechanisms at work during the interpretation of 
language in context. To begin with, a series of studies were conducted to examine 
further the range of factors that may influence how people reason about events in 
time, focusing specifically on previously unexplored personality differences, 
lifestyle differences and behavioural differences (Studies 1 to 8). Next, the focus of 
the investigation was turned to the interpretation of metaphorical expressions about 
time in prescribed contexts (Studies 9 to 14). In this chapter, the thesis is drawn to a 
conclusion and the findings of these studies are reported and discussed in terms of 
the theoretical, methodological and practical issues they raise for the language 
sciences. In addition, with an aim of continuing the ongoing process of mutual 
feeding between theoretical and experimental research in the field of cognitive 
linguistics (Núñez 2007), new areas of research are suggested for further empirical 
testing. 
 
9.2. Overview: Part II 
 
9.2.1. Chapter 4: Individual differences 
 
Hitherto, research investigating abstract thinking about time has been focused 
primarily on investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning. However, while 
spatial schemas may exert an important influence on the structure and 
representation of time, people’s construals of time are not solely dependent on their 
experiences of motion in space but rather, a complex of factors. Indeed, in addition 
to time, other abstract domains, such as emotion and personality, can be understood 
in terms of motion in space (Lakoff and Johnson 1980); thus, raising the possibility 
that other abstract domains may be connected to time via shared spatial schemas. 
Building on insights from recent lines of research, which have highlighted a number 
of additional influences on ambiguity resolution in the interpretation of 
metaphorical expressions about time (Hauser et al. 2009; Richmond et al. 2012), in 
Chapter 4, six studies were conducted to examine further the range of factors that 
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may influence how people think about time and their concomitant interpretation of 
an ambiguous temporal expression. 
 
STUDY 1: EXTROVERSION-INTROVERSION 
 
To begin with, Study 1 examined the role that personality differences play in 
influencing people’s perspectives on the movement of events in time, focusing 
specifically on the personality dimension of extroversion-introversion. The findings 
revealed that, in line with an active approach to time, participants who adopted the 
Moving Ego perspective (answering Friday) in response to the Next Wednesday’s 
meeting question exhibited higher degrees of extroversion in comparison to 
participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday). 
 
STUDY 2: STUDENTS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
 
Next, reasoning that earlier research investigating the metaphoric representation of 
time have sampled student populations, but that the lifestyle of a student is not 
representative of the general population, Study 2 investigated whether lifestyle may 
play a role in influencing people’s conceptualisations of time. To test this, in Study 
2, university students’ responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question were 
compared against those from a sector of the population operating under quite 
different time pressures: university administrators. The findings showed that 
students, with their relative control over the structuring of their time and fewer 
external constraints, were more likely to disambiguate the question using the 
Moving Ego perspective (answering Friday), whereas administrators, who are more 
cognisant of external pressures and for whom time is relatively controlled by 
external demands, were more likely to use the Moving Time perspective (answering 
Monday).  
 
STUDY 3: PROCRASTINATION AND CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
 
On the assumption that the habitual movement of tasks may be a contributor to the 
temporal perspective adopted in response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
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question, Study 3 tested whether individual differences in conscientiousness (John 
1990) and procrastination (Lay 1986) may contribute to a person’s view of time 
and, hence, to their interpretation of the question. Concordant with earlier findings, 
which show that procrastinators tend to postpone action (Milgram et al. 1998; 
Milgram and Tenne 2000) and conscientious individuals tend to prioritise action 
(Back et al. 2006; John and Srivastava 1999), the results showed that participants 
who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (answering Friday) averaged higher 
procrastination scores and lower conscientiousness scores in comparison to 
participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective (answering Monday). 
 
STUDY 4: TRAVELLING TO WORK 
 
Noting that recent research investigating the effects of personality differences on 
the resolution on temporal ambiguity have relied on participants’ self-reported 
assessments of personality variables, three studies examined whether these 
relationships have force in real life by testing whether, in addition to self-reported 
conscientiousness and procrastination, there is a relationship between conscientious 
and procrastinating behaviours and temporal perspective. To begin with, Study 4 
compared participant’s responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question against 
the extent to which they were on schedule for work (i.e. if they were early, on time, 
or late). In line with earlier findings, which indicate that high degrees of self-
reported conscientiousness are demonstrably related to the Moving Time 
perspective (Study 3) and that conscientious behaviour is associated with 
punctuality (Ashton 1998; Back et al. 2006), the findings showed that people who 
adopted the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday), were more likely to be 
running early in comparison to people who adopted the Moving Ego perspective 
(responding Friday). 
 
STUDIES 5 AND 6: THE ASSIGNMENT SUBMISSION AND THE SCHEDULED 
APPOINTMENT 
 
Moving beyond self-assessment of timeliness, to examine whether the observed 
effects have real world consequences, Studies 5 and 6 sought evidence of a 
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relationship between more objectively observable on-time behaviours and 
metaphorical perspectives of time. Specifically, Study 5 investigated whether 
students submitting their assignment closer to the deadline would think about time 
differently in comparison to students submitting their assignment further in advance 
of the deadline, as demonstrated by their response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question. Next, Study 6 investigated the relationship between temporal perspective 
and timeliness for a scheduled appointment, comparing participant’s time of arrival 
against their resolution of temporal ambiguity, using two new temporal reasoning 
questions: the Noon meeting question and the October meeting question. 
Concordant with earlier findings, the results from Studies 5 and 6 showed that 
participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective were tending to their 
obligations earlier on average compared to participants who adopted the Moving 
Ego perspective, suggesting that the earlier effects have observable consequences, 
as evidenced by more objectively measureable real-life behaviours. 
 
In sum, building on recent research findings (e.g. Hauser et al. 2009; Richmond et 
al. 2012), the results from Chapter 4 provide further evidence of the range of 
individual differences that may influence how people reason about time, while also 
providing initial evidence that individual differences in time management as 
observed in real-life contexts may influence how people resolve temporal 
ambiguities. In addition, by drawing on additional measures of adopted temporal 
perspective, these studies generalise previous findings to temporal reasoning at 
different time scales, suggesting a consistency between temporal reasoning and the 
ways in which people conceptualise the movement of events in time. 
 
9.2.2. Chapter 5: Event valence 
 
Moving beyond factors that are directly tied to the individual, in other lines of 
research investigating the metaphoric representation of time, it has been shown that 
the valence of the event, and specifically the comprehender’s affective orientation 
towards the event, may also influence the resolution of a temporally ambiguous 
utterance, thus providing new insights on metaphor and its ability to reflect people’s 
thinking and feelings (Margolies and Crawford 2008; Lee and Ji 2013; Ruscher 
2011). To examine further the ways in which the valence of an event, the life 
145 
 
experiences and personality of the comprehender and metaphorical perspectives of 
time are interrelated, in Chapter 5, two studies were conducted to investigate 
whether the interpretation of a temporally ambiguous question may arise from an 
interaction between the valence of the event and aspects of the personality and 
lifestyle of the comprehender.  
 
STUDY 7: NEXT WEDNESDAY’S PARTY 
 
Firstly, Study 7 sought to examine further the interaction between individual 
differences in personality and event valence on temporal reasoning, focusing 
specifically on the personality dimension of extroversion-introversion. Specifically, 
the aim was to investigate whether differences between the social-seeking 
behaviours of extroverts and the social-withdrawing behaviours of introverts would 
be reflected in their resolution of the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s party question. 
Contrary to the prediction that extroverts would be more likely to imagine 
themselves approaching a social event (viewing it positively) and introverts would 
be more likely to imagine a social event approaching themselves (viewing it 
negatively), the finding showed that the difference in self-reported extroversion 
scores between participants adopting the Moving Ego perspective (responding 
Friday) and those adopting the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday) was 
marginal. Thus, although extroverts might be more likely to imagine themselves 
approaching events (in line with the Moving Ego perspective), particularly social 
situations (Lucas et al. 2000), this effect may be undermined by the tendency to 
want an enjoyable and sociable event, such as a party, to occur sooner (in line with 
the Moving Time perspective) (cf. Margolies and Crawford 2008). 
 
STUDY 8: NEXT WEDNESDAY’S ASSIGNMENT DEADLINE 
 
Next, probing further the ways in which the valence of an event, the life experiences 
of the comprehender and metaphorical perspectives of time are interrelated, Study 8 
investigated the effects of event valence on students’ resolution of temporal 
ambiguity using a focal event that features on all academic calendars: the 
assignment deadline. In line with the assumption that assignment deadlines are one 
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of the most prominent causes of stress among students (Kohn and Frazer 1986) and 
that people tend to feel worse about the rescheduling of a negative event when it is 
moved earlier in time (Margolies and Crawford 2008), the results showed that, in 
response to the Next Wednesday’s assignment deadline question, participants who 
felt better about the rescheduling of the event were more likely to adopt the Moving 
Ego perspective (indicated by Friday and I am approaching the event responses). 
By contrast, participants who felt worse about the rescheduling of the event were 
more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective (indicated by Monday and The 
event is approaching me responses). Moreover, consistent with other lines of 
research, which suggest that people are more likely to imagine a negative future 
event approaching themselves (Lee and Ji 2013; Margolies and Crawford 2008), the 
student population displayed a tendency for disambiguating the Next Wednesday’s 
assignment deadline question in line with the Moving Time perspective. In sum, the 
results from Study 8 provide additional evidence that the interpretation of an 
ambiguous temporal question may arise from an interaction between the 
comprehender’s affective orientation towards the event and aspects of their 
lifestyle. 
 
9.2.3. Chapter 6: Grammatical differences 
 
While much research has made use of McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous 
question (and more recently, various permeations of their question), very little 
research has been conducted to probe the linguistic contributors to the different 
interpretations of the question, leaving unanswered questions regarding the factors 
that may contribute to its ambiguity. To this end, in Chapter 6, the focus of the 
investigation was turned to the linguistic properties of individual elements in the 
question; probing factors that may contribute to the question’s inherent ambiguity. 
 
STUDY 9: NEXT WEDNESDAY’S MEETING – VERB VS. ADVERB 
 
To begin with, Study 9 sought to investigate the source of the ambiguity in the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question, examining whether the locus of the ambiguity is 
centred on the adverb forward (cf. Boroditsky 2000; Kranjec and McDonough 
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2011), centred on the verb move (cf. Restak 2011), or a combination of both. By 
comparing responses to the ambiguous question using nine verbs (move, pull, bring, 
rush, draw, push, shift, take and carry) and two adverbs (forward and backward), it 
was shown that the interpretation of the question likely results from the interplay of 
verb and adverb, with responses to [verb]  forward constructions differing from 
their [verb]  backward counterparts and responses to the question differing across 
the set of verbs. In addition, the results showed an interaction between the verb and 
the adverb, with the difference in response to the forward and backward version of 
the question varying depending on the choice of verb. This co-dependence of the 
verb and the adverb suggests that individual lexical items do not influence the 
interpretations of the question in isolation. Instead, the locus of the ambiguity is 
distributed across the utterance, suggesting an interplay of the semantics of the verb 
and the semantics of the adverb, analogous to the distributed semantics observed in 
the domain of space (Sinha and Kuteva 1995). 
 
STUDY 10: NEXT WEDNESDAY’S MEETING – GRAMMATICAL AGENCY 
 
Building on insights from earlier lines of research, which demonstrate that level of 
agency may influence how people reason about time and their concomitant 
interpretation of an ambiguous temporal question (Dennis and Markman 2005; 
Richmond et al. 2012), Study 10 directly investigated whether different ways of 
thinking about conceptual agency may also influence temporal reasoning by altering 
the grammatical voice (active or passive) and the personal pronoun (first, second or 
third) in the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. The results showed that, while 
there was no effect of grammatical voice (active or passive) on the interpretation of 
the question, personal pronoun influenced the temporal perspective participants 
adopted in their responses. Specifically, when the wording of the question implied 
that the participant had been responsible for rescheduling the meeting (second 
person condition), participants were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego 
perspective (responding Friday). By contrast, when the wording indicated that a 
colleague had rescheduled the meeting (third person condition), participants were 
more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday). In line 
with the assumption that the Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors each exhibit 
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an implied agency, the findings consolidate and extend earlier research on the 
influence of agency on temporal reasoning, demonstrating that comprehenders may 
use personal pronouns as an indicator of their own agentive involvement in a given 
context in order to resolve an ambiguous temporal question. 
 
In sum, in order to gain further insight into the nature of the ambiguity in the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question, the focus of the investigation in Chapter 6 was 
turned to the linguistic properties of individual elements in the question. By altering 
the adverb, the verb and grammatical indicators of agency, it was shown that 
changes in the language of the question resulted in changes in the temporal 
perspective adopted in response to the question; thus, providing support to the 
notion that the interpretation of an ambiguous input depends on the properties of 
individual pieces of information and combinations of pieces of information within 
an utterance (e.g. MacDonald and Seidenberg 2006; Trueswell and Tanenhaus 
1994). 
 
9.2.4. Chapter 7: Cultural artefacts 
 
Spatial representations of time are pervasive across the world. This strong space-
time association is reflected in the language people use when talking about time, the 
actions people use to depict events in time and the artefacts cultures use to represent 
time. While the practice of using space to represent time is shared by many 
languages and cultures, vast differences have been observed in the ways in which 
time is laid out in space. Specifically, a body of research lays testament to the ways 
in which culturally specific spatial representations systematically shape how people 
think about time (e.g. Boroditsky et al. 2010; Casasanto and Bottini 2014; Bergen 
and Chan 2012; Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010; Tversky et al. 1991). In other lines 
of research, it has also been shown that spatial schemas may exert an important 
influence on the representation of time, such that engaging in certain types of 
spatial-motion thinking may influence how people reason about events in time and 
their concomitant interpretation of a temporally ambiguous expression (e.g. 
Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; Kranjec 2006; Matlock et al. 2005, 2011; Núñez et 
al. 2006). Combining these two separate lines of research on space-time 
mappings—namely, research investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning 
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and research investigating the culturally specific associations between space and 
time—the aim of Chapter 7 was to extend research on space-time mappings in a 
new direction. To do this, three studies were conducted to investigate the role of 
cultural artefacts, namely calendars and clocks, in the interpretation of metaphorical 
language in context and specifically how they might be used to resolve ambiguous 
statements about time.  
 
STUDY 11: THE MULTI-TASKING CHALLENGE 
 
Firstly, Study 11 directly tested whether responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question might be attributable, in part, to the way the calendar is used in English (cf. 
Richmond et al. 2012). To do this, responses to the question elicited via a calendar 
were compared against responses elicited metalinguistically. The results revealed a 
significant difference in the proportion of Monday and Friday responses across the 
two conditions, with participants in the Calendar condition more likely rescheduling 
the meeting to Friday than participants in the Metalinguistic condition. On the 
assumption that people automatically access culturally specific spatial 
representations that are consistent with the direction of orthography in their native 
language when reasoning about time (e.g. Boroditsky et al. 2010; Bergen and Chan 
Lau 2012; Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010; Tversky et al. 1991), the results indicate 
that the prevalence of Friday responses among participants in the Calendar 
condition may be attributed to the left-to-right orientation of time in English, 
whereby the directionality of forward motion is towards later times, as opposed to 
temporal perspective per se. 
 
STUDY 12: THE CALENDAR TASK 
 
Extending these findings, Study 12 sought to investigate further the culturally 
specific associations between space and time and the role of orthography direction 
in temporal reasoning. To do this, responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
question elicited via an English calendar were compared against responses elicited 
via a ‘reverse’ (right-to-left) calendar. The findings revealed that participants in the 
Normal Calendar condition were more likely to respond Friday than participants in 
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the Reverse Calendar condition, for whom the difference in the proportion of 
Monday and Friday responses was marginal. Taken together, the findings suggest 
that, while the prevalence of Friday responses among participants in the Normal 
Calendar condition may be attributed to participants using a space-time mapping 
that is congruent with the direction of orthography in English, asking participants to 
use a (right-to-left) space-time mapping that is incongruent with the direction of 
orthography in English causes interference (cf. Fuhrman and Boroditsky 2010); 
hence, responses among participants in the Reverse Calendar condition were mixed. 
 
STUDY 13: THE CLOCK TASK 
 
Extending the findings from Studies 11 and 12, which investigated the role of the 
calendar in the resolution of McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question, Study 13 investigated the role of the analogue clock 
in the resolution of Núñez et al.’s (2006) ambiguous Noon meeting question, 
comparing responses elicited via a clockwise clock with responses elicited via a 
‘reverse’ (anticlockwise) clock. The results showed that participants in the 
Clockwise condition were more likely to depict 2pm on the face of the clock than 
participants in the Anticlockwise condition, for whom the difference in the 
proportion of 10am and 2pm depictions was marginal. Thus, while the prevalence of 
2pm responses among participants in the Clockwise condition might be due to them 
using a space-time mapping that is consistent with the customary direction of 
motion around the clock, asking participants to use an (anticlockwise) space-time 
mapping that is inconsistent with the customary direction of motion around the 
clock may have caused interference; thus, resulting in a mixed response among 
participants in the Anticlockwise condition. 
 
Taken together, the findings from Chapter 7 provide additional evidence that 
people’s perspectives on the movement of events in time are not only grounded in 
their experiences of motion in space, but also in their patterns of interactions with 
cultural artefacts. Furthermore, the results extend prior research by demonstrating 
that, in their interpretation of ambiguous metaphorical expressions about time, 
people automatically access and use familiar spatial representations of extrinsic 
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temporal reference, whereby moving forward in space corresponds with moving 
later in time. Moreover, asking participants to use a reverse space-time mapping 
creates interference, which is reflected through their temporal reasoning. 
 
9.2.5. Chapter 8: Space-time metaphors in natural language 
 
While the nature of the relationship between space and time has been scrutinised 
extensively by researchers in the cognitive sciences, one area that has received 
comparatively less attention is the frequency and contexts of use of space-time 
metaphors in natural language. Extending McGlone and Pfiester’s (2009) research, 
which provides valuable initial insights into the ways in which space-time 
metaphors are used in the passage of positively and negatively valenced events in 
natural language, in Chapter 8, a brief corpus study was conducted to examine 
further the relative frequency and contexts of use of Moving Ego and Moving Time 
metaphors in the description of temporal motion events. 
 
STUDY 14: TEMPORAL MOTION EVENTS 
 
The aim of Study 14 was twofold. The first aim was to investigate whether the 
path/manner asymmetries observed in the domain of MOTION are also evident in 
temporal metaphorical uses by examining the relative frequency of naturally-
occuring path and manner verbs in English in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL 
MOTION. The second aim was to examine the relative frequency of Moving Ego and 
Moving Time metaphors in naturally-occurring temporal expressions. The findings 
of the study, although still preliminary, suggest that, although space-time metaphors 
are attested in natural language, they are not pervasive—at least not among 
expressions denoting the passage of of temporal motion events. In addition, the 
path/manner asymmetries observed in the domain of MOTION were not reflected in 
the sub-domain of TEMPORAL MOTION. Specifically, the results showed an opposite 
tendency to the domain of MOTION, with path verbs being used more frequently than 
manner verbs for the description of temporal motion events in English. Secondly, 
the results demonstrated a slightly higher percentage of Moving Time expressions 
in comparison to Moving Ego expressions across the set of motion verbs. 
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9.2.6. General remarks 
 
In sum, by adapting McGlone and Harding’s (1998) Next Wednesday’s meeting 
disambiguation paradigm, scholars in the cognitive sciences have provided evidence 
for the psychological reality of three distinct spatial construals of time, with 
demonstrations that deictic spatial schemas (Boroditsky 2000; Boroditsky and 
Ramscar 2002), sequential spatial schemas (Núñez 2007; Núñez et al. 2006) and 
extrinsic spatial schemas (Kranjec 2006) can be used to influence how people think 
about time and their concomitant interpretation of an ambiguous temporal question. 
More recently, research has extended beyond investigating the effects of spatial 
influences on temporal reasoning, providing preliminary evidence that personality 
differences, emotional experiences and the valence of an event may also influence 
people’s perspectives on the movement of events in time (e.g. Hauser et al. 2009; 
Margolies and Crawford 2008; Richmond et al. 2012). By building on and 
extending the findings of prior research, this thesis serves to shed light on the 
mechanisms at work during the interpretation of language in context, providing a 
more fully explanatory framework for the metaphoric representation of time. 
Specifically, taken together, the results demonstrate that the interpretation of 
metaphorical language about time in context is modified by the strength and 
relevance of multiple sources, ranging from linguistic cues and contextual features 
to individual differences, which interact in order to create meaning. These findings 
are concordant with other lines of cognitive linguistic research concerning 
individual differences in language knowledge, which demonstrate that 
comprehenders’ performances are influenced by a number of factors, such as 
frequency and lexical specificity (e.g. Street and Dąbrowska 2010, 2014). In 
addition, these findings provide additional support for psycholinguistic research on 
constraint-based processing (e.g. MacDonald and Seidenberg 2006; Trueswell and 
Tanenhaus 1994), which stipulates that a myriad of information sources play an 
immediate role in the comprehension of words and sentences. Indeed, 
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to reiterate Farmer et al.: 
 
 …comprehenders use all salient and reliable sources of information, as soon 
 as possible, to guide their interpretation of an incoming linguistic signal. 
 Indeed, many  factors... may influence how an incoming string of words is 
 processed. (2012: 354) 
 
In this regard, the processing of metaphorical expressions about time, and, in 
particular, the resolution of temporal ambiguity, is no exception. Nevertheless, it is 
important to acknowledge that this research is not without its limitations. Indeed, 
the studies undertaken in this thesis give rise to a number of additional research 
questions which require future investigation. 
 
9.3. Future research 
 
9.3.1. Implications for cross-linguistic research 
 
Hitherto, the vast majority of research examining the interpretation of ambiguous 
metaphorical expressions about time has been conducted in English; thus, greater 
and richer insights into metaphoric representations of time might be achieved, 
firstly, by extending the number of languages under investigation. Indeed, while 
cross-linguistic research in this area is comparatively scarce (see Bender et al. 2005, 
2010 for German, Mandarin and Tongan; Elvevåg et al. 2011 for Dutch; Lai and 
Boroditsky 2013 for Mandarin), preliminary cross-linguistic research findings 
suggest that the language itself may play a role in the interpretive possibilities 
available to a comprehender. For instance, Elvevåg et al. (2011) examined 
interpretations of the Next Wednesday’s meeting question among Dutch speakers, 
the results of which showed that, similarly to English, the question elicited both 
Monday and Friday responses. As such, although preliminary research suggests that 
when translated into some languages, the question remains ambiguous, other lines 
of research have shown that this is not universally the case: when the question is 
translated into German, using the term vorverlegen for ‘moved forward’, the vast 
majority of participants responded Monday (Bender et al. 2005), indicating that the 
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German translation of the question is not truly ambiguous. A similar preference for 
responding Monday has also been observed among speakers of Mandarin (Bender et 
al. 2010; Lai and Boroditsky 2013). In addition, anecdotal evidence which, pending 
further empirical analysis, should be taken with some caution, suggests that in other 
languages, such as Czech (Mirjam Fried, personal communication, August 2011), 
Finnish (Tuomas Huumo, personal communication,  August 2011), Italian (Claudia 
Baldoli, personal communication,  July 2011) and Ukrainian (Olga Pykhtina, 
personal communication,  August 2011), Friday is the only possible response. As 
such, whether or not multiple competing interpretations are available in the 
language being examined is a factor that should be taken into consideration in 
further cross-linguistic research in this area. Moreover, given that language itself 
may play a role in the interpretive possibilities available to a comprehender, these 
findings also highlight, as a method of best practice, the necessity of surveying 
participants’ native languages, as the interpretation of the question in a participant’s 
L1 may influence their interpretation of the question in L2. For instance, a native 
speaker of German might be more likely to infer an L1 interpretation and 
respond Monday to the question in English.37 
 
Tying in with the findings from Chapter 7, which make use of cultural artefacts as 
mediums for directly eliciting responses to ambiguous temporal questions, follow-
up research might build upon these preliminary findings by examining whether the 
patterns observed vary systematically across languages and cultures. For instance, 
because graphic conventions in Arabic-speaking cultures have an implicit leftward 
directionality, Arabic literates have a polarized right-left spatial continuum which 
can be co-opted for time (e.g. Tversky et al. 1991). Thus, one question that arises is 
when would Arabic participants move forward Wednesday’s meeting to if they 
were provided with an Arabic calendar which highlights the right-to-left orientation 
of time in Eastern culture? Similarly, speakers of Mandarin frequently make use of 
vertical metaphors for talking about events in time (e.g. Scott 1989; Yu 1998); thus, 
how would Mandarin participants resolve the Next Wednesday’s meeting question if 
                                                 
37
 All experiments in this thesis explicitly surveyed the participants’ native language. As all 
participants were native speakers of English, cross-linguistic influences can be ruled-out as a 
potential contributor. 
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they were provided with a vertical calendar that highlights the up-to-down 
orientation of time reflected linguistically in Mandarin? 
 
Also, building on the findings of Chapter 8, which demonstrate a higher proportion 
of path verbs than manner verbs in English for describing motion events in time, as 
well as selectional tendencies in the grammatical constructions of temporal motion 
expressions, the next step in extending this research would be to examine these 
patterns of usage in other languages. Of particular interest is whether V-languages, 
such as Spanish, would display a similar tendency to English for the path/manner 
asymmetries in the domain of MOTION to be divergent from those observed in the 
sub-domain of TEMPORAL MOTION. 
 
In sum, by extending the number of languages under investigation and the methods 
of assessment, it may be possible to achieve a more fully explanatory framework for 
the metaphoric representation of time. 
 
9.3.2. Implications for theories of metaphor 
 
Recently, at the 12th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, cognitive 
linguists were encouraged to: (i) ‘look back’, taking stock of the past 25 years of 
research in cognitive linguistics; (ii) ‘look forward’, considering the next generation 
of cognitive linguistics research; and (iii) ‘look outward’, extending research to 
understudied populations and applications, particularly in regard to endangered 
languages and signed languages (ICLC-12, June 2013). While recent metaphor 
research, especially in the domains of space and time, has taken heed of the notion 
‘looking outward’, by investigating spatial representations of time among an 
increasing range of indigenous communities,38 the question remains of how it is 
possible to ‘look forward’ and pave the way for the next generation of metaphor 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 Examples include: Amondawa (Sinha et al. 2011); Aymara (Núñez and Sweetser 2006); Mian 
(Fedden and Boroditsky 2012); Pormpuraaw (Boroditsky and Gaby, 2010); Tzeltal (Brown 2012); 
Yélî Dnye (Levinson and Majid 2013); Yucatec Mayas (Le Guen and Balam 2012); and Yupno 
(Núñez et al. 2012). 
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research. With the advent of new interactive technologies, one possible solution is 
to turn our focus to the role that emerging cultural artefacts play in creating wider 
cognitive and computational webs (cf. Gibbs 1999). In particular, for future 
research, the iGeneration (born after 1999, Pendergast 2009; Rosen 2010) may 
provide a rich testbed for investigating whether people’s interactions with digital 
cultural artefacts shape embodiment and, hence, metaphorical thought. 
 
There has, for instance, been a recent surge of videos on YouTube depicting 
‘technotoddlers’ interacting with a range of digital technologies, the most prominent 
of which is the iPad (Wohlwend 2013). One video entitled, A Magazine is an iPad 
That Does Not Work,39 shows a toddler using her fingers to press, tap, swipe and 
pinch on the screen of an iPad. Subsequently, she attempts to use the same finger 
movements on the pages of a magazine but appears perplexed and loses interest 
when the magazine is unresponsive to her actions. While such casual observations 
should be interpreted with some caution, recent research from the field of 
neuroscience suggests that digital cultural artefacts are indeed radically altering the 
ways in which young minds are developing and functioning (e.g. Small et al. 2009; 
Small and Vorgan 2008). Taken together, these findings raise the question of how 
new cultural artefacts may, consequently, be influencing metaphoric thought. To 
illustrate, consider the ways in which people interact with touch screen calendars on 
smart devices. The iPad (iOS 7), for example, enables users to alternate between 
different ‘views’ of time, each of which is understood through different space-time 
metaphors: in the ‘day’ view and the ‘month’ view, users advance through the hours 
of the day and the months of the year by vertically swiping the screen upwards (UP 
IS EARLIER; DOWN IS LATER), whereas in the ‘week’ view, users move later through 
the days of the week by horizontally swiping the screen leftwards (LEFT IS EARLIER; 
RIGHT IS LATER). Thus, by automatically alternating between different space-time 
metaphors—namely, UP IS EARLIER and LEFT IS EARLIER—digital cultural artefacts 
dictate a necessity for users to be flexible in their representations of time, as they  
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uqF2gryy4Gs (CBSNewsOnline 2011) [accessed 
November 2013]. 
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switch to thinking about different time spans on different timescales (cf. Casasanto 
and Jasmin 2012).40 
 
In addition, while recent lines of metaphor research have begun exploring the 
cognitive and neural basis of metaphor, the focus has largely been centred on the 
processing of metaphor as a function of language-related factors, such as novelty, 
interpretability and valence (e.g. Cardillo et al. 2010; Schmidt and Seger 2009; 
Subramaniama et al. 2012). Drawing on the assumption that conceptual metaphors 
are as much internally represented in the minds of individuals as they are spread out 
into the social and cultural world (Gibbs 1999), new insights into the ‘metaphorical 
brain’ (cf. Lai and Coulson in preparation) might similarly be gained by extending 
the neuroscientific investigation of metaphor out into the digital world; thereby, 
exploring metaphor processing as a function of interactions with digital cultural 
artefacts. Furthermore, future research in cognitive linguistics would benefit from 
exploring the roles that cultural artefacts—both existing and emerging—play in 
shaping metaphoric thought. 
 
9.4. Conclusion 
 
By building upon and extending earlier lines of research on space-time mappings, 
the overall aim of this thesis was to shed light on the mechanisms at work during 
the interpretation of language in context, providing a more fully explanatory 
framework for the metaphoric representation of time. This aim was achieved 
through a series of studies that were conducted to examine further the range of 
factors that may influence how people reason about events in time and by 
investigating further the interpretation of metaphorical expressions about time in 
prescribed contexts. Taken together, the results reported in this thesis have yielded 
                                                 
40
 It should be noted that recent research has sought to distinguish between two fundamentally 
different representations of deictic time: one with an ‘internal’ perspective, where the deictic centre 
(the ego) correlates with the present and metaphorically signifies the experience of now and a second 
with an ‘external’ perspective, where the deictic centre is displaced to an external vantage point, 
which is perpendicular to the axis on which time is represented (Casasanto and Jasmin 2012; Núñez 
and Cooperrider 2013). Moreover, recent research on temporal gestures proposes that, in their 
conceptualisation of external deictic time, people adopt a ‘Moving Attention’ perspective (as 
opposed to a Moving Ego or Moving Time perspective), which is grounded in patterns of interaction 
with cultural artefacts (as opposed to patterns of interaction with the natural environment) 
(Casasanto and Jasmin 2012). 
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some original and valuable data, which should be of interest to practitioners and 
academics in the language sciences. They also provide the opportunity for a number 
of future research studies in this area. 
 
Arguably, research on space-time mappings—both empirical and theoretical—is 
growing at a faster pace than any other area of research in the field cognitive 
linguistics. Thus, although the results reported in this thesis have yielded some 
innovative insights, a conservative approach should be adopted in their 
interpretation. Specifically, as progress continues to be made in this area of 
research, a reappraisal of the current findings might be necessitated in the future. 
Indeed, theoretical developments generate new hypotheses for empirical testing, 
dictate what experimental distinctions to make and allow for new theoretical 
interpretations of existing empirical results which are, in turn, fed back into the 
process. To reiterate Núñez (2007), knowledge attainment in cognitive linguistics 
involves developments not only in linguistics and psychology, but also in 
neuroscience, anthropology and other related disciplines. It is through this 
continuing process of mutual feeding that further insight into and greater 
understanding of the metaphoric representation of time is also perpetuated. 
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 Appendices 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Frequency of English motion verbs 
 
English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
abandon 4253 Transl Path 
accelerate 1046 Transl Manner 
accompany 4663 Transl Figure + Co-motion 
advance 2925 Transl Path 
alight 338 Transl Path 
amble 165 Transl Manner 
approach 6647 Transl Path 
arise 9450 Self-c / Transl Manner 
arrive 13422 Transl Path 
ascend 323 Transl Path 
back 4150 Transl Path 
backpack 60 Transl Manner 
balloon 62 Transl Manner 
bend 3259 Self-c Manner 
bicycle 42 Transl Manner 
bike 68 Transl Manner 
blow 4730 Transl Cause 
boat 64 Transl Manner 
bob 371 Self-c Manner 
bobsled (US) 0 Transl Manner 
bobsleigh (UK) 0 Transl Manner 
bolt 430 Transl Manner 
boogie 48 Self-c Manner 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
bop 35 Self-c Manner 
bounce 1167 Self-c Manner 
bound 487 Transl Manner 
bow 1288 Self-c Manner 
bowl 727 Transl Manner 
bus 83 Transl Manner 
cab 1 Transl Manner 
cancan 0 Self-c Manner 
canoe 14 Transl Manner 
canter 103 Transl Manner 
caper 11 Transl Manner 
capriole 0 Self-c Manner 
capsize 95 Self-c Manner 
caravan 0 Transl Manner 
careen 10 Self-c / Transl Manner 
career 201 Transl Manner 
cavort 68 Transl Manner 
charge 6368 Transl Path + Manner 
chariot 0 Transl Manner 
chase 2013 Transl Path + Manner 
circle 631 Transl Manner 
circuit 13 Transl (Motion) + Ground 
circulate 1390 Transl (Motion) + Ground 
clamber 397 Transl Manner 
climb 5328 Transl Path + Manner 
clip 643 Transl Manner 
clump 44 Transl Manner 
coach 910 Transl Manner 
coggle 0 Self-c Manner 
coil 211 Self-c Manner 
come 143322 Transl Path 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
conduct 5027 Transl Figure + Co-motion 
conga 0 Self-c Manner 
convoy 5 Transl Figure + Co-motion 
crash 2109 Transl Concurrent Result 
crawl 1050 Transl Manner 
creep 1452 Transl Manner 
cross 6706 Transl Path 
crouch 801 Self-c Manner 
cruise 601 Transl Manner 
curvet 0 Self-c Manner 
cycle 546 Transl Manner 
dance 3211 Self-c Manner 
dart 538 Transl Manner 
dash 876 Transl Manner 
dawdle 73 Transl Manner 
decelerate 42 Transl Manner 
depart 1338 Transl Path 
descend 1654 Transl Path 
desert 999 Transl Path 
disembark 122 Transl Path + Ground (ship) 
dive 1015 Transl Path + Manner 
divert 1156 Transl Path 
dodder 12 Self-c / Transl Manner 
dodge 410 Self-c / Transl Manner / Path 
dogsled 0 Transl Manner 
dribble 187 Transl Manner 
drift 1828 Transl Cause 
drive 14493 Transl Manner 
drop 10021 Transl Path 
edge 743 Transl Manner 
embark 1319 Transl Path + Ground (ship) 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
emigrate 429 Transl Path + Ground (country) 
enter 13681 Transl Path 
escape 5135 Transl Path 
escort 747 Transl Figure + Co-motion 
exit 385 Transl Path 
fall 25843 Transl Path 
ferry 332 Transl Manner 
file 1415 Transl Manner 
flap 485 Self-c Manner 
flee 1998 Transl Cause + Path + Manner 
flick 996 Self-c Manner 
flip 420 Self-c Manner 
flit 221 Transl Manner 
float 1708 Self-c / Transl Manner 
flounder 157 Self-c Manner 
flutter 451 Self-c Manner 
fly 8571 Transl Ground (air) 
follow 40602 Transl Path 
ford 34 Transl Path + Ground (river) + Manner 
foxtrot 3 Self-c Manner 
frisk 36 Transl Manner 
frolic 8 Transl Manner 
gallop 369 Transl Manner 
gambol 20 Transl Manner 
gimp 4 Transl Manner 
glide 433 Transl Manner 
go 236313 Transl Path 
gondole 0 Transl Manner 
goosestep 0 Transl Manner 
grovel 58 Transl Manner 
guide 2055 Transl Figure + Co-motion 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
hare 32 Transl Manner 
hasten 474 Transl Manner 
helicopter 9 Transl Manner 
hike 82 Transl Manner 
hobble 172 Transl Manner 
hop 501 Self-c / Transl Manner 
hound 134 Transl Path 
hover 878 Self-c Ground (on air) 
hurl 665 Transl Manner 
hurry 2291 Transl Manner 
hurtle 248 Transl Manner 
immigrate 5 Transl Path + Ground (country) 
inch 308 Transl Manner 
jeep 0 Transl Manner 
jet 75 Transl Manner 
jig 28 Self-c Manner 
jitterbug 2 Self-c Manner 
jive 26 Self-c Manner 
jog 455 Transl Manner 
journey 221 Transl Manner 
jump 4810 Self-c / Transl Manner 
kayak 5 Transl Manner 
keel 103 Self-c Manner 
kick 3417 Self-c Figure (body part: feet, legs) 
kneel 963 Self-c Manner 
land 3628 Transl Path + Ground (land) 
lead 32102 Transl Figure + Co-motion 
lean 4444 Self-c Manner 
leap 1961 Self-c / Transl Manner 
leap-frog 0 Transl Manner 
leave 60578 Transl Path 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
limp 369 Transl Manner 
lope 68 Transl Manner 
lumber 0 Transl Manner 
lunge 193 Transl Path + Manner 
lurch 392 Self-c Manner 
march 1718 Transl Manner 
meander 173 Transl Manner 
mince 88 Transl Manner 
moonwalk 0 Self-c / Transl Manner / Manner + Ground 
moped 15 Transl Manner 
mosey 9 Transl Manner 
motor 176 Transl Manner 
motorbike 0 Transl Manner 
motorcycle 22 Transl Manner 
mount 3037 Transl Path 
move 37290 Self-c + Transl (Motion) 
nip 402 Transl Manner 
nod 5408 Self-c Figure (body part: head) 
oar 3 Transl Manner 
outrun 
 
61 
 
Transl 
 
Manner + Co-motion / 
Action correlation 
overturn 636 Self-c Manner 
pace 602 Transl Manner 
pad 228 Transl Manner 
paddle 362 Transl Manner / Manner + Ground (water) 
parachute 76 Transl Manner 
parade 372 Transl Manner 
pass 19336 Transl Path 
pedal 183 Transl Manner 
penetrate 1162 Transl Path 
perambulate 12 Transl Manner 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
pirouette 0 Self-c Manner 
plod 210 Transl Manner 
plummet 274 Transl Path + Manner 
plunge 1333 Transl Path + Manner 
polka 0 Self-c Manner 
pop 1956 Transl Manner 
pounce 311 Transl Path + Manner 
prance 77 Transl Manner 
promenade 12 Transl Manner 
pronk 0 Self-c / Transl Manner 
prowl 177 Transl Manner 
punt 34 Transl Manner 
pursue 4512 Transl Path 
quake 35 Self-c Manner 
quickstep 3 Self-c Manner 
quiver 342 Self-c Manner 
race 3496 Transl Manner 
raft 6 Transl Manner 
ramble 119 Transl Manner 
reach 22088 Transl Path 
recede 445 Transl Path 
recline 92 Self-c Manner 
recoil 200 Transl Path 
reel 402 Self-c / Transl Manner 
retire 3480 Transl Path 
retreat 889 Transl Path 
return 21364 Transl Path 
revolve 485 Self-c Manner 
rickshaw 2 Transl Manner 
ride 5022 Transl Manner 
rise 14608 Self-c / Transl Manner / Path 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
roam 535 Transl Manner 
roar 937 Transl Manner 
rock 948 Self-c Manner 
rocket 116 Transl Manner / Path + Manner 
roll 4438 Self-c / Transl Manner 
rollerblade 1 Transl Manner 
romp 130 Transl Manner 
rotate 684 Self-c Manner 
rove 63 Transl Manner 
row 567 Transl Manner 
rumba 0 Self-c Manner 
run 38304 Transl Manner 
rush 3025 Transl Manner 
sail 2646 Transl Manner 
samba 0 Self-c Manner 
sashay 13 Transl Manner 
saunter 183 Transl Manner 
scale 567 Transl Path 
scamper 167 Transl Manner 
scatter 1516 Transl Path 
scoot 38 Transl Manner 
scram 5 Transl Path + Manner 
scramble 966 Transl Manner 
scud 33 Transl Manner 
scurry 297 Transl Manner 
scuttle 254 Transl Manner 
seesaw 2 Self-c Manner 
shadow 291 Transl Path 
shake 8494 Self-c Manner 
shamble 75 Transl Manner 
ship 1562 Transl Manner 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
shiver 1093 Self-c Manner 
shoot 7203 Transl Manner 
shudder 660 Self-c Manner 
shuffle 517 Transl Manner 
shuttle 32 Transl Manner 
sidle 113 Transl Manner 
sink 2919 Transl Path 
skate 275 Transl Manner 
skateboard 23 Transl Manner 
skedaddle 2 Transl Path + Manner 
ski 378 Transl Manner 
skid 209 Transl Manner 
skim 342 Transl Manner 
skip 660 Transl Manner 
skitter 57 Transl Manner 
skulk 59 Transl Manner 
skydive 6 Transl Ground (on air) + Path + Manner 
sled (US) 8 Transl Manner 
sledge (UK) 7 Transl Manner 
sleepwak 0 Transl Manner 
slide 2798 Transl Manner 
slink 53 Transl Path  + Manner 
slip 4667 Transl Manner 
slither 234 Transl Manner 
slog 69 Transl Manner 
slouch 96 Self-c / Transl Manner 
sneak 447 Transl Manner 
soar 934 Transl Path + Manner 
somersault 63 Self-c Manner 
somnambulate 0 Transl Manner 
speed 1711 Transl Manner 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
spin 1710 Self-c Manner 
spring 1722 Transl Manner 
sprint 247 Transl Manner 
squaredance 0 Self-c Manner 
squat 487 Self-c Manner 
stagger 718 Self-c / Transl Manner 
stalk 415 Transl Manner / Path + Manner 
stamp 1158 Self-c / Transl Figure (body part: foot) + Manner 
stampede 32 Transl Path + Manner 
step 5520 Transl Figure (body part: foot) + Manner 
stomp 102 Self-c / Transl Manner 
stoop 419 Self-c Manner 
storm 659 Transl Manner 
stray 484 Transl Path 
streak 231 Transl Manner 
stretch 4472 Self-c Manner 
stride 1040 Transl Manner 
stroll 772 Transl Manner 
strut 141 Transl Manner 
stumble 997 Transl Manner 
stump 150 Transl Manner 
swagger 19 Transl Manner 
sway 758 Self-c Manner 
sweep 2949 Transl Manner 
swerve 212 Transl Path 
swim 2302 Transl Manner + Ground (water) 
swing 3177 Self-c Manner 
swirl 395 Self-c Manner 
swoop 393 Transl Path + Manner + Ground 
tack 384 Transl Path 
tail 172 Transl Path + Manner 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
tango 6 Self-c Manner 
tapdance 0 Self-c Manner 
taxi 15 Transl Manner 
tear 2663 Transl Manner 
teeter 116 Self-c / Transl Manner 
throw 10776 Transl Manner 
thrust 1325 Transl Path + Manner 
thunder 290 Transl Manner 
tiptoe 163 Transl Manner 
tittup 2 Transl Manner 
toboggan 11 Transl Manner 
toddle 44 Transl Manner 
topple 393 Transl Cause + Path 
totter 153 Self-c / Transl Manner 
tour 761 Transl Manner 
track 899 Transl Path + Manner 
trail 1070 Transl Path + Manner 
traipse 48 Transl Manner 
tram 4 Transl Manner 
tramp 196 Transl Manner 
trample 276 Transl Figure (body part: feet) + Manner 
travel 8410 Transl Manner 
traverse 291 Transl Path 
tread 886 Transl Figure (body part: feet) + Manner 
trek 162 Transl Manner 
tremble 1383 Self-c Manner 
trip 779 Transl Manner 
trolley 1 Transl Manner 
troop 105 Transl Manner 
trot 436 Transl Manner 
truck 24 Transl Vehicle / Instrument 
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English 
motion verb 
Frequency 
 
Motion 
 
Semantic 
components 
trudge 252 Transl Manner 
trundle 171 Transl Manner 
tumble 824 Transl Path + Manner 
turn 43441 Self-c / Transl Manner / Path 
twine 57 Self-c Manner 
twirl 134 Self-c Manner 
twist 1757 Self-c Manner 
vault 150 Transl Manner 
vibrate 282 Self-c Manner 
waddle 96 Transl Manner 
wade 295 Transl Ground (water) + Manner 
waft 199 Transl Ground (air) + Manner  
wag 215 Self-c Manner 
walk 19882 Transl Manner 
waltz 25 Self-c Manner 
wander 2306 Transl Manner 
wave 2471 Self-c Manner 
wheel 663 Transl Manner 
whirl 380 Self-c Manner 
whisk 380 Transl Manner 
whiz(z) 149 Transl Manner 
wiggle 88 Self-c Manner 
wind 2211 Self-c Manner 
wobble 219 Self-c Manner 
wriggle 443 Self-c Manner 
yacht 0 Transl Manner 
zigzag 63 Self-c Manner 
zoom 237 Transl Manner 
 
  
171 
 
Appendix 2 
 
English motion verbs in the sub-domain of TEMPORAL MOTION 
 
Contexts: Path of motion verbs 
 
Go 
1 if there's any thing on, before we go to bed (SP:PS03T) I'm going to 
see this eighty thirty five, As Time Goes By   
MT 
 
Come 
1 worry, as usual, that I shall be mopping you up for months to come.'' 
Maybe,' said Jay.' I'm too far in 
MT 
2 The fighting, which had died down during the night, flared again as 
dawn came, and US Cobra gunships began to fly over 
MT 
3 the greater part (but not all) of them know that the time has come: 
they are off and have begun once more that great southward flight 
MT 
4 I am sure he will retain the leadership for many years to come and 
he is in the process of emerging from the Government's 
MT 
5 What are the names of your children?'), or night comes so abruptly 
it is as though someone has pulled down a blind. 
MT 
6 will doubtless provide the basic starting-point for scholars of 
twentieth century Conservatism for years to come, but to date it 
MT 
7 And he's taking me shopping in New York 
tomorrow. Christmas is coming and he thinks I ought to know about 
MT 
 
Follow 
1 Return to Bracknell station following my engagement, to catch the 
9.49pm train back to Waterloo. 
Seq. 
2 In Britain such was the period following the defeat of Clodius 
Albinus in the civil war of AD 196. 
Seq. 
3 In the half-century that followed the restoration of the Stuart 
monarchy in 1660 
Seq. 
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4 it may have been a manifestation of the insecurity of Aldfrith in the 
years immediately following his accession. 
Seq. 
5 to renew and confirm the charters, which was done in 
october following. To these charters were now added 
Seq. 
6 In the hours that follow, these glycoproteins dendritic spines, and 
the synaptic contact areas 
Seq. 
7 Although air-raid sirens were often heard in Baghdad during the 
months that followed, both sides' air forces tended 
Seq. 
 
Reach 
1 to ACFA by transfer from the Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust's 
mailing list when they reach the age of 18, or by direct referral. 
ME 
2 3-4 years, and 84 per cent of those with 1-2 years to go before 
reaching pension age. Second, we found that ill health was 
ME 
3 line (pause) it's the analogy of someone pedalling on a bicycle, if 
you reach thirty five and you're going up on a bicycle 
ME 
 
Pass 
1 As time passes this new life will change and itself be superseded, 
requiring a re-ordering of the 
MT 
2 that from the time I was sixteen I found myself hardly letting a 
week pass without writing one or two descriptions 
MT 
3 But it slowed her up considerably, and as time passed she found 
herself casting furtive glances over her shoulder. 
MT 
4 Sir Fulke.' The knight blew out his cheeks.' The day is passing, 
friar,' he observed tartly, glaring out of the window.' 
MT 
5 A few minutes passed as they congratulated Cara on what they 
realised was something of a very large achievement 
MT 
6 you haven't got no idea of the (SP:PS0G0) No. (SP:PS0FS) time 
sort of pass (SP:PS0G0) But I did hear this one 
MT 
7 he whispered achingly. A tiny echo sighed back at him. A full 
minute passed before he could move again. 
 
MT 
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8 on Bishopstow almost before Alexandra realized it, so swiftly and 
busily did her days pass. Her parents travelled home 
MT 
9 (Lights snap on. Nothing displaced. Much time has passed. The 
three people look the same. Abberley talking cheerfully to Max. 
MT 
10 to the bubble fountain, when the lights were switched on. The time 
had passed so quickly that she hadn't realised how late it was 
MT 
11 As the months and years passed, Dorian Gray grew more and more 
afraid of the picture. 
MT 
12 sleepless, she waited for the night to pass. She had known they 
weren't going to make love the moment the sound 
MT 
13 and has been singularly unsuccessful in doing so over the three 
decades that have passed since Suez. 
MT 
14 Five centuries have passed since the discovery of America, a focal 
point in the history of discoveries. 
MT 
 
Enter 
1 skin absorbs too readily here and may become puffy. # FORTIES # 
As you enter your forties your skin is likely to be even drier 
ME 
 
Arrive 
1 Christmas Eve had now arrived along with her two grown-up 
children, Stephen and Carol 
MT 
2 all winter, though she has ventured on a carriage trip or two since 
spring arrived, is excited by the promise Cavour has made 
MT 
 
Approach 
1 Furthermore, as Congress approached its October adjournment, 
several other pieces of legislation threatened to  
ME 
2 He was now approaching thirty years old and, as the year turned, he 
wanted desperately to get 
ME 
3 that a fierce spark of that madness might be living on within her as 
she approached the middle of her life. 
 
ME 
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4 Remove the uncertainty of succession, all three directors 
are approaching their mid-forties, and therefore 
ME 
5 And as the skiing season approaches, you can rely on them to 
supply first-class winter warmers. 
MT 
6 The family portrait reveals more: father of three children 
and approaching his ruby wedding with his wife Sheila 
ME 
7 I longed for company and felt unreasonably deserted. When the 
appointed hour approached and we could see the visitors 
MT 
8 With winter approaching and the slump growing the situation looks 
like getting worse. 
MT 
9 and as the days lengthened and winter approached there was 
understandable bad feeling between landladies and    
MT 
10 The shop had suddenly become very busy as Christmas approached, 
and although the cycling was finished Anne and Sarah 
MT 
11 a show of force as the number of corruption charges increased him 
and the date approached for the release of the Rettig report 
MT 
12 As noon approached John adopted a behaviour pattern that I knew 
well: stretching, scratching, complacently  
MT 
13 It was dusk by the time she checked out of the Shelbourne; night 
was approaching rapidly. The sun left a red stain 
MT 
14 Thus skidding violently from one side to the other, his 
youth approached the moment at which he would   
ME 
15 Scottish Natural Heritage.' We are fast approaching the point when 
the risk of attempting a rescue 
ME 
 
 
Contexts: Manner of motion verbs 
 
Travel 
1 the Department of Public Services. # CARDIFF CASTLE 
# TRAVEL BACK THROUGH 1900 YEARS OF HISTORY # 
ME 
2 Oxford's Lord Mayor, Queenie Warley will travel through time to 
meet Queen Elizabeth the First 
ME 
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Race 
1 The afternoon was slipping away, the afternoon was racing by. 
Sheltered from the wind, Jessica could feel her face begin to roast 
MT 
 
Wander 
1 Lizzie was wandering backwards in time. The past, reflected Sara, 
when the peacock silk curtains were newly hung 
ME 
 
Tear 
1 She began to feel exasperated. Time was tearing along and there 
were the coals to fetch. 
MT 
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Individual diferences in the interpretation 
of ambiguous statements about time
Abstract: What factors inluence the ways in which people resolve ambiguity? 
In English, two contrasting perspectives are implicit in deictic temporal expres-
sions: the Moving Time metaphor conceptualizes time as moving forward towards 
the ego and the Moving Ego metaphor conceptualizes the ego as moving forward 
towards the future (Clark 1973). We examine the ambiguity arising from these 
two  conceptualizations, claimed to be equally likely in a “neutral” context 
 (Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002). Whereas previous studies have demonstrated 
that exposure to a spatial situation related to one interpretation may inluence 
the resolution of the ambiguity (e.g. Boroditsky 2000; Núñez 2007), we focus on 
the lifestyle and personality factors of the participants as potential additional 
 inluences on ambiguity resolution in the interpretation of temporal metaphors. 
Experiment 1 asks whether lifestyle might inluence an individual’s approach 
to  time and resulting resolution of temporal ambiguity, comparing preferred 
 responses from two groups of participants with very diferent demands on the 
structuring of time: university students and administrators. We observed a 
 diference between the two groups, with administrators more frequently adopt-
ing  the Moving Time perspective and students, the Moving Ego perspective. 
 Experiment 2 examines personality-related diferences, focusing speciically on 
individual diferences in procrastination (Lay 1986) and conscientiousness (John 
1990). We observed a signiicant efect with participants who adopted the Mov-
ing Ego perspective reporting higher procrastination scores and lower conscien-
tiousness scores than participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective. 
Experiment 3 investigates further personality-related diferences, focusing spe-
ciically on  individual diferences in extroversion (John 1990). We observed a 
 relationship  between extroversion and disambiguation responses, with partici-
pants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective evidencing higher levels of extro-
version. Taken together, the results from these three studies suggest that 
 individual diferences in lifestyle and personality may inluence people’s per-
spectives on the movement of events in time and their concomitant interpretation 
of temporally ambiguous utterances, precluding a universal “neutral” context 
within which language is interpreted.
Keywords: Moving Time, Moving Ego, metaphor, temporal perspective, ambi-
guity, individual diferences, lifestyle, personality.
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1 Introduction
It has long been observed that speakers systematically employ language from 
concrete and perceptually rich domains to talk about abstract concepts. One 
of  the most paradigm examples of this is illustrated by the ways in which 
the   abstract domain time is metaphorically conceptualized in terms of the 
 concrete domain space in a wide range of languages throughout the world 
(e.g.  Evans 2004; Haspelmath 1997; Núñez and Sweetser 2006; Yu 1998). In 
 English, there are various types of spatial metaphors for time, including those 
structured around the relative placement of ego and events in time (Moving 
Ego  and Moving Time, Clark 1973; Lakof and Johnson 1999), those structured 
around the conceptualization of events as elements in a sequence (Moore 2006; 
Núñez et al. 2006), and those structured around the conceptualization of events 
placed in relation to the forward-moving low of time, without additional refer-
ence points (Kranjec 2006). Of these, the space-time metaphors that have received 
the most attention in the empirical literature are those structured around the 
 relative placement of ego and events in time (e.g. Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; 
Matlock et al. 2005; McGlone and Harding 1998; Ramscar et al. 2010). In the 
 Moving Ego metaphor, time is depicted as a stationary landscape that the active 
ego moves across, as evidenced by expressions such as We’re approaching Christ-
mas and We’re coming up to the deadline. In the Moving Time metaphor, time is 
conceived as a conveyor belt that events move along, from the future to the past, 
relative to a stationary ego, as evidenced by expressions such as Christmas is 
 approaching and The deadline is coming up. These two metaphors are argued to 
be equally common in English speakers’ conceptualizations of time: “In a neutral 
context, people are equally likely to think of themselves as moving through time 
as they are to think of time as coming toward them” (Boroditsky and Ramscar 
2002: 185).1
The systematicity and coherence of the Moving Ego and Moving Time meta-
phors in language have given rise to research investigating the psychological 
 reality of these two metaphors. In a seminal study conducted by McGlone and 
Harding (1998), participants were asked to interpret a series of context sen-
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tences  which were phrased in either the terms of the Moving Ego metaphor 
(e.g.  we passed the deadline two days ago) or the Moving Time metaphor (e.g. 
the  deadline passed two days ago). At the end of the block of priming state-
ments,  participants read an ambiguous target statement, such as The meeting 
originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two days and 
were then asked to indicate the day of the week on which the event would occur. 
The results showed that participants tended to disambiguate the target consis-
tently with the primes, such that participants who were primed with Moving 
Ego  metaphors more frequently interpreted “moved forward” in line with the 
Moving Ego perspective (responding Friday), and participants who were primed 
with Moving Time metaphors more frequently interpreted “moved forward” in 
line with the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday). In addition to 
 providing evidence for two psychologically distinct global systems underlying 
two diferent ways of mapping events in time, these results suggest that the 
 perspective adopted in the interpretations of unambiguous temporal statements 
may exert an inluence on the interpretation of subsequent ambiguous temporal 
statements.1
Building on McGlone and Harding’s (1998) indings, Boroditsky (2000) and 
Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) devised a series of experiments to investigate 
whether engaging in certain types of spatial thinking might inluence how people 
think about time. In one experiment, participants were asked to imagine moving 
towards a stationary object or to imagine an object moving towards them before 
1 Although spatial metaphors for time are attested in English, one area that has received 
 comparatively less attention is how common natural usages of these metaphors are and 
how  they  are  used. One reviewer raises the question of whether space-time metaphors are 
in fact quite  infrequent and used only in circumscribed contexts. To illustrate, two of the most 
cited VPs used  in examples of Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors are approaching and 
coming up (Clark 1973; Bender et al. 2010; Boroditsky 2000; Evans and Green 2006; Lakof and 
Johnson 1999; McGlone and Harding 1998; Moore 2006; Núñez 2007; Núñez and Sweetser 2006; 
Radden 2004). In order to assess the frequency of temporal uses of these VPs in natural produc-
tion, we  extracted 200-token samples for each VP from the Brigham Young University-British 
 National Corpus (BYU-BNC; Davies 2004–). Of these, we identiied 20 temporal instances of 
 approaching and 17 temporal instances of coming up (see Appendix); thus, demonstrating 
that although space-time metaphors may be infrequent, they are attested in corpora. Examina-
tion of the  extracted instances revealed that 60% of the instances of approaching and 53% 
of  the  instances of coming up represented the Moving Time perspective. While an extensive 
 analysis of the nature and frequencies of naturally occurring temporal expressions is beyond 
the remit of this paper, it is nevertheless worth highlighting their rate of occurrence in natural 
language use.
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answering the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting question. Based on the as-
sumption that our experience of time is grounded in our understanding of space 
(Lakof 1993; Lakof and Johnson 1980, 1999), it was hypothesized that imagining 
moving through space towards a stationary object is analogous to the Moving Ego 
perspective and imagining a moving object travelling through space towards the 
self is analogous to the Moving Time perspective. Thus, if space and time do share 
some relational structure, participants primed in the ego-moving spatial condi-
tion should “reuse” this perspective for time and answer Friday, whereas partici-
pants primed in the object-moving spatial condition should adopt the Moving 
Time perspective and answer Monday. As predicted, participants tended to re-
spond in a prime-consistent manner to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, 
suggesting that diferent ways of thinking about motion in space can yield difer-
ent construals of time. Further experiments conducted in a range of settings have 
conirmed these initial indings (Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002). For instance, 
participants who were at the beginning or end of a train journey and thus more 
likely to be engaged with the notion of travelling were more likely to respond 
 Friday than participants who were in the middle of their journey. This pattern of 
results suggests that the temporal perspective adopted, and hence the interpreta-
tions of ambiguous temporal statements, can be primed not only by temporal, but 
also by spatial stimuli; thus, indicating that spatial and temporal representations 
are conceptually related.
These preliminary results have been extended, with demonstrations that 
non-deictic spatial schemas (Kranjec 2006; Núñez et al. 2006), abstract spatial 
motion schemas (Matlock et al. 2011) and deictically-oriented ictive motion sche-
mas (Matlock et al. 2005; Ramscar et al. 2010) can also inluence interpretations 
of ambiguous temporal statements. For example, Matlock et al. (2005) and Rams-
car et al. (2010) conducted a number of experiments to investigate whether think-
ing about ictive motion (FM), similarly to thinking about actual motion, would 
inluence the ways in which people think about time. In these studies, partici-
pants were primed with one of two FM sentences, The road goes all the way to New 
York or The road comes all the way from New York (whereby the participants’ loca-
tion at Stanford was the implied starting point or end point) before answering the 
Next Wednesday’s meeting question. The results showed that when participants 
were primed with FM going away from them, from Stanford to New York, they 
were more likely to provide a Friday response, whereas when participants were 
primed with FM coming towards them, from New York to Stanford, they were 
more likely to provide a Monday response. As was the case with actual motion, 
Ramscar et al. (2010) concluded that just thinking about ictive motion is sui-
cient to inluence how people think about time. Furthermore, these indings 
 further substantiate the claim that when people engage in certain kinds of 
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 spatial-motion thinking, they may also unwittingly and dramatically change how 
they think about time.
While spatial schemas may exert an important inluence on the structure and 
representation of time, a closer look at responses in the absence of priming re-
veals an additional potential contributor: only student participants have been 
sampled in a “neutral” context, and these respondents have shown a preference 
for answering Friday: Boroditsky (2000), Núñez (2007) and Sullivan and Barth 
(2012) report these igures to be 54%, 61% and 77%,2 respectively. To further put 
these numbers in perspective, Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002, Study 1) report that 
people primed to imagine themselves moving through space (and predicted to 
adopt the Moving Ego perspective) responded Friday 57% of the time. Similarly, 
people waiting to ly (and thus likely thinking about motion and predicted to 
adopt the Moving Ego perspective) responded Friday 62% of the time (Boroditsky 
and Ramscar 2002, Study 3). Thus, rates of Friday responses which difer little 
from the “neutral” context baselines have been taken as evidence for the adop-
tion of the Moving Ego perspective, suggesting that there might be something 
about the population sampled that favours one direction in the resolution of tem-
poral ambiguity.
As researchers in the cognitive sciences have been concerned primarily with 
testing the efects of priming on the interpretation of ambiguous temporal state-
ments, preferred temporal perspective in a “neutral” unprimed context has 
 received scant attention. However, recent research investigating the ways in 
which people perceive and understand time has extended beyond demonstrating 
the psychological reality of space-time metaphors and has begun to consider 
language-external characteristics of the participants on the perception of time 
and the resolution of temporally ambiguous utterances. In an innovative study, 
Hauser et al. (2009) investigated the link between the seemingly unrelated but 
similarly embodied abstract domains of anger and time. Anger, both as an event-
induced emotion and as a personality trait, is spatially represented by approach-
related motivations, which cause the active self to approach a goal or situation 
(Harmon-Jones 2007), much as the self moves into the future in the Moving Ego 
metaphor. Building on aspects of Conceptual Metaphor Theory; namely, that peo-
ple understand abstract concepts, such as anger or time, in terms of more con-
crete domains, such as space, and that multiple abstract concepts can borrow 
from the same source domain, Hauser et al. (2009) hypothesized that anger and 
2 Sullivan and Barth’s (2012) sample consisted of a mostly (~98%) student population (Hilary 
Barth, personal communication, August 2013).
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the Moving Ego representation of time may tap into a similar approach-related 
spatial motivation that would serve as an embodied cognitive link between the 
two domains. To test this hypothesis, Hauser et al. (2009) asked participants to 
complete questionnaires designed to measure trait anger (that is, anger as part of 
their personality) before responding to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question. 
Their indings showed that participants with higher trait anger, as measured 
by  the questionnaires, were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective 
 (responding Friday) than to adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding 
 Monday). In discussing the implications of their results, Hauser et al. (2009: 1178) 
observe that as time representation is inluenced by trait anger, it raises the pos-
sibility that additional personality-related diferences may play important roles 
in inluencing how people reason about time.
More recently, Richmond et al. (2012), reasoning that those with a strong 
sense of personal agency (Vallacher and Wegner 1989) would be more likely to 
conceive of themselves as moving through time, investigated the relationship 
 between level of perceived personal agency and temporal perspective. In one 
 experiment, participants responded to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question 
before completing a questionnaire for measuring individual diferences in the 
level of perceived personal agency (Richmond et al. 2012, Study 2). The indings 
showed that, in line with their predictions, participants who adopted the Moving 
Ego perspective reported signiicantly higher agency scores in comparison to 
 participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective; thus providing initial 
evidence for the relationship between perceived agency and temporal perspec-
tive. Probing this relationship further, Richmond et al. (2012, Study 3) examined 
whether perceived agency and temporal perspective might be associated with 
emotional experiences. Reasoning that people who feel in control and proactively 
approach a positive future are more likely to experience feelings of happiness, 
while people who wait for time to exert control over them are more likely to expe-
rience depression, Richmond et al. (2012) hypothesized that higher levels of self-
reported happiness would encourage the adoption of the Moving Ego perspective 
(indicated by a Friday response), while higher levels of self-reported anxiety 
and depression would encourage the adoption of the Moving Time perspective 
(indicated by a Monday response). To test this, they compared participants’ re-
sponses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question with their scores on a series of 
questionnaires for measuring anxiety, happiness and depression. In line with 
their predictions, the results showed that participants who adopted the Moving 
Ego perspective evidenced higher scores for happiness than participants who 
 adopted the Moving Time perspective. Conversely, participants who adopted the 
Moving Time perspective evidenced higher scores for anxiety and depression 
than participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective. Taken together, these 
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indings extend the range of individual diferences that may inluence people’s 
representations of time.
While the majority of research investigating abstract thinking about time has 
thus far been primarily focused on investigating spatial inluences on temporal 
reasoning, arguably, there are factors beyond the control of the experimenters 
that play a role in how speakers interpret an ambiguous temporal utterance – 
suggesting an important gap in our understanding of the contributors to language 
understanding. In particular, recent lines of research have provided initial evi-
dence that personality diferences and emotional experiences may also inluence 
people’s perspectives on the movement of events in time and their concomitant 
interpretations of temporally ambiguous utterances, precluding a universal “neu-
tral” context within which language is interpreted (Hauser et al. 2009; Richmond 
et al. 2012; see also Margolies and Crawford 2008; Ruscher 2011). Furthermore, 
while motion in space is demonstrably related to temporal perspective (e.g. Boro-
ditsky 2000; Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002), it cannot be the sole determiner: 
Margolies and Crawford (2008) found diferent efects of emotional valence on 
responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question when compared to re sponses 
to a question asking whether participants considered themselves to be approach-
ing an event or considered the event to be approaching them. Thus, rather than 
being attributed to a single factor, a person’s conceptualization of time likely re-
sults from a culmination of factors. To reiterate Richmond et al. (2012), although 
time is objectively measured, it is subjectively understood. Taken together, these 
indings give rise to the question: which other individual diferences might inlu-
ence how people think about time? To address this question, three experiments 
were conducted, investigating whether previously unexplored lifestyle and per-
sonality diferences may inluence a person’s conceptualization of time and their 
concomitant interpretation of an ambiguous temporal expression. First, because 
the majority of studies have sampled student populations, but the lifestyle of a 
student is not representative of the general population, we investigated whether 
lifestyle might inluence an individual’s approach to time, comparing the pre-
ferred responses of university students to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question 
with those from a sector of the population operating under quite diferent time 
pressures: university administrators (Experiment 1). Turning to factors more 
tightly bound to the individual, we investigated whether individual diferences 
in procrastination, conscientiousness (Experiment 2) and extroversion (Experi-
ment 3) might inluence the temporal perspective adopted in response to the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question. The results of the experiments provide further 
evidence that individual diferences in lifestyle and personality may combine 
with context to inluence the ways in which comprehenders resolve linguistic am-
biguities regarding the placement of events in time.
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2 The present studies
2.1 Lifestyle diferences: Students and administrators
As discussed, earlier lines of research investigating the psychological reality of 
space-time metaphors have focused on testing the efects of priming on the 
 interpretation of ambiguous temporal statements primarily among students 
(Boroditsky 2000; Núñez 2007; see also Alloway et al. 2006; Matlock et al. 2005; 
Matlock et al. 2011; Núñez et al. 2006; Ramscar et al. 2010). More to the point, only 
students have been surveyed outside of a priming context. However, as observed 
by Hauser et al. (2009: 1178):
. . . time representation is not simply afected by situations (e.g. one’s current move-
ment through space), but is a variable that is inluenced by perceptually related individual 
diferences.
Thus, one issue that warrants further investigation is that the lifestyle of a  student 
is not representative of the general population, which gives rise to the possibility 
that earlier results may have occurred, in part, due to the particular lifestyle typi-
cal of the participant population. To illustrate, in UK universities, the average 
academic year is 24 weeks and students receive an average of 13.4 contact hours 
per week (NUS-HSBC 2011; Guardian 2011); thus, students are able to structure 
the bulk of their time for themselves. By contrast, UK administrators, managers 
and professionals (representing 65.2% of the UK labour market) and UK full-time 
employees work on average 41.4 hours per week and receive 28 days annual 
paid leave (BBC News 2008; Directgov 2012; Oice for National Statistics 2010). 
For these full-time employees, time is primarily structured by external demands 
rather than by the employees themselves. Furthermore, whereas workers are paid 
for their time, students are the ones who pay to attend university; they are the 
consumers. Therefore, generally speaking, whereas students have the option of 
turning up to a lecture, workers do not have the option of turning up for work, 
providing students with a greater degree of temporal lexibility in their daily lives 
than that enjoyed by workers in full-time positions. As such, students difer from 
full-time employees in two separate but related ways: irst, students are relatively 
in control of the structuring of their time, whereas employees are relatively con-
trolled by time; second, students enjoy a relatively high degree of temporal lexi-
bility. In view of these diferences, and in view of insights from Richmond et al. 
(2012), who found that people who report higher levels of perceived personal 
agency were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective, we hypothesized 
that these diferences may inluence people’s attitudes about time, with the result 
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that people who have control over time and temporal lexibility in their daily 
lives, such as students, may think of time quite diferently to those who require 
high degrees of time management on a daily basis and are regimented by the 
clock, such as administrators.
To this end, in Experiment 1, we ask whether the nature of a person’s lifestyle 
contributes to their view of time and, hence, to their interpretation of ambiguous 
statements about time in an unprimed context. To test this, we presented univer-
sity students and administrators (such as personal assistants, secretaries, univer-
sity timetable coordinators), who deal with the daily management of a multitude 
of events and activities, with the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting question. 
With their relative control over the structuring of their own time and high degree 
of temporal lexibility, we predict that students will be more likely to adopt the 
Moving Ego perspective, showing a preference for interpretations in which the 
meeting has been moved later in time, to Friday, as observed in previous studies. 
In contrast, professionals are subject to more external constraints and hence are 
more aware of external inluences and pressures. As such, we predict that admin-
istrators, who require high degrees of time management in their daily lives and 
for whom time is relatively controlled by external demands, will be more likely to 
adopt the Moving Time perspective, showing a preference for interpretations in 
which the meeting has been moved earlier in time, to Monday.
2.2 Experiment 1
2.2.1 Participants
123 adults from Northumbria University participated in this experiment. 90 par-
ticipants were administrators, with an age range of 23 to 62 years and a mean age 
of 40 years. 33 participants were full-time students (undergraduate and postgrad-
uate), with an age range of 19 to 61 years and a mean age of 30 years. All partici-
pants were native speakers of English from the UK.
2.2.2 Materials and procedure
Participants were approached on the Northumbria University campus in oices, 
cofee shops and the university library. Following informed consent, all partici-
pants completed a questionnaire using a pen while sitting down. The question-
naire consisted of one experimental question: the Next Wednesday’s meeting 
 disambiguation paradigm, in addition to demographic questions requesting the 
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participant’s age, gender, native language, nationality and occupation. Partici-
pants were informed that the experimenter was investigating attitudes towards 
time management in universities.
The following instructions appeared at the top of the page:
Please read the following question and provide your answer below. Do not spend too much 
time thinking about it and do not change your answer: I am interested in your initial 
 reaction.
  Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days.
  What day has the meeting been re-scheduled to?
2.2.3 Results and discussion
As predicted, we found that administrators were more likely to respond Monday, 
while students were more likely to respond Friday. Concretely, only 28.9% of ad-
ministrators responded Friday in comparison to 60.6% of students. To determine 
whether the diference in responses between administrators and students was 
signiicant, a chi-square test for independence was used. The chi-square test 
 revealed a signiicant relationship: χ21,123 = 10.375; p < 0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.290.
3 
Indeed, the student response is in line with the responses of control group 
 participants in the studies conducted by Boroditsky (2000), Núñez (2007) and 
Sullivan and Barth (2012), who report a similar preference among students for 
answering Friday in an unprimed context. Moreover, the efect size is also compa-
rable with that of Núñez (2007): Cramer’s V = 0.239.4 In contrast, the administra-
tors demonstrated a tendency to choose Monday, in line with predictions based 
on lifestyle diferences between the two groups.
These results indicate an inluence of lifestyle on people’s preferred temporal 
perspective and consequent responses to a temporally ambiguous question: as 
predicted, students, with their high degree of temporal lexibility and relative 
3 For completeness, we also examined results for an age-matched sub-group of students and 
administrators (N = 30; R = 23 to 57 years; M = 37 years; SD = 13.100). In line with the overall ind-
ings, 26.7% of administrators responded Friday in comparison to 66.7% of students. To deter-
mine whether the diference in responses between administrators and students was signiicant, 
a chi-square test for independence was used. The chi-square test revealed a signiicant relation-
ship: χ21,30 = 4.821; p = 0.028; Cramer’s V = 0.401.
4 Due to insuicient information, we were unable to calculate the efect size for Boroditsky 
(2000) and Sullivan and Barth (2012).
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control over the structuring of their own time, were more likely to think in a more 
egocentric way, and thus, were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective 
(responding Friday). In contrast, professionals, who are subject to more external 
constraints and are more aware of external inluences and pressures, were more 
likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday). Experiment 1 
thus provides initial evidence that lifestyle diferences may inluence people’s 
perspectives on the movement of events in time and their concomitant interpreta-
tions of temporally ambiguous utterances.
Hand-in-hand with lifestyle diferences, there is a tendency for students and 
administrators to difer along certain personality parameters. For example, re-
search shows that procrastination is especially common in the academic domain, 
with up to 95% of students procrastinating habitually with academic tasks such 
as writing assignments, studying for examinations and keeping up-to-date with 
weekly seminar reading (Ellis and Knaus 1977; Ferrari and Beck 1998; see also 
Solomon and Rothblum 1984). Furthermore, Rivera (2007) claims that procrasti-
nation is likely to be the single most common time management problem and that 
students rank highly as a group most vulnerable to procrastination. In contrast 
to the student population, procrastination has been found to chronically afect 
15–20% of nonstudent adults, with the lowest rates of procrastination reported 
by  professional, business and educational employees, such as university ad-
ministrators (Harriott and Ferrari 1996). Consistent with this assumption, the 
 essential  job criteria for Northumbria University administrators, like those in 
our  study,  stipulate that applicants should possess “Excellent organisational 
skills” and the “Ability to prioritise workload and manage conlicting priorities” 
(Work4Northumbria 2012). If the preferences observed in Experiment 1 were 
 driven, in part, by a tendency for students to procrastinate and for administra-
tors  to resist procrastination, we might expect that people who report high 
 degrees of procrastination would be more likely to adopt the Moving Ego per-
spective than people who report low degrees of procrastination. To test this, 
 Experiment 2 directly examines the relationship between temporal perspective 
and procrastination.
2.3 Personality diferences: Procrastination
In Experiment 1, we found that a population which tends to be associated with 
high rates of procrastination tended to adopt the Moving Ego perspective in their 
responses to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question, while a population which 
tends to be associated with low rates of procrastination tended to adopt the 
 Moving Time perspective. How might the tendency to procrastinate relate to the 
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interpretation of a temporally ambiguous utterance? As deined by the Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED 2007), to procrastinate is:
To defer action, delay; to postpone until another day; to defer; to put of; to be dilatory.
Consistent with this, evidence from personality research suggests that procrasti-
nators are characterized by a tendency to defer or postpone action (Milgram et al. 
1998; Milgram and Tenne 2000), whereas conscientious individuals tend to pri-
oritize action (Back et al. 2006; John and Srivastava 1999). Looked at another 
way,  the deferment associated with procrastination can be understood as the 
movement of tasks ‘forward’ into the future, in a direction deined by the ego’s 
movement through time (in line with the Moving Ego perspective), while the pri-
oritization associated with conscientiousness can be viewed as the movement of 
tasks ‘forward’ towards the present, ergo towards the ego (in line with the Moving 
Time perspective). Thus, if this habitual movement of tasks helps to deine the 
temporal perspective adopted in response to the Next Wednesday’s meeting ques-
tion, we should see that procrastinators favour the Moving Ego perspective, and 
conscientious individuals, the Moving Time perspective.
Along with the opposed directionality of task movement, personality  research 
also indicates that lack of conscientiousness may account for task avoidance pro-
crastination and dilatory behaviour (Milgram and Tenne 2000; Schouwenburg 
and Lay 1995). This negative correlation suggests a means by which to strengthen 
our test of the relation between procrastination and time perspective: because 
procrastination operates in parallel to (lack of) conscientiousness in predicting 
behaviour, the relation found between procrastination and dilatory behaviour 
should be matched by an inverse relation between conscientiousness and dila-
tory behaviour (cf. Johnson and Bloom 1995; Lay 1997; Schouwenburg and Lay 
1995).
In Experiment 2 we draw upon this connection to further examine the role 
that individual diferences play in inluencing people’s preferred temporal per-
spective. Speciically, Experiment 2 investigates whether individual diferences 
in conscientiousness (John 1990) and procrastination (Lay 1986) contribute to a 
person’s view of time and, hence, to their interpretation of the ambiguous Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question in an unprimed context. Consistent with the 
 correlations between procrastination and lifestyle and with the results of Experi-
ment 1, we predict that people who adopt the Moving Ego perspective (respond-
ing Friday) will exhibit a higher degree of procrastination, as well as a lower 
degree of conscientiousness, whereas people who adopt the Moving Time per-
spective (responding Monday) will exhibit a lower degree of procrastination, as 
well as a higher degree of conscientiousness.
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2.4 Experiment 2
2.4.1 Participants
28 full-time undergraduate students from Northumbria University participated in 
this experiment, with an age range of 18 to 27 years and a mean age of 20 years. 8 
participants were male and 20 were female. All participants were native speakers 
of English from the UK.
2.4.2 Materials and procedure
A three-part questionnaire was distributed to a irst year introductory English 
 literature class. Following informed consent, all participants completed the ques-
tionnaire using a pen while sitting down.
Part 1 of the questionnaire gathered demographic information: age, gender, 
native language and nationality.
For Part 2 of the questionnaire, procrastination was measured using the 
 Student Procrastination Scale (Lay 1986) and conscientiousness was measured 
using the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John 1990). Sample items included: I generally 
delay before starting on work I have to do (procrastination) and I see myself as 
someone who does things eiciently (conscientiousness). A ive-point Likert scale 
was used with “Very true” anchoring the let-hand side of the scale, “Neutral” in 
the middle and “Very untrue” anchoring the right-hand side of the scale.
The inal part of the questionnaire consisted of one question: the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting disambiguation paradigm. Participants read the following 
instructions:
Please read the following question and provide your answer below. Do not spend too much 
time thinking about it and do not change your answer: I am interested in your initial  reaction.
  Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days.
  What day has the meeting been re-scheduled to?
2.4.3 Results and discussion
The Student Procrastination Scale Key (Lay 1986) was used to calculate the aver-
age procrastination score for each participant. The scale ranged from 1–5, with 
1  denoting a low procrastination score and 5 denoting a high procrastination 
score. Mean scores for each individual were calculated by adding the scores for 
each statement and dividing by the total number of statements, i.e. 20. As 
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 predicted, participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (responding 
 Friday) averaged signiicantly higher procrastination scores (M = 3.541; SD = 0.337) 
than participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective (responding  Monday) 
(M = 2.978; SD = 0.499), t(26) = 3.446, p = 0.002, d = 1.322.
The BFI Scoring Key (John and Srivastava 1999) was then used to calculate 
the average conscientiousness score for each participant. The scale ranged from 
1–5, with 1 denoting a low conscientiousness score and 5 denoting a high con-
scientiousness score. Mean scores for each individual were calculated by adding 
the scores for each statement and dividing by the total number of statements, i.e. 
9. Again, as predicted, participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective 
(responding Monday) averaged signiicantly higher conscientiousness scores 
(M = 3.695; SD = 0.552) than participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspec-
tive (responding Friday) (M = 3.153; SD = 0.697), t(26) = 2.299, p = 0.030, d = 0.862.
Furthermore, in concordance with earlier studies which demonstrate that 
procrastination operates in parallel to (lack of) conscientiousness in predicting 
behaviour (Johnson and Bloom 1995; Lay 1997; Schouwenburg and Lay 1995), we 
found that there was a signiicant negative correlation between conscientious-
ness and procrastination (Spearman’s rho = 0.801, p < 0.0001).
Building on earlier indings regarding the interplay between personality 
 factors and temporal disambiguation (Hauser et al. 2009; Richmond et al. 2012), 
Experiment 2 provides converging evidence that personality diferences play a 
role in inluencing how people think about time and interpret temporally ambigu-
ous language. Speciically, as predicted, participants who interpreted the tempo-
rally ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting question in line with the Moving Ego 
perspective (answering Friday) averaged higher degrees of procrastination and 
lower degrees of conscientiousness as compared to participants who adopted the 
Moving Time perspective (answering Monday). Whereas Experiment 2 examined 
a personality factor connected to the lifestyle diference examined in Experiment 
1, the earlier studies suggest that additional individual factors which share a 
 conceptual relation with the Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors may like-
wise inluence the resolution of temporally ambiguous language (cf. Hauser et al. 
2009; Richmond et al. 2012). Thus, to further investigate the role that personality 
diferences play in inluencing how people think about time, Experiment 3 exam-
ines the relationship between temporal perspective and another Big Five person-
ality factor: extroversion.
2.5  Personality diferences: Extroversion
One of the most reliably identiied personality diferences is the distinction be-
tween extroverts and introverts (Eysenck 1952; Giambra et al. 1988; Revelle et al. 
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1980). Extroverts are typically characterized as assertive, dominant, and ener-
getic, implying a more active approach towards the social and material world, 
whereas introverts are better characterized as withdrawn, reserved, and compli-
ant, implying a more passive approach (John 1990; John and Srivastava 1999; 
John et al. 2008). Furthermore, extroversion is represented by behavioural 
 approach motivations (e.g. Elliot and Thrash 2002), much like anger, which 
 Hauser et al. (2009) found to be associated with Friday responses to the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question. Approach and avoidance motivations are inher-
ently spatial (cf. Hauser et al. 2009; Margolies and Crawford 2008); thus, building 
on earlier lines of research which demonstrate that engaging in particular types of 
spatial thinking can yield diferent construals of time, we hypothesized that there 
would be diferences in temporal reasoning between extroverts and introverts 
that parallel the spatially-based diferences between approach and avoidance. 
Because approach motivation involves the activation of outward, goal-directed 
and engaging behaviours (Higgins 1997), extroversion aligns well with the  Moving 
Ego perspective, with its connections to active control over the structuring of 
one’s own time. By contrast, avoidance motivation involves passive or inhibited 
behaviours (Higgins 1997); thus, introversion aligns well with the Moving Time 
perspective, with its suggestion that it is time that exerts control over the passive 
individual.
To this end, the aim of Experiment 3 is to further examine the role that 
 spatially grounded individual diferences play in inluencing people’s preferred 
temporal perspective. Speciically, Experiment 3 investigates whether individual 
diferences in extroversion (John 1990) contribute to a person’s view of time and, 
hence, to their interpretation of the ambiguous Next Wednesday’s meeting ques-
tion in an unprimed context. We predict that the more active, assertive personali-
ties of extroverts would lead to a higher likelihood of adopting the Moving Ego 
perspective (responding Friday) and the more passive personalities of introverts 
would lead to a higher likelihood of adopting the Moving Time perspective 
 (responding Monday).
2.6 Experiment 3
2.6.1 Participants
46 adults with an age range of 18 to 73 years and a mean age of 42 years partici-
pated in this experiment. 14 participants were male and 32 were female. In order 
to more clearly focus on the distinction between extroverts and introverts, 
we  chose to sample a broad cross-section of society: occupations ranged from 
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unemployed to professional (academics, lawyers) and highest level of qualiica-
tion ranged from no qualiications to PhD level. All participants were native 
speakers of English from the UK.
2.6.2 Materials and procedure
Participants were approached in libraries, cofee shops, sports centres and so-
cial clubs in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Following informed consent, all participants 
completed a four-part questionnaire using a pen while sitting down.
Part 1 of the questionnaire gathered demographic information: age, gender, 
native language, nationality and highest level of education.
For Part 2 of the questionnaire, participants completed an acceptability judg-
ment task which consisted of 9 pairs of temporal expressions, such as We’re ap-
proaching Christmas (Moving Ego) and Christmas is approaching (Moving Time). 
Participants were presented with a 5-point Likert scale for each pair of expres-
sions, with each expression anchoring one end of the scale and “equally good” 
anchoring the centre. The purpose of including this task was to ensure that in 
unambiguous temporal expressions, both the syntactic framing associated with 
the Moving Ego perspective and that associated with the Moving Time perspec-
tive were acceptable to our participant population.
For Part 3 of the questionnaire, extroversion was measured using the eight 
extroversion statements, such as I see myself as someone who is reserved, from the 
BFI (John 1990) and a ive-point Likert scale with “Very true” anchoring the let-
hand side of the scale, “Neutral” in the middle and “Very untrue” anchoring the 
right-hand side of the scale.
The inal part of the questionnaire consisted of one question: the Next 
Wednesday’s meeting disambiguation paradigm. Participants read the following 
instructions:
Please read the following question and provide your answer below. Do not spend too 
much time thinking about it and do not change your answer: I am interested in your initial 
reaction.
  Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days.
  What day has the meeting been re-scheduled to?
2.6.3 Results and discussion
The BFI Scoring Key (John and Srivastava 1999) was used to calculate the average 
extroversion score for each participant. The scale ranged from 1–5, with 1 denot-
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ing a low extroversion score and 5 denoting a high extroversion score. Mean 
 extroversion scores for each individual were calculated by adding the scores 
for  each statement and dividing by the total number of statements, i.e. 8. As 
 predicted, participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (responding 
 Friday) averaged signiicantly higher extroversion scores (M = 3.739; SD = 0.554) 
than participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective (responding  Monday) 
(M = 3.353; SD = 0.721), t(44) = 2.036, p = 0.048, d = 0.600.
We then examined participants’ preferences for either the syntactic framing 
associated with the Moving Ego perspective or that associated with the Moving 
Time perspective in the absence of ambiguity. We assigned numerical values to 
the Likert scales used in the acceptability judgment task, with −2 corresponding 
to the Moving Time end of the scale, 0 corresponding to the centre of the scale 
(i.e. both statements equally good), and 2 corresponding to the Moving Ego end of 
the scale. Our results showed no preference for either perspective in unambigu-
ous statements (M = −0.056, SD = 0.601).
Experiment 3 thus provides converging evidence that individual diferences 
in personality play a role in inluencing how people think about time. Speciically, 
as predicted, participants who interpreted the temporally ambiguous Next Wednes-
day’s meeting question in line with the Moving Ego perspective (answering Friday) 
averaged higher degrees of extroversion than participants who dis ambiguated 
the question in line with the Moving Time perspective (answering Monday).
3 General discussion
Hitherto, the vast majority of research investigating abstract thinking about time 
has been primarily focused on investigating spatial inluences on temporal rea-
soning; however, recent lines of research have extended beyond this, providing 
initial evidence that emotional experiences and, to a lesser extent, personality 
diferences, may also inluence people’s perspectives on the movement of events 
in time and their concomitant interpretations of temporally ambiguous utter-
ances, suggesting that there may not be a universal “neutral” context within 
which language is interpreted (Hauser et al. 2009; Richmond et al. 2012; see 
also Margolies and Crawford 2008; Ruscher 2011). As people’s conceptualizations 
of time cannot be attributed to a single factor, but instead, to a complex of fac-
tors,  we sought to further investigate which other individual diferences might 
inluence the ways in which people reason about events in time. Our results 
 demonstrate that both lifestyle and personality factors inluence people’s tempo-
ral perspective, precluding a universal “neutral” context for language interpreta-
tion and ambiguity resolution.
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In Experiment 1, we addressed the representativeness of the undergraduate 
populations directly, asking whether lifestyle diferences play a role in inluenc-
ing people’s preferred temporal perspective. To do this, we compared responses 
of students to the Next Wednesday’s meeting question with those of administra-
tors. We found that students, with relative control over the structuring of their 
own time and a high degree of temporal lexibility, were more likely to adopt the 
Moving Ego perspective (responding Friday). In contrast, administrators, who 
deal with the daily management of events and for whom time is regulated by ex-
ternal demands, were more likely to adopt a Moving Time perspective (respond-
ing Monday). Thus, lifestyle factors may carry through to language interpretation, 
leading to diferences in the interpretation of an ambiguous temporal utterance 
in the absence of further disambiguation cues.
Building on earlier indings, which demonstrate that personality diferences 
play a role in inluencing how people think about time (Hauser et al. 2009; 
 Richmond et al. 2012), Experiment 2 investigated whether individual diferences 
in conscientiousness (John 1990) and procrastination (Lay 1986) contribute to a 
person’s view of time and, hence, to their interpretation of the ambiguous Next 
Wednesday’s meeting question in an unprimed context. In line with the predic-
tion that the habitual movement of tasks may be a contributor to the temporal 
perspective adopted in response to McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous 
meeting question, with procrastinators tending to postpone action to a later date 
(Milgram et al. 1998; Milgram and Tenne 2000), and conscientious individuals 
tending to prioritize early action (Back et al. 2006; John and Srivastava 1999), we 
found that participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (answering 
 Friday) averaged higher degrees of procrastination, as well as lower degrees of 
conscientiousness, whereas participants who adopted the Moving Time perspec-
tive (answering Monday) averaged higher degrees of conscientiousness, as well 
as lower degrees of procrastination.
Experiment 3 provided converging evidence that individual diferences in 
personality play a role in inluencing how people think about time. Our indings 
in this experiment focused on one personality factor – extroversion – a factor that 
is characterized by an active approach-related motivation (John and Srivastava 
1999). In line with this active approach to events, we observed that participants 
who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (responding Friday) reported a higher 
degree of extroversion than participants who adopted the Moving Time perspec-
tive (responding Monday). Taken together, the indings from Experiments 2 and 3 
re-emphasize the diferences noted in Experiment 1, while suggesting a potential 
convergence between the roles of lifestyle and personality in the resolution of 
temporal ambiguity. This convergence of factors is incompatible with the as-
sumption of a “neutral” context, suggesting that language interpretation may 
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arise from an interaction between that which is encoded in the utterance and 
 aspects of the experiences and personality of the interpreter.
Our inding that the lifestyle and personality of the comprehender inluences 
the interpretation of an ambiguous temporal utterance raises the question of 
whether other kinds of factors may exert signiicant inluences on interpretation. 
Previous research on the Next Wednesday’s meeting question points to two as-
pects of what is encoded in the question that may interact with the lifestyle and 
personality factors examined here.
First, the ambiguous question asks about the rescheduling of a “meeting”, 
the nature of which is unspeciied to the comprehender.5 Recent research has 
demonstrated that the valence of an event (positive or negative) may inluence 
how people reason about time (Margolies and Crawford 2008). Reasoning that 
positive afect is typically associated with approach motivations and negative 
 afect, with avoidance motivations (Cacioppo et al. 1993; Chen and Bargh 1999; 
Neumann et al. 2003), Margolies and Crawford (2008) predicted that positively 
valenced events might encourage use of the Moving Ego perspective and nega-
tively valenced events might encourage use of the Moving Time perspective. 
Across three experiments, they observed an association between positive afect 
and the Moving Ego perspective (and, conversely, between negative afect and the 
Moving Time perspective), suggesting that the valence of an event can inluence 
how people reason about time.6
Second, the language itself may play a role in the interpretive possibilities 
available to a comprehender. Although the ambiguity observed in English is evi-
dent in some other languages, such as Dutch (Elvevåg et al. 2011), cross-linguistic 
investigations of the Next Wednesday’s meeting question have shown that this is 
not universally the case: when the question is translated into German, using the 
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention.
6 It should be noted that while participants in the positive (enthusiasm) condition were more 
likely to describe themselves as approaching the event (in line with the Moving Ego perspective) 
and participants in the negative (dread) condition were more likely to describe the event as 
 approaching themselves (in line with the Moving Time perspective), the valence of the event did 
not signiicantly afect whether the participants responded Monday or Friday. Margolies and Craw-
ford (2008) ofer two possible explanations for this apparent inconsistency, the irst being that al-
though people might have a tendency to imagine themselves approaching positive events (in line 
with the Moving Ego perspective), this efect is undermined by the tendency to want positive 
events to occur sooner (in line with the Moving Time perspective). The second possible explana-
tion relates to the diferent nature of the two questions: whereas the ‘approach question’ relates to 
a spatial scene and may tap into a person’s underlying representations of space,  McGlone and 
Harding’s (1998) ‘days question’ relates to a temporal scene and may tap into a person’s underlying 
representations of time. Although related, the two representations may  remain somewhat distinct.
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term vorverlegen for “moved forward”, the overwhelming majority of participants 
responded Monday (Bender et al. 2005), suggesting that the German question is 
not truly ambiguous. A similar preference for responding Monday has also been 
observed among speakers of Mandarin Chinese (Bender et al. 2010). Following 
up on these observations, preliminary cross-linguistic research investigating the 
Next Wednesday’s meeting question indicates that when translated into some 
 languages, the question remains ambiguous, while in others, it does not (Dufy in 
preparation): Anecdotally, the question is ambiguous in Afrikaans (p.c. Hannelie 
Grobler 2011), Danish (p.c. Marie Jensen 2011) and Hungarian (p.c. Zoltán Kövec-
ses 2011), much as it is in English. By contrast, the ambiguity is not apparent in 
languages such as Czech (p.c. Mirjam Fried 2011), Finnish (p.c. Tuomas Huumo 
2011), Italian (p.c. Claudia Baldoli 2011) and Ukrainian (p.c. Olga Pykhtina 2011), 
for which Friday appears to be the only possible response. While these prelimi-
nary indings, pending further empirical analysis, should be taken with some 
caution, these cross-linguistic diferences further counter the notion of the “neu-
tral” context. They also highlight, as a method of best practice, the necessity of 
surveying participants’ native languages, as the interpretation of the question in 
a participant’s L1 may inluence their interpretation of the question in L2. For 
 instance, a native speaker of German might be more likely to infer an L1 interpre-
tation and respond Monday to the question in English.7
4 Conclusion
Research examining interpretations of the temporally ambiguous Next Wednes-
day’s meeting question have largely been built on the assumption that partici-
pants may respond in a “neutral” context (Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002). While 
these studies have convincingly demonstrated a role for spatial thinking in the 
resolution of the temporal ambiguity, they have let unexamined a host of poten-
tial contributors to language interpretation and ambiguity resolution. By chal-
lenging the assumption of a “neutral” context, our study aims to round out the 
picture of contributors to language interpretation. Taken together, our indings 
suggest that individual diferences in personality and lifestyle may inluence 
 people’s perspectives on the movement of events in time, suggesting a role for 
such individual factors in the interpretation of ambiguous language and the con-
ceptualization of time. To reiterate Levine (2006: XVI):
7 To the best of our knowledge, our studies are the irst to explicitly survey participants’ native 
language. As all our participants were native speakers of English from the UK, we can rule out 
cross-linguistic inluences as a potential contributor.
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. . . how people construe the time of their lives comprises a world of diversity. There are 
drastic diferences on every level: from culture to culture, city to city, and from neighbor to 
neighbor.
In sum, our evidence combines with past indings to suggest that a complete 
 understanding of responses to temporally ambiguous language might only be 
achieved through the joint consideration of individual factors as well as contex-
tual priming.
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Appendix
Table 1: Temporal instances of approaching in the BYU-BNC
Token sample: 200
Token frequency: 20 (10%)
Moving Time (MT) frequency: 12 (60%)
Moving Ego (ME) frequency: 8 (40%)
1 Then he washed his hands. Christmas was approaching and the shop windows began 
to ill with seasonal tableaux.
MT
2 They made love as though tomorrow was fast approaching, and with it imminent 
departure. 
MT
3 Our mission? To ilm arctic foxes facing up to the rigours of approaching winter. We 
were not, however destined to be alone 
MT
4 It was several weeks later. There was a smell of approaching summer in the air. The 
Sunday school had closed
MT
5 Another Friday 13th was approaching so I was certain we could expect another move, 
maybe the big one.
MT
6 of the play. The scene with Lesley-Jane started. Everyone knew the climax was 
approaching.
MT
7 With Christmas approaching police believe the thieves may try to sell of the birds to 
dealers
MT
8 It is approaching midnight in Munster when the recovery crew return to conclude 
another busy day for the
ME
9 The time might be approaching when the viability of employing these vase armies of 
professionals needs to be reappraised.
MT
10 the time was fast approaching when the reverse became true and the king would 
defend the church from the plans 
MT
11 You are a destroyer, MacQuillan, but the time is approaching when you will be destroyed. 
No over-use of capitals, no underlining.
MT
12 This time with the Parliamentary Recess fast approaching, the Government urged the 
Commons not to insist on its disagreement with the Lords
MT
13 The indenture suggests that he was then approaching the end of his career. A 
citizen’s will of July 1449 implies that
ME
14 he stares into his Guinness with the glum patience of a headmaster approaching 
retirement. 
ME
15 Imperial Adventures by Dea Birkett Macmillan, 25 IN January 1892 Mary Kingsley, 
approaching 30, was her mother’s nurse in Cambridge.
ME
16  It took Preston back iteen years. Like the problem. It was a problem of youth, not of 
approaching middle age.
MT
17 his courage and sense of public duty there is no need to enlarge. Though 
approaching early middle age, on the outbreak of the last world war he at once
ME
18 Young people approaching the age when they would no longer be the formal 
responsibility of the local authorities
ME
19 The fact that she was approaching thirty can not have made the decision any easier. 
Neither can the marriage of her younger sister
ME
20 These fortunate people are the irst generation approaching retirement who have not 
sufered a signiicant interruption in their career because of the war
ME
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Table 2: Temporal instances of coming up in the BYU-BNC
Token sample: 200
Token frequency: 17 (8.5%)
Moving Time (MT) frequency: 9 (53%)
Moving Ego (ME) frequency: 8 (47%)
1 The time is just coming up to twenty-one minutes past seven o’clock. Tonight we are 
certainly – hopping – from one subject to another.
ME
2 We exhibited there. But there’s an International Business Fair coming up at the end 
of this month.
MT
3 Symphony No 29 was written in the later part of 1773. Mozart was then coming up to 
his eighteenth birthday, but already a mature master
ME
4 they will tell you everybody they know who’s going to have er a wedding coming up 
and then you can write to them. 
MT
5 their fortunes in the opinion polls did they decide that, with the general coming up, 
and the prospect of their being routed, they should do something.
MT
6 What we’re gonna do now, it’s just coming up to twenty past three, so we’ll take a 
tea break and then
ME
7 It’s coming up for midnight,’ said Shirley, with some relief, pointing at the quartz 
carriage clock on the mantelpiece
ME
8 again haven’t asked Spike about inding out erm (pause) when and where by-
elections are coming up. (SP:PS1R8) I don’t think there are any coming up.
MT
9 eye on a little set of drawers, yew-wood veneer. Lucy’s birthday’s coming up, 
November the seventh . . .”
MT
10 And with several parties coming up this autumn-winter the prospects for the coming 
months are looking good.
MT
11 If you’ve got a birthday or something coming up and if somebody wants to know 
what to buy you (pause) that’s what
MT
12 No I haven’t got me outit yet (SP:PS01V) No, when is your wedding coming up? 
(SP:PS01T) April the fourth (SP:PS01V) Ooh is it, ooh (SP:PS01T)
MT
13 so Dave’s forty one? (SP:PS09U) Forty, forty last June, he’s coming up to forty one 
this year (SP:PS09T) forty one in May? (SP:PS09U) Yeah (pause)
ME
14 Runaway wins against Newport and Bridgend has boosted conidence but the crunch 
is coming up . . . time for Gloucester to ight their way out of trouble
MT
15 seven (SP:PS01V) Oh that’s fantastic (SP:PS01T) Aye (SP:PS01T) you know he’s 
twenty seven coming up you know
ME
16 I will certainly er stay in order but (pause) the British electorate coming up to June 
the ninth and the European er elections will not know even if
ME
17 they do not face the same regeneration problem; only now are their oldest 
consultants coming up to retirement.
ME
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Abstract
In English, two deictic space-time metaphors are in common usage: the Moving Ego metaphor
conceptualizes the ego as moving forward through time and the Moving Time metaphor conceptu-
alizes time as moving forward toward the ego (Clark, 1973). Although earlier research investigat-
ing the psychological reality of these metaphors has typically examined spatial influences on
temporal reasoning (e.g., Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002), recent lines of research have extended
beyond this, providing initial evidence that personality differences and emotional experiences may
also influence how people reason about events in time (Duffy & Feist, 2014; Hauser, Carter, &
Meier, 2009; Richmond, Wilson, & Zinken, 2012). In this article, we investigate whether these
relationships have force in real life. Building on the effects of individual differences in self-
reported conscientiousness and procrastination found by Duffy and Feist (2014), we examined
whether, in addition to self-reported conscientiousness and procrastination, there is a relationship
between conscientious and procrastinating behaviors and temporal perspective. We found that par-
ticipants who adopted the Moving Time perspective were more likely to exhibit conscientious
behaviors, while those who adopted the Moving Ego perspective were more likely to procrastinate,
suggesting that the earlier effects reach beyond the laboratory.
Keywords: Moving Ego; Moving Time; Time; Metaphor; Procrastination; Conscientiousness;
Personality; Self-report; Behavior
1. Introduction
It has often been observed that in English, language from the relatively concrete
domain of space is recruited to talk about the relatively abstract domain of time (e.g.,
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Humanities, Northumbria University, Lipman Building, Newcastle-upon-Tyne NE1 8ST, UK. E-mail: sarah.
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Clark, 1973; Evans, 2004; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Traugott, 1978). Indeed, many meta-
phor theorists have claimed that the sensory and motor representations that derive from
constant successful functioning in the cultural and physical environment are recycled to
support abstract thought (Gibbs, 1994; K€ovecses, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999).
In the domain of time, for instance, these representations derive from the human experi-
ence of navigating through, orienting within, and observing motion in space. While there
are various types of spatial metaphors for time in English, particular attention has been
paid to two deictic space-time metaphors: the Moving Ego metaphor conceptualizes time
as a stationary landscape that the active ego moves across, for example, We’re approach-
ing Christmas and the Moving Time metaphor conceives of time as a conveyor belt that
events move along, relative to a stationary ego, for example, Christmas is approaching
(Clark, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In seminal research investigating the psychologi-
cal reality of these two metaphors, Boroditsky (2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002)
devised a series of experiments to examine whether engaging in thought about spatial
motion under various circumstances might prime different construals of time. In one
experiment, participants were asked to imagine moving toward a stationary object or to
imagine an object moving toward them before answering the ambiguous question: Next
Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward 2 days. Which day is the meeting now that
it’s been moved? (cf. McGlone & Harding, 1998). Based on the assumption that people’s
understanding of time is grounded in their experiences in space (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999), it was hypothesized that imagining moving through space toward a
stationary object would encourage participants to adopt the Moving Ego perspective
(responding Friday) and imagining a moving object traveling through space toward the
self would encourage participants to adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding
Monday). As predicted, participants tended to respond in a prime-consistent manner to
the Wednesday’s meeting question, suggesting that different ways of thinking about
motion in space may influence a person’s conceptualization of time and their
concomitant interpretation of a temporally ambiguous question. These preliminary results
have been extended, with demonstrations that non-deictic spatial schemas (Kranjec, 2006;
Nu~nez, Motz, & Teuscher, 2006), fictive motion schemas (Matlock, Ramscar, & Borodit-
sky, 2005; Ramscar, Matlock, & Dye, 2010) and abstract motion schemas (Matlock,
Holmes, Srinivasan, & Ramscar, 2011) can also influence how people reason about events
in time.
In addition to time, a variety of abstract domains draw upon the concrete domain of
space, including emotions, health, social status, personality traits, etc. (Lakoff & John-
son, 1980), raising the possibility that these domains may be connected to time via
shared spatial schemas. Although the majority of research investigating abstract thinking
about time has hitherto been primarily focused on investigating spatial influences on
temporal reasoning, recent lines of research have provided initial evidence that person-
ality differences and emotional experiences may also influence an individual’s approach
to time and resulting resolution of temporal ambiguity (Duffy & Feist, 2014; Hauser,
Carter, & Meier, 2009; Richmond, Wilson, & Zinken, 2012; see also Lee & Ji, 2014;
Margolies & Crawford, 2008; Ruscher, 2011). For example, Hauser et al. (2009)
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investigated the link between the seemingly unrelated but similarly embodied abstract
domains of anger and time, reasoning that anger is spatially grounded in approach-
related motivations, which cause the active self to approach a goal (Harmon-Jones,
2003), much in the way that the self approaches the future in the Moving Ego meta-
phor. As such, Hauser et al. (2009) hypothesized that this approach-related spatial moti-
vation could serve as an embodied cognitive link between the two domains. To test
this hypothesis, they had participants complete a series of questionnaires for measuring
trait anger (that is, anger as part of their personality) before responding to the Wednes-
day’s meeting question (Hauser et al., 2009). The results showed that participants who
reported higher trait anger scores were more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspec-
tive (responding Friday) than to adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding Mon-
day), thus providing initial evidence for a relationship between anger and
representations of time.
In another study, Richmond et al. (2012), reasoning that people with a strong sense of
personal agency (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) would be more likely to conceive of them-
selves as moving through time, investigated the relationship between level of perceived
personal agency and temporal perspective. In one experiment, participants responded to
the Wednesday’s meeting question before completing a questionnaire for assessing indi-
vidual differences in the level of perceived personal agency (Richmond et al., 2012;
Study 2). They found that participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective reported
significantly higher agency scores than participants who adopted the Moving Time per-
spective. These findings thus extend the range of spatially grounded individual differences
that may influence people’s representations of time, demonstrating that people’s conceptu-
alization of time likely results from a culmination of factors, rather than a single factor
(Richmond et al., 2012).
More recently, Duffy and Feist (2014) investigated whether individual differences in
conscientiousness (John, 1990) and procrastination (Lay, 1986) would contribute to a
person’s view of time and, hence, to their interpretation of the ambiguous Wednesday’s
meeting question. Personality research shows that in contrast to procrastinators, who
tend to defer or postpone action (Milgram, Mey-Tal, & Levison, 1998; Milgram &
Tenne, 2000), conscientious individuals tend to prioritize action (Back, Schmukle, &
Egloff, 2006; John & Srivastava, 1999). In other words, procrastination involves the
movement of tasks “forward” into the future, in a direction defined by the ego’s move-
ment through time (in line with the Moving Ego perspective) while conscientiousness
involves the movement of tasks “forward” toward the present, ergo toward the ego (in
line with the Moving Time perspective).1 Thus, Duffy and Feist (2014) hypothesized
that the habitual movement of tasks may be a contributor to the temporal perspective
adopted in response to the Wednesday’s meeting question, with procrastinators favoring
the Moving Ego perspective, and conscientious individuals favoring the Moving Time
perspective. To test these predictions, they had participants complete a questionnaire for
measuring trait conscientiousness (John, 1990) and trait procrastination (Lay, 1986).
Sample items included I do not do assignments until just before they are to be handed
in (procrastination) and I see myself as someone who does things efficiently (conscien-
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tiousness). Participants then responded to the Wednesday’s meeting question. Consistent
with the predictions, participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (answering
Friday) averaged higher procrastination scores, as well as lower conscientiousness
scores than participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective (answering Mon-
day).
While recent research has provided initial evidence that individual personality differ-
ences that may be conceptualized spatially may also influence an individual’s approach
to time and resulting resolution of temporal ambiguity, all of these studies have relied
on participants’ self-reports regarding personality traits, leaving open the question of
whether these relationships have force in real life. To address this question, three exper-
iments examined the resolution of temporal ambiguity, using as our impetus Duffy and
Feist’s (2014) investigation of conscientiousness and procrastination in relation to tem-
poral perspective. Thus, the current study compares the resolution of temporal ambiguity
to the timeliness of workers traveling to work, that is, if they were early, on time, or
late (Experiment 1), to the timeliness of students submitting an essay (Experiment 2),
and to the time of arrival for a scheduled appointment (Experiment 3). The results from
these three experiments provide further validation of the initial findings while also pro-
viding evidence that individual differences in time management as observed in real-life
contexts may influence how people think about time and how they resolve temporal
ambiguities.
2. The present studies
2.1. Experiment 1
While many kinds of behavior may be associated with conscientiousness and procrasti-
nation, one measure that has been demonstrably related to both of these personality vari-
ables across a number of studies is that of punctuality (e.g., Ashton, 1998; Back et al.,
2006; Dıaz-Morales, Ferrari, Dıaz, & Argumedo, 2006; Roberts, Bogg, Walton, Cher-
nyshenko, & Stark, 2004; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984). For instance, in one study inves-
tigating reasons for procrastinating among students, Solomon and Rothblum (1984) found
lack of punctuality to be the measure of behavior that correlated most significantly with
self-reported procrastination. In another study investigating the influence of personality
on punctuality in a real-life setting, Back et al. (2006) found that participants who
reported higher conscientiousness scores tended to arrive earlier for their scheduled
appointment. Thus, punctuality provides an objectively observable real-world reflex of
procrastination and conscientiousness.
Taken together, these findings suggest a way to extend Duffy and Feist’s (2014) results
using a measure of real-life behavior: we hypothesized that there would be differences in
temporal reasoning between people who are on time for work and those who are not. To
test this, in Experiment 1, we interviewed people at a bus station who were en route to
work. We predict that, in response to the Wednesday’s meeting question, people who are
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running early would be more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding
Monday), whereas people who are running late would be more likely to adopt the Moving
Ego perspective (responding Friday).
2.1.1. Participants
One hundred and four adults with an age range of 18–59 years and a mean age of
33 years participated in this experiment in exchange for a small reward.2 Forty partici-
pants were male and 65 were female. All participants were native speakers of English.
2.1.2. Materials and procedure
The experiment took place on a Wednesday morning between 7.30 am and 9.30 am at
Newcastle Haymarket bus station. People waiting for a bus were approached individually
by an experimenter. The experimenter greeted each person and asked if they were travel-
ing to work. People who responded Yes were then asked if they would be willing to take
part in a brief survey. Following informed consent, participants provided demographical
information (age, gender, and native language) before answering two test questions and the
Wednesday’s meeting question. For the first test question—Are you on time for work—
participants answered using one of the three options provided: Yes, No, or Not applicable.3
For the second test question—If yes or no which applies most to you?—participants rated
the extent to which they were on schedule for work using one of five options: Very late,
Late, On time, Early, or Very early. The order in which these options were presented was
counterbalanced across participants. Participants then provided a response to the ambiguous
temporal question: Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward 2 days. What day
has the meeting been rescheduled to? All questions were administered orally and all
responses were written down by the experimenter throughout the exchange.
2.1.3. Results and discussion
The answers to the two test questions were compared against the answer to the
Wednesday’s meeting question for each participant. As predicted, participants who were
on schedule or early were more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding
Monday), whereas participants who were running late were more likely to adopt the Mov-
ing Ego perspective (responding Friday). Concretely, 62.7% of participants on schedule
responded Monday in comparison to 17.2% of participants who were not. A chi-square
test revealed a reliable difference in the proportion of Monday and Friday responses
between the two groups: v21,104 = 17.262, p < .0001 Cramer’s V = 0.407. For the second
test question, which measured the extent to which each participant was on schedule for
work, responses were coded with a number from 1 to 5, with 1 denoting I am very late
and 5 denoting I am very early. As predicted, participants who adopted the Moving Time
perspective (responding Monday) were more likely to be running early (M = 3.279;
SD = 0.760) than participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (responding
Friday) (M = 2.635; SD = 0.908), t(102) = 3.279, p < .001, d = 0.643.
Building on the effects of self-reported conscientiousness and procrastination on tem-
poral reasoning found by Duffy and Feist (2014) Experiment 1 provides converging
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evidence that, in addition to self-reported conscientiousness and procrastination, there is a
relationship between conscientious and procrastinating behaviors and temporal perspec-
tive, as observed in a real-life setting. The results, however, raise further questions. One
shortfall is that the measure of behavior relied on participants’ self perceptions of the
extent to which they were on schedule for work; thus, giving rise to the question of
whether the effects have observable, real-world consequences using more objective mea-
sures. To address this, in Experiment 2 we sought a more objective measure of behavior,
surveying students as they arrived to submit an assignment.
2.2. Experiment 2
Procrastination is argued to be especially common in the academic domain, with up to
95% of students procrastinating consistently with academic tasks such as studying for
examinations, keeping up-to-date with weekly seminar reading and writing essays (e.g.,
Ellis & Knaus, 1977; Ferrari & Beck, 1998; see also Solomon & Rothblum, 1984; Steel,
Brothen, & Wambach, 2001). Researchers investigating psychological explanations for
procrastination among students have assessed procrastinating behavior via the times taken
by students to submit assignments (Beswick, Rothblum, & Mann, 1988). Similarly,
research investigating conscientiousness and its relation to professionalism among medi-
cal students has made use of on-time submission of assignments as an objective measure
of conscientiousness (Finn, Sawdon, Clipsham, & McLachlan, 2009; McLachlan, Finn, &
Macnaughton, 2009). Because the punctuality of the submission of an assignment pro-
vides an objectively observable index of conscientiousness/procrastination, Experiment 2
investigated whether students submitting their assignment further in advance of the dead-
line would reason about time differently from students submitting their assignment closer
to the deadline, as evidenced by the temporal perspective they adopted in response to the
Wednesday’s meeting question. We predict that students who submit their essay earlier
would be more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective (responding Monday),
whereas students who submit their essay later would be more likely to adopt the Moving
Ego perspective (responding Friday).
2.2.1. Participants
Sixty undergraduate students from Northumbria University, with an age range from
19 to 30 and a mean age of 21 years, participated in this experiment. Twenty-one
participants were male and 39 were female. All participants were native speakers of
English.
2.2.2. Materials and procedure
The experiment took place on a Wednesday. Participants were approached individually
by an experimenter at the Student Advice and Support Centre on the Northumbria Uni-
versity campus, where students based in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences are
required to submit their assignments for formal assessment. The experimenter greeted
each participant and asked if they would be willing to take part in a brief survey. Following
S. E. Duffy, M. I. Feist, S. McCarthy / Cognitive Science 38 (2014) 1667
informed consent, participants provided demographical information (age, gender, and
native language) before answering the test question How far in advance of the deadline
did you submit your assignment? and then providing a response to the ambiguous tempo-
ral question Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward 2 days. What day has
the meeting been rescheduled to? All questions were administered orally and all
responses were written down by the experimenter throughout the exchange.
2.2.3. Results and discussion
The answer to the test question was compared against the response to the Wednesday’s
meeting question for each participant.4 As predicted, participants who adopted the Mov-
ing Ego perspective (responding Friday) were submitting their assignment closer to
the deadline (M = 145 min prior; SD = 82 min) than participants who adopted the
Moving Time perspective (responding Monday) (M = 208 min prior; SD = 116 min),
t(58) = 2.495, p = .015, d = 0.635. The results thus extend upon the findings in Experi-
ment 1, providing further evidence that the relationship between temporal perspective and
self-reported procrastination and conscientiousness is matched by the relationship between
temporal perspective and procrastinating/conscientious behaviors.
Across two experiments, we have observed connections between time-management
behaviors and temporal perspective sampled outside the laboratory. However, as in much
related research, the findings rely on the interpretation of a single ambiguous question;
thus, giving rise to the question of whether we would observe similar effects using dif-
ferent dependent variables for measuring temporal perspective. If the Wednesday’s meet-
ing question is a robust and reliable measure of temporal perspective, we would expect
to observe a similar pattern of results using other ambiguous temporal questions that
make use of different temporal units, for example, hours within the day, Tomorrow’s
noon meeting has been moved forward 2 hours and months within the year, The October
meeting has been moved forward 2 months (cf. Kranjec, Cardillo, Schmidt, & Chatterjee,
2010; Lai & Boroditsky, 2013; Nu~nez et al., 2006).5 Indeed, research shows that people
tend to be consistent in their representations of time, such that people who imagine
moving forward a meeting scheduled for Wednesday by 2 days to Monday (as opposed
to Friday) are also more likely to imagine moving forward a meeting scheduled for noon
by 2 hours to 10 am (as opposed to 2 pm) (Nu~nez et al., 2006; cf. Richmond et al.,
2012). However, these measures have yet to be used in conjunction with the sampling
of real-world behaviors.
To address this issue, Experiment 3 investigated whether people arriving earlier for a
scheduled appointment would reason about time differently to people arriving later for a
scheduled appointment (cf. Back et al., 2006). Extending on from the Wednesday’s meet-
ing question, participants responded to two different questions intended to measure tem-
poral perspective: the noon meeting question and the October meeting question. Building
on earlier findings, we predict that people who arrive early would be more likely to adopt
the Moving Time perspective (indicated by 10 am and August responses), whereas people
who arrive late would be more likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective (indicated by
2 pm and December responses).
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2.3. Experiment 3
2.3.1. Participants
Forty-five adults with an age range of 19–65 years and a mean age of 38 years partici-
pated in this experiment in exchange for a gift voucher. Eighteen participants were male
and 27 were female. All participants were native speakers of English.
2.3.2. Materials and procedure
The experiment took place between January and March. Participants were recruited
through flyers that were distributed in local shops and restaurants, as well as through an
online advertising website. To take part in the study, participants were instructed to con-
tact the experimenter via email. They were then allocated an appointment time and
instructed that they should arrive at a specified meeting point—namely, the entrance of
the Lipman coffee shop on the Northumbria University campus—at the time allocated.
The experimenter recorded the arrival time of each participant. Lateness was calculated
by the number of minutes between the appointment time and the time of the participant’s
arrival and earliness was calculated by the number of minutes between the appointment
time and the time of the participant’s arrival multiplied by 1 (cf. Back et al., 2006);
hence, positive scores indicate late arrival and negative scores indicate early arrival (e.g.,
5 min late; 0 min on time; 5 min early). Following informed consent, all participants
completed the study using a pen while sitting down at a table. To begin with, participants
provided demographical information (age, gender, native language, occupation, and high-
est level of education) before undertaking a study comprised of six tasks that were unre-
lated to the current experiment. The two ambiguous meeting test questions appeared on
separate pages and were interspersed between the different tasks (cf. Boroditsky, 2000).
Specifically, the first test question appeared after task 3 (a vocabulary task) and the sec-
ond test question appeared after task 5 (an author recognition task). Participants read each
test question before indicating when the meeting had been rescheduled to. The order of
the two test questions was counterbalanced across participants.
2.3.3. Results and discussion
The time of arrival ranged from 22 min early to 25 min late. On average, participants
arrived 2.89 min before their appointment time (SD = 9.14). Thirty participants were
early, 0 were exactly on time, and 15 were late. As predicted, participants who arrived
early for their appointment were more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective (indi-
cated by 10 am and August responses), whereas participants who arrived late were more
likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective (indicated by 2 pm and December responses).
Concretely, for the noon meeting question, 63.3% of participants who arrived early
responded 10 am in comparison to 36.7% of participants who arrived late. A chi-square
test revealed a reliable difference in response: v21,45 = 4.132, p = .042 Cramer’s
V = 0.303. Similarly, for the October meeting question, 66.7% of participants who
arrived early responded August in comparison to 33.3% of participants who arrived late.
Again, a chi-square test showed a reliable difference in response: v21,45 = 4.500,
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p = .034 Cramer’s V = 0.316. Participants were also highly consistent in their answers.
Those who responded 10 am also answered August (88.0%), and those who responded
2 pm also answered December (95.0%): v21,45 = 30.633, p < .0001 Cramer’s V = 0.825.
Looked at another way, for the noon meeting question, participants who adopted the
Moving Time perspective arrived earlier on average (M = 6.130; SD = 8.465) than par-
ticipants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (M = 0.750; SD = 8.744),
t(45) = 2.585, p = .013, d = 0.799. Similarly, for the October meeting question, partici-
pants who adopted the Moving Time perspective arrived earlier on average (M = 5.800;
SD = 8.367) than participants who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (M = 0.750;
SD = 8.944), t(45) = 2.531, p = .015, d = 0.756.
These results provide corroborating evidence that time-management behaviors, as sam-
pled in real-world situations, correlate with the perspective adopted in the resolution of
temporal ambiguity. Furthermore, Experiment 3 extends the findings to two additional
temporal reasoning questions, strengthening our confidence in the relationships uncovered
and suggesting that the original effects observed were not due to the specific item being
used, that is, the Wednesday’s meeting question.
3. General discussion
Hitherto, research investigating abstract thinking about time has typically been con-
cerned with investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning. However, the influence
of space as a source domain for metaphor extends beyond time, encompassing other
abstract domains such as emotion, social status, and personality traits. Our understanding
of the workings of metaphor is incomplete without an investigation of potential connec-
tions among similarly grounded abstract domains.
Recent lines of research have extended beyond demonstrating the psychological reality
of space-time metaphors, providing initial evidence that personality differences and emo-
tional experiences, particularly those grounded in spatial schemas, may also influence an
individual’s approach to time and resulting resolution of temporal ambiguity (Duffy &
Feist, 2014; Hauser et al., 2009; Richmond et al., 2012; see also Lee & Ji, 2014; Margo-
lies & Crawford, 2008; Ruscher, 2011). However, these studies have all relied on partici-
pants’ self-reports regarding personality traits, introducing a measure of uncertainty into
the conclusions regarding the connections uncovered. Building on insights from Duffy
and Feist (2014) who found that individual differences in self-reported conscientiousness
and procrastination may contribute to a person’s view of time and, hence, to their inter-
pretation of the ambiguous Wednesday’s meeting question, we sought to investigate
whether these relationships have force beyond the laboratory. Across three experiments,
we examined whether, in addition to self-reported conscientiousness and procrastination,
there is a relationship between conscientious and procrastinating behaviors and temporal
perspective.
In Experiment 1, we investigated whether the extent to which a traveler was on time
for work would influence the temporal perspective they adopted in response to the
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Wednesday’s meeting question. Consistent with earlier findings which showed that high
degrees of self-reported conscientiousness are demonstrably related to the Moving Time
perspective (Duffy & Feist, 2014) and that conscientious behavior is associated with
punctuality (Ashton, 1998; Back et al., 2006), we found that people who adopted the
Moving Time perspective (responding Monday), were more likely to be running early
than were people who adopted the Moving Ego perspective (responding Friday).
In Experiments 2 and 3, we moved beyond self-assessment of timeliness, investigating
the relationship between objectively observable on-time behavior and temporal perspec-
tive. Experiment 2 examined whether students submitting their assignment further in
advance of the deadline would reason about time differently from students submitting
their assignment closer to the deadline, while Experiment 3 examined the relationship
between temporal perspective and timeliness for a scheduled appointment, while also
extending the sampling measure to two new temporal reasoning questions. In line with
earlier findings, we found in both cases that participants who adopted the Moving Ego
perspective were meeting their obligations later on average than participants who adopted
the Moving Time perspective, thus extending earlier findings to encompass more objec-
tively measureable behaviors.
Taken together, the results from these experiments provide further validation of
earlier findings that individual differences in conscientiousness and procrastination may
influence how people think about time and how they resolve temporal ambiguities
(Duffy & Feist, 2014), suggesting psychologically real connections between similarly
grounded abstract domains. In addition, the results extend prior work in two ways.
First, these results provide evidence of a relationship between naturally occurring
conscientious and procrastinating behaviors and temporal perspective, thus taking the
findings beyond the laboratory to strengthen our confidence in the relationships uncov-
ered. Secondly, by drawing on additional measures of adopted temporal perspective,
these studies generalize previous findings to temporal reasoning at different time scales,
suggesting a consistency between temporal reasoning and the ways in which we move
through time.
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Notes
1. In line with the opposed directionality of task movement, personality research sug-
gests that procrastination tends to operate in parallel to (lack of) conscientiousness
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in predicting behavior (e.g., Lay, 1997; Johnson & Bloom, 1995; Schouwenburg &
Lay, 1995).
2. Twelve participants were unwilling to disclose their age; thus, the range and mean
is calculated on the basis of the remaining 92 participants.
3. No participant chose the Not applicable option.
4. In line with earlier findings, this student population demonstrated a preference for
answering Friday (58.3%) in comparison to Monday (41.7%) (cf. Boroditsky,
2000; Duffy & Feist, 2014; Nu~nez, 2007; Sullivan & Barth, 2012).
5. Similarly to the Wednesday meeting question, the noon meeting and the October
meeting questions are ambiguous, giving rise to two possible responses: 10 am or
2 pm (the noon meeting question) and August or December (the October meeting
question).
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The Role of Cultural Artifacts in the Interpretation
of Metaphorical Expressions About Time
Sarah E. Duffy
Northumbria University
Across cultures, people employ space to construct representations of time. English exhibits two
deictic space–time metaphors: the “moving ego” metaphor conceptualizes the ego as moving for-
ward through time and the “moving time” metaphor conceptualizes time as moving forward towards
the ego. Earlier research investigating the psychological reality of these metaphors has shown that
engaging in certain types of spatial-motion thinking may influence how people reason about events
in time. More recently, research has shown that people’s interactions with cultural artifacts may also
influence their representations of time. Extending research on space–time mappings in new direc-
tions, three experiments investigated the role of cultural artifacts, namely calendars and clocks, in
the interpretation of metaphorical expressions about time. Taken together, the results provide initial
evidence that, in their interpretation of ambiguous metaphorical expressions about time, people auto-
matically access and use spatial representations of absolute time, whereby moving forward in space
corresponds with moving later in time. Moreover, asking participants to use a reverse space–time
mapping causes interference, which is reflected through their temporal reasoning.
One of the most fundamental and yet enigmatic aspects of human experience is that of time.
We do not possess apparatus for the processing of temporal experience in the same way that our
sensory-perceptual apparatus enables the processing of spatial experience; yet, we can conceive
of its passage in much the way we can conceive of any other worldly experience (Evans, 2004).
The reason for this, it has been proposed, is that the sensory and motor representations that derive
from interacting in the natural environment are recycled in order to support abstract thought (e.g.,
Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In the domain of time, for instance,
these representations derive from the human experience of navigating through, orienting within
and observing motion in space. As such, spatial concepts largely constitute our conceptions of
temporality, such that space is often useful and, arguably, necessary to structure how people think
about time (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
More recently, research has demonstrated that conceptual metaphors are as much cultural as
they are internally represented in the minds of individuals, with culture playing an instrumental
role in shaping embodiment and, hence, metaphorical thought (cf. Gibbs, 1999). Indeed, while
the practice of using space to represent time may be universal, vast differences have been
observed in the ways in which time is spatialized across languages and cultures. For instance, the
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future may be construed as in front of us (English), behind us (Aymara), below us (Mandarin),
uphill (Yupno), or to the west (Kuuk Thaayorre) (Boroditsky, Fuhrman, & McCormick, 2010;
Boroditsky & Gaby, 2010; Núñez, Cooperrider, Doan, & Wassmann, 2012; Núñez & Sweetser,
2006). Furthermore, a body of research has provided evidence that people’s experiences with
cultural artifacts1—such as calendars, graphs, and written text—may also influence their repre-
sentations of time. For example, in one study, Tversky, Kugelmass, and Winter (1991) instructed
English participants (who read left-to-right) and Arabic participants (who read right-to-left) to
graphically lay out a sequence of events, such as the meals of the day. The results showed that,
whereas English participants organized the sequence from left-to-right, positioning breakfast to
the left of lunch and dinner to the right, Arabic participants showed the opposite arrangement,
consistent with the direction of orthography in both of these languages. Similar patterns have
also been found in reaction time tasks comparing English and Hebrew literates (Fuhrman &
Boroditsky, 2010; cf. Ouellet, Santiago, Israeli, & Gabay, 2010). For example, Fuhrman and
Boroditsky (2010, Studies 2 and 3) found that when instructing participants to make rapid tem-
poral order judgments about pairs of images (e.g., a person at different stages in life; filling
a cup of coffee), English participants were consistently faster when making earlier judgments
using the left response key and later judgments using the right response key. By contrast, Hebrew
participants showed the reverse pattern. Moreover, instructing participants to use a space–time
mapping that was inconsistent with the direction of orthography in their native language created
interference, causing participants’ response times to slow down. Taken together, Fuhrman and
Boroditsky (2010) concluded that people automatically access culturally specific representations
of space when making judgments about time.
The relationship between space and time is also reflected in the language people habitually
use when talking about events in time: instances in time can be conceived as points (at noon;
on Monday); durations can be expressed in terms of distance (a long meeting; a short vacation);
events can be moved (the party was brought forward; the deadline was pushed backward). Indeed,
while English exhibits various spatial metaphors for time, particular attention has been paid to
two deictic space–time metaphors: in the “moving ego” metaphor, time is construed as a static
landscape that the active ego moves across (e.g., “We’re approaching Christmas”; “We’ve passed
the deadline”) and in the “moving time” metaphor, time is conceptualized as a conveyor belt on
which events move, relative to a stationary ego (e.g., “Christmas is approaching”; “The deadline
has passed”; H. H. Clark, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In addition to linguistic evidence,
research conducted by Boroditsky and colleagues (Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar,
2002) has provided evidence for the psychological reality of these two metaphors, demonstrating
that thinking about spatial motion under various circumstances can prime different construals
of time. For instance, by using an ambiguous temporal task, namely Next Wednesday’s meeting
has been moved forward two days. What day is the meeting now that it has been rescheduled?
(cf. McGlone & Harding, 1998), Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) found that when participants
were primed with a self-motion scenario (e.g., moving through space towards a stationary object;
in line with the “moving ego” perspective), they were more likely to re-use this perspective
for time and respond Friday. By contrast, when participants imagined motion towards the self
1Cultural artifacts (or in other parlance, cultural technologies, cognitive artifacts, or material artifacts), can be defined
as “artifacts that support symbolic and conceptual processes in abstract conceptual domains” (da Silva Sinha, Sinha,
Sampaio, & Zinken, 2012, p. 32; cf. Evans, 2013; Núñez & Cooperrider, 2013; Tversky, 2011; Williams, 2004).
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(e.g., imagining a moving object traveling through space towards them; in line with the “moving
time” perspective), they were more likely to respond Monday. Taken together, the results provide
evidence of a conceptual relationship between spatial and temporal representations, such that
different ways of thinking about motion in space can yield different construals of time.
Probing this relationship further, Matlock, Holmes, Srinivasan, and Ramscar (2011) conducted
a series of experiments to investigate whether, similarly to thinking about actual motion, think-
ing about subtler forms of motion, such as abstract motion,2 may influence how people reason
about events in time and their concomitant interpretation of a temporally ambiguous expression.
Through a series of experiments, participants completed tasks which required them to think about
sequences of numbers or letters that proceeded in either ascending order (5 to 17 or G to P) or
descending order (17 to 5 or P to G) before answering the ambiguous Wednesday’s meeting
question. The results showed that when participants were primed with forward abstract motion
(ascending order), they were more likely to adopt the “moving ego” perspective and respond
Friday, whereas when participants were primed with backward abstract motion (descending
order), there was no reliable difference between the proportion of Friday and Monday responses.
In discussing the implications of their findings, Matlock et al. (2011) reasoned that forward
motion is deeply entrenched in everyday experience (e.g., through walking, cycling and driving),
which may encourage participants to adopt the “moving ego” perspective and respond Friday.
By contrast, as people are far less accustomed to engaging in backward motion, it is probably
less clear which perspective to adopt; hence, responses to the ambiguous meeting question were
mixed.
Moving beyond spatial-motion thinking, Jamalian and Tversky (2012) reasoned that if people
use actions in space to express their construals of time and gestures are abstracted actions in space
that frequently accompany language, then observing gesture may likewise affect how people rea-
son about events in time. In one study investigating whether speech-accompanying gestures could
be used to disambiguate the Wednesday’s meeting question, Jamalian and Tversky (2012) found
that participants who viewed a gesture moving away from them accompanying the utterance was
moved forward, were more likely to adopt the “moving ego” perspective (responding Friday),
whereas participants who viewed a gesture moving towards them were more likely to adopt the
“moving time” perspective (responding Monday). Concordant with earlier findings, Jamalian and
Tversky (2012) concluded that observing representational actions, namely gestures, also dramat-
ically influence how people think about time. Moreover, information that is conveyed in gestures,
but not in speech, can also alter people’s conceptions of time and their concomitant interpretation
of a temporally ambiguous expression.
As demonstrated, McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous meeting question has been used
extensively in research investigating metaphorical representations of time, despite the question
consisting of a single measure. However, one issue that arises from using a single experimental
question is that measures comprised of a single item are potentially unreliable (e.g., Oshagbemi,
1999; Pollard, 1996). Furthermore, as noted by Richmond, Wilson, and Zinken (2012), as the
ambiguous meeting question refers specifically to the week (i.e., the calendar), as opposed to
2Abstract motion occurs in processes that involve mentally moving from symbol to symbol in an ordinal sequence
(see Langacker, 1986, 1987).
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the ego, it raises the possibility that earlier findings may reflect properties of the English lan-
guage, as opposed to being a function of temporal perspective per se. To address these issues,
Richmond et al. (2012) sought to investigate the general reliability of McGlone and Harding’s
(1998) ambiguous meeting question by examining the consistency between participants responses
to the Wednesday’s meeting question and their responses to other ambiguous spatial, clock and
calendar questions.3 While the level of consistency varied between questions, with calendar ques-
tions demonstrating the highest level of consistency with responses to the Wednesday’s meeting
question, the results showed an overall pattern, whereby responses to all four types of question
were consistent in their representations.4 Richmond et al. (2012) concluded that although the
responses to the Wednesday’s meeting question might be attributed, in part, to the way in which
the calendar is used in English, responses to the spatial and clock questions produced relatively
similar results, thereby demonstrating the robustness of the designation of the “moving ego” and
“moving time” temporal perspectives.
Taken together, the reviewed research provides an important foundation for the understanding
of space–time mappings, demonstrating that people’s perspectives on the movement of events
in time are not only grounded in their experiences of motion in space but also in their patterns
of interactions with cultural artifacts; thus, reiterating the notion that conceptual metaphors are
as much cultural as they are internally represented in the minds of individuals (Gibbs, 1999).
Combining these two separate lines of research on space–time mappings—namely, research
investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning and research investigating the culturally
specific associations between space and time—the next step in extending the existing research is
to examine whether people access culturally specific spatial representations of time in their inter-
pretations of ambiguous metaphorical expressions about time. To do this, three experiments were
conducted investigating the use of cultural artifacts, namely calendars and clocks, as mediums
for directly eliciting responses to ambiguous temporal questions. Experiment 1 directly investi-
gates whether responses to the Wednesday’s meeting question may be attributed to the way the
calendar is used in English (cf. Richmond et al., 2012), comparing the responses to the original
question and answer format with responses to the question elicited via a calendar. Building on
insights from earlier research, which suggest that culturally specific spatial representations sys-
tematically shape how people think about time (e.g., Tversky et al., 1991), Experiment 2 sought
to investigate further the culturally specific associations between space and time and the role of
orthography direction in temporal reasoning. To do this, responses to the Wednesday’s meeting
question were elicited via a calendar and compared against responses elicited via a “reverse”
(right-to-left) calendar. Extending the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, which investigate the
role of the calendar in the resolution of McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous Wednesday’s
meeting question, Experiment 3 investigated the role of the analogue clock in the resolution of
3Examples included: A book will be re-edited so that page 10 will move forward 5 pages (spatial); Normally an alarm
clock is set for 9 a.m. but the alarm has been moved forward 10 minutes (clock); The winter Olympics normally take place
in December but the committee has moved it forward one month (calendar). The responses to each question were coded
as either ego-moving or time-moving in their representation.
4Concordantly, other lines of research have similarly demonstrated that people tend to be consistent in their repre-
sentations of time, such that people who imagine moving forward a meeting scheduled for Wednesday by two days to
Monday (as opposed to Friday) are also more likely to imagine moving forward a meeting scheduled for noon by two
hours to 10 a.m. (as opposed to 2 p.m.; Núñez, Motz, & Teuscher, 2006; cf. Duffy, Feist, & McCarthy, in press).
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Núñez and colleagues’ (2006) ambiguous Noon meeting question (“Tomorrow’s noon meeting
has been moved forward two hours. What time is the meeting now that it has been rescheduled?”),
comparing responses elicited via a clock against responses elicited via a “reverse” (anticlockwise)
clock. Taken together, the results provide initial evidence that, in their interpretation of ambigu-
ous metaphorical expressions about time, people automatically access and use culturally specific
spatial representations that are consistent with the direction of orthography in their native lan-
guage. Moreover, asking participants to use a reverse space–time mapping causes interference,
which is reflected through their temporal reasoning.
EXPERIMENT 1
As shown, McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous Wednesday’s meeting question has been
used extensively in research investigating spatial influences on temporal thinking. In particular,
it has been observed that while the “spatial schemas”5 guiding the responses to the Wednesday’s
meeting question are assumed to operate below awareness, participants often become aware of
the ambiguous nature of the question immediately upon providing their response (Kranjec &
McDonough, 2011). This might be explained, in part, by the fact that while a number of stud-
ies have attempted to disguise the purpose of the experiment by embedding the Wednesday’s
meeting question within booklets containing filler tasks (e.g., Boroditsky, 2000; Matlock et al.,
2011; Ramscar, Matlock, & Dye, 2010), the “metalinguistic”6 format of the question enables
participants to reflect upon their response with a degree of awareness; thus, raising the ques-
tion of whether it is possible to devise a context within which participants might respond to the
Wednesday’s meeting question with a reduced awareness of the task’s objective than has previ-
ously been the case. To address this, a new experiment was devised, in which participants were
recruited to take part in a Multi-tasking Challenge, whereby they were instructed to schedule
a number of events into a calendar while simultaneously watching a video clip and answering
questions relating to the video clip. Participants’ responses to the Wednesday’s meeting ques-
tion were elicited via a calendar (test condition) and compared against responses to the original,
metalinguistic version of the question (control condition). In light of earlier findings, which sug-
gest that responses to the Wednesday’s meeting question might be partly attributed to the way in
which the calendar is used in English (Richmond et al., 2012, Study 1), it is predicted that the
proportion of Monday and Friday responses will be parallel across the test and control conditions.
Method
Participants. Participants in Experiment 1 were 65 full-time undergraduate students, with an
age range of 18 to 33 years and a mean age of 20 years. Of participants, 17 were male and 48 were
5A spatial schema can be considered as a “condensed redescription of perceptual experience for the purpose of
mapping spatial structure onto conceptual structure” (Oakley, 2010, p. 215; cf. Johnson, 1987).
6Metalinguistic awareness involves the ability to think explicitly about aspects of language and solve linguistic prob-
lems, such as the detection of ambiguity and grammaticality (Galambos & Goldin-Meadow, 1990; Galambos & Hakuta,
1988). This requires an awareness of language as a system, as well as an ability to access and manipulate knowledge
about the system (Bialystok & Ryan, 1985).
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female. Participants were assigned to either the test or the control conditions. All participants
were native speakers of English from the UK.
Materials and procedure. Participants were given a multi-tasking exercise that consisted
of two tasks and were informed that they would complete the two tasks simultaneously while
watching a video clip. They were also informed that they would be given until the end of the
video clip (2 minutes, 25 seconds) to complete both tasks.
For Task 1, participants in the test condition were provided with a 12-month university events
calendar which was printed on six pieces of paper back-to-back and were instructed to schedule
three events into the calendar:
1. Thursday 19th January
Kate Smith has cancelled the Solo Exhibition. Cross out the event in the calendar.
2. Wednesday 9th May
The meeting has been moved forward two days. Enter the new date into the calendar.
3. Saturday 3rd March
The Pauline Hughes Workshop has been rescheduled for the following Saturday. Enter the new date
into the calendar.
In the test condition, responses to the Wednesday’s meeting question were elicited by participants
scheduling the rearranged date into the calendar provided. In the control condition, participants
responded to the original, question and answer format of the Wednesday’s meeting question.
For Task 2, which was a distracter task, all participants answered three multiple-choice ques-
tions relating to the video clip, Matthew’s Day Off ,7 which was projected onto a screen at the
front of the classroom. The purpose of the distracter task was twofold. The first aim was to min-
imize participants’ engagement of metalinguistic awareness; thereby, allowing them to process
the questions and provide answers to them more automatically. The second aim was to ensure
that participants had attended to the video clip, which was assessed by whether or not they had
answered at least two out of the three multiple-choice questions correctly.
Results and Discussion
Four participants were excluded from subsequent analyses for failure to answer at least two of
the multiple-choice questions correctly. Of the remaining participants (N = 61), participants
in the Calendar (test) condition were more likely to respond Friday (83.9%) than participants
in the Metalinguistic (control) condition (60.0%). Contrary to the prediction that the propor-
tion of Monday and Friday responses would be parallel across the test and control conditions,
a chi-square test revealed a reliable difference in the responses between the two conditions:
7Matthew’s Day Off is Honda’s 2012 game-day Super Bowl commercial for the Honda CRV, in which actor Matthew
Broderick parodies his role in the popular film Ferris Bueller’s Day Off (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mP5l1_
s4urU).
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χ21,61 = 4.322; p = 0.038; Cramer’s V = 0.266. Thus, while both groups of participants demon-
strated a preference for answering Friday, this finding raises the question of why participants in
the Calendar condition were more likely to reschedule the meeting to Friday than participants in
the Metalinguistic condition. One possible explanation relates to the notion that the left-to-right
orientation of time in English does not stem from patterns in language (e.g., ∗Monday is to the left
of Tuesday), but rather, from the left-to-right direction of orthography in Western culture. Indeed,
Casasanto and Jasmin note that “because graphic conventions in English-speaking cultures have
an implicit rightward directionality, English speakers have a polarized left-right spatial contin-
uum which can be co-opted for time” (2012: 659). To illustrate, the calendar instantiates absolute
time, whereby days are conventionally conceptualized as locations along a calendar’s timeline in
ascending order from left-to-right (e.g., from the 1st to the 7th) and moving rightward in space
correlates with moving later in time (Casasanto & Bottini, 2013; Kranjec, 2006). Thus, in contrast
to participants in the control condition, who “mentally visualized” moving forward the meeting,
participants in the calendar condition were predisposed to a left-to-right space–time mapping by
means of the calendar, whereby the directionality of forward motion is towards later times and
hence moving the meeting later to Friday.8
The findings from Experiment 1 thus suggest that as the calendar served to highlight the left-
to-right orientation of time in English, responses to the Wednesday’s meeting question might
be attributed to the lateral organization of time on calendars, as opposed to temporal perspec-
tive per se; therefore, offering an explanation as to why Friday responses were more prevalent
among participants in the Calendar condition, in comparison to the Metalinguistic condition.
Taken together, Experiment 1 corroborates and extends the range of research demonstrating that
people automatically access culturally specific spatial representations that are consistent with the
direction of orthography in their native language when reasoning about time (e.g., Bergen & Chan
Lau, 2012; Boroditsky et al., 2010; Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010; Ouellet et al., 2010; Tversky
et al., 1991). Building on these findings, Experiment 2 sought to investigate further the culturally
specific associations between space and time and the role that the direction of orthography plays
in shaping people’s conceptualizations of time.
EXPERIMENT 2
Recent research investigating whether orthography can influence the direction in which time flows
along people’s mental timelines has demonstrated that, through exposure to a new orthography,
it is possible to alter their space–time associations. Specifically, in one experiment conducted by
Casasanto and Bottini (2013), Dutch literates were presented with a series of phrases such as “a
year before” (een jaar daarvoor) or “a decade after” (een decennium daarna) and were instructed
to press a button on the left or right of a keyboard to indicate whether the phrases referred to a
time in the past or the future. In one condition, the phrases were presented in standard Dutch
8Indeed, findings from behavioral studies have shown that the left-to-right representation of the mental line in Western
cultures generalizes to the mental representation of ordinal sequences more broadly, such as the arrangement of numbers,
letters, days, and months. When people are thinking about ordinal sequences, they move along the mental line, suggesting
a strong coupling between external physical space and internal mental space (e.g., Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993;
Gevers, Reynvoet, & Fias, 2003).
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orthography and in the other condition, the phrases were presented in mirror-reversed Dutch.
Casasanto and Bottini’s (2013) findings showed that participants in the Standard Dutch condi-
tion were faster to assess past-oriented phrases by pressing the left button and future-oriented
phrases by pressing the right button. However, by the second series of testing, participants in the
Mirror-reversed Dutch condition displayed the reverse pattern of reaction times. In discussing the
implications of their findings, Casasanto and Bottini (2013) concluded that exposure to a new
orthography for a period of time is sufficient to transiently weaken people’s culturally preferred
space–time mapping, hence reversing the flow of time in their minds.
Building on insights from Casasanto and Bottini’s (2013) findings, Experiment 2 repeated
the calendar rescheduling task used in Experiment 1, replacing the familiar calendar format
with a reverse, right-to-left calendar that is incongruent with the direction of orthography in
English (Figure 1). Specifically, English literates were provided with an Arabic calendar, which
depicts temporal linearity from right-to-left and instructed to enter the date of the rescheduled
Wednesday’s meeting into the calendar. On the assumption that asking people to use a space–
time mapping that is inconsistent with the direction of orthography in their native language
causes interference (Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010), it is predicted that that there will be a mixed
response to the Wednesday’s meeting question among participants in the Reverse Calendar con-
dition. Specifically, it is predicted that some participants will be guided by the direction of the
reverse temporal number line (right-to-left), leading to a Friday response, whereas other par-
ticipants will be guided by the direction of orthography in English (left-to-right), leading to a
Monday response. To provide a comparison group for the results from the Reverse Calendar con-
dition, a second group of participants responded to the Wednesday’s meeting question using a
“normal” left-to-right calendar. Concordant with the findings from Experiment 1, it is predicted
that participants in the Normal Calendar condition will demonstrate a similar preference for
responding Friday.
FIGURE 1 The reverse calendar used in Experiment 2.
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Method
Participants. Participants for Experiment 2 were 58 full-time undergraduate students, with
an age range of 18 to 21 years and a mean age of 19 years. Of participants, 34 were male and
24 were female. Participants were assigned to either the Normal Calendar or the Reverse Calendar
conditions. All participants were native speakers of English from the UK.
Materials and procedure. Participants were provided with a one month calendar, which
was printed on a single side of paper. In the Normal Calendar condition, the days of the week
were positioned at the top of the calendar and arranged in ascending order from left-to-right.
In the Reverse Calendar condition, the days of the week in Arabic, with an English translation
underneath, were positioned at the top of the calendar and arranged in ascending order from right-
to-left. The only event featured on both calendars was the meeting scheduled for Wednesday 9th
May. The following instructions appeared underneath the calendar:
Wednesday 9th May
The meeting has been moved forward by two days.
Enter the new date into the calendar.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, in contrast to the participants in the Normal Calendar condition, who again
showed a preference for answering Friday (82.8%),9 responses among participants in the Reverse
Calendar condition were mixed, with 51.7% of participants responding Friday in comparison to
48.3% of participants responding Monday. To determine whether the difference in responses
between participants in the Normal Calendar condition and Reverse Calendar condition was
significant, a chi-square test for independence was used. The chi-square test revealed a reli-
able difference in the proportion of Monday and Friday responses across the two conditions:
χ21,58 = 6.340; p = 0.012; Cramer’s V = 0.331. Taken together, the findings suggest that the
prevalence of Friday responses among participants in the Normal Calendar condition may be
attributed to participants using a space–time mapping that is consistent with the direction of
orthography in English—as found in Experiment 1. By contrast, asking participants to use a
(right-to-left) space–time mapping that is inconsistent with the (left-to-right) direction of orthog-
raphy in English caused interference (cf. Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010); hence, responses among
participants in the Reverse Calendar condition were mixed. In sum, Experiments 1 and 2 provide
the first studies of their kind into the ways in which people may use cultural artifacts, such as
calendars, to resolve ambiguous metaphorical expressions about time. Developing this area of
research, Experiment 3 sought to investigate further the role of cultural artifacts in the resolution
of temporally ambiguous expressions by means of the clock.
9Notably, the proportion of Monday and Friday responses without the distracter task is in line with the responses
reported in Experiment 1, which included a distracter task.
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EXPERIMENT 3
According to Evans (2013), there is a broad distinction that can be made in terms of absolute
temporal reference between event-reckoning systems (e.g., calendars), which provide a means of
framing events in time and time-reckoning systems (e.g., clocks), which either model or repre-
sent the passage of time. Within both types of systems, further distinctions can be made between
systems that are repeatable, open-ended, and closed. For instance, whereas open-ended systems
relate to linear representations of time, repeatable systems are concerned with cyclical representa-
tions of time (Evans, 2013). While people conceptualize time using both types of representations,
recent empirical research suggests that people are generally biased towards linear thinking—a
tendency that has been observed among industrialized as well as non-industrialized commu-
nities (e.g., Brang, Teuscher, Ramachandarn, & Coulson, 2010; Kessell 2008; Sinha, da Silva
Sinha, Zinken, & Sampaio, 2011). For instance, recent experimental research on the Amazonian
language Amondawa suggests that cyclicity is not relevant to the time interval system used in
Amondawa culture (Sinha et al., 2011). In one experiment, participants took part in an elicitation
game, which required them to construct schematic representations of different time intervals (e.g.,
the succession of seasons and the 24-hour diurnal cycle), by placing a series of paper plates, each
representing an interval of time, on the ground. Sinha et al. (2011) found that all of the partic-
ipants constructed curvilinear representations of the seasonal and diurnal cycles on a horizontal
axis, in either a left-to-right or right-to-left direction. Moreover, none of the participants produced
cyclical representations of the time intervals. In discussing their findings, Sinha et al. (2011) posit
that in Amondawa, the seasonal and diurnal time intervals are conceptualized in terms of “hap-
penings” against which other activities and events are indexed, or with which other happenings in
the natural and social world may coincide. As such, the schematization of time intervals appears
to be simply in terms of succession, which can be spatially represented as a line (although not
necessarily a straight one).
In another series of experiments conducted by Kessell (2008; cf. Kessell & Tversky, submitted,
as cited in Jamalian & Tversky, 2012) investigating the production and comprehension of cyclical
and linear processes, participants were instructed to produce diagrams depicting cyclical pro-
cesses, such as the seasons, and linear processes, such as making scrambled eggs. The findings
showed that, as anticipated, participants tended to depict the linear processes in lines but, surpris-
ingly, they also tended to depict the cyclical processes in lines without any return to the beginning.
In discussing the implications of the findings, namely that people tend to produce linear repre-
sentations of cyclical processes, Kessell (2008) reasons that it is easier to conceptualize events
progressing forward through time with a beginning, a middle and end than it is to imagine events
travelling in a circle, returning to where they started and initiating the process again. Indeed, time
moves forward and cannot go back on itself and while each day consists of a morning, noon and
night, each day is also unique, rather than a replication of the day previous. Conceptualizing time
as a cycle is difficult because it requires thinking about a series of events in terms of a general
process rather than an individual instance (cf. Jamalian & Tversky, 2012).10
10Notably, other lines of research investigating the ways in which people spatially represent the months of the year
show that time–space synesthetes are more likely to depict calendars using cyclical representations, whereas, consistent
with Kessell’s (2008) findings, non-synesthetes are more likely to use linear rows or rectangular arrangements (Brang
et al., 2010).
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As research investigating space–time mappings has hitherto been primarily focused on linear
representations of time (e.g., Casasanto & Bottini, 2013; Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010; Tversky
et al., 1991), new research investigating cyclical representations of time importantly paves the
way for further empirical study in this area.11 As such, whereas Experiments 1 and 2 focused
on linear representations of time, in Experiment 3, the attention will be turned to circular rep-
resentations of time. Notably, calendars are typically represented in terms of horizontal rows
of days that are sequenced in vertical rows of weeks, with earlier weeks sequenced above later
weeks; thus, representing linear time. By contrast, an analogue clock measures time in cycles of
seconds, minutes and hours using hands that trace a cyclic path around the dial; thus, it lends
itself to capturing cyclical time (Evans, 2013). As such, whereas McGlone and Harding’s (1998)
Wednesday’s meeting question provides a useful tool for investigating linear representations of
time, Núñez et al.’s (2006) Noon meeting question would be more apt for examining cyclical
representations of time.
To this end, whereas Experiments 1 and 2 investigated the role of the calendar in the reso-
lution of the ambiguous Wednesday’s meeting question, Experiment 3 sought to investigate the
role of the analogue clock in the resolution of the ambiguous Noon meeting question. To do
this, participants were provided with a clockwise clock (condition 1) or an anticlockwise clock
(condition 2) and instructed to indicate the time of the rescheduled noon meeting by drawing the
minute and the hour hands onto the face of the clock—thus, providing a new method for elicit-
ing participants’ responses to the question (Figure 2). Similarly to Experiment 2, which aimed to
determine how participants would fare with a temporal rescheduling task using a reverse calendar,
the purpose of the anticlockwise clock is for investigating how participants would resolve tem-
poral ambiguity using a clock that is incongruent with the customary direction of motion around
FIGURE 2 The clockwise clock (left) and anticlockwise clock (right)
used in Experiment 3.
11The dearth of research on cyclical representations of time might be attributed to the fact that cyclical representations
of time are comparatively less diverse than linear representations of time. To illustrate, consider the way in which the hands
on an analogue clock rotate around the dial in a clockwise direction. The explanation for this is quite simple: the first
mechanical clocks were built to imitate the path of a sundial shadow where, in the northern hemisphere, the shadow on
the sundial rotates from west to north to east, i.e., clockwise (Sorensen, 2011); henceforth, the clockwise rotation became
quasi-standardized across the globe.
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the clock. In this situation, it is predicted that there will be a mixed response to the Noon meeting
question: some participants will be guided by the direction of the reverse temporal number line
(anticlockwise), leading to a 2 p.m., whereas other participants will be guided by the customary
direction of motion (clockwise), leading to a 10 a.m. response.
Method
Participants. Participants for Experiment 3 were 60 full-time students, with an age range of
18 to 27 years and a mean age of 20 years. Of this group, 29 participants were male and 31 were
female. Participants were assigned to either the Clockwise or the Anticlockwise condition. All
participants were native speakers of English from the UK.
Materials and procedure. Participants were provided with a diagram of an analogue clock,
without the minute or the hour hands, printed on a single side of paper. The following instructions
appeared underneath the diagram of the clock:
Tomorrow’s noon meeting has been moved forward by two hours. Draw the minute and the hour
hands onto the face of the clock to indicate the new time of the meeting.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, in contrast to the participants in the Clockwise condition, who showed a prefer-
ence for depicting 2pm on the face of the clock (73.3%), responses among participants in the
Anticlockwise condition were mixed, with 46.3% of participants depicting 2pm in comparison
to 53.3% of participants depicting 10 a.m. To determine whether the difference in depictions
between participants in the Clockwise condition and Anticlockwise condition was significant, a
chi-square test for independence was used. The chi-square test revealed a reliable difference in the
proportion of 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. depictions across the two conditions: χ21,60 = 4.444; p = 0.035;
Cramer’s V = 0.272. The findings thus suggest that the prevalence of 2 p.m. responses among
participants in the Clockwise condition may be attributed to participants using a space–time map-
ping that is consistent with the customary direction of motion around the clock, whereby moving
forward (i.e., clockwise) in space corresponds with moving later in time. By contrast, asking par-
ticipants to use an (anticlockwise) space–time mapping that is inconsistent with the customary
(clockwise) direction of motion around the clock may have caused interference; hence, responses
among participants in the Anticlockwise condition were mixed.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across languages and cultures, speakers systematically employ space to represent events in time.
This strong space–time association is reflected in the language people use when talking about
time, the actions people use to depict events in time and the artifacts cultures use to represent
time. Earlier research has shown that spatial schemas may exert an important influence on the
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representation of time, such that engaging in certain types of spatial-motion thinking may influ-
ence how people reason about events in time and their concomitant interpretation of a temporally
ambiguous expression. Combining two separate lines of research on space–time mappings—
namely, research investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning and research investigating
the culturally specific associations between space and time—the aim of this paper was to extend
research on space–time mappings in a new direction. Specifically, three experiments investigated
the role of cultural artifacts, namely calendars and clocks, in the interpretation of metaphorical
language in context.
Experiment 1 directly investigated whether responses to the Wednesday’s meeting question
might be attributable, in part, to the way the calendar is used in English (cf. Richmond et al.,
2012), comparing the responses to the question elicited via a calendar with responses elicited
metalinguistically. The findings showed a significant difference in the proportion of Monday and
Friday responses across the two conditions, with participants in the Calendar condition more
likely rescheduling the meeting to Friday than participants in the Metalinguistic condition. On the
assumption that people automatically access culturally specific spatial representations that are
consistent with direction of orthography in their native language when reasoning about time (e.g.,
Boroditsky et al., 2010; Bergen & Chan Lau, 2012; Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010; Ouellet et al.,
2010; Tversky et al., 1991), the results suggest that the prevalence of Friday responses among
participants in the Calendar condition may be attributed to the left-to-right orientation of time
in English, whereby the directionality of forward motion is towards later times, as opposed to
temporal perspective per se.
Building on these findings, Experiment 2 investigated further the culturally specific asso-
ciations between space and time and the role of orthography direction in temporal reasoning,
comparing responses to the Wednesday’s meeting question elicited via an English calendar with
responses elicited via a “reverse” (Arabic) calendar. The results showed that, in contrast to the par-
ticipants in the Normal Calendar condition, who showed a preference for answering Friday, the
difference in the proportion of Monday and Friday responses among participants in the Reverse
Calendar condition was marginal. Thus, while the prevalence of Friday responses among par-
ticipants in the Normal Calendar condition may be attributed to participants using a space–time
mapping that is consistent with the direction of orthography in English, asking participants to
use a (right-to-left) space–time mapping that is inconsistent with the direction of orthography
in English caused interference (cf. Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010), resulting in mixed responses
among participants in the Reverse Calendar condition.
Noting that research investigating space–time mappings has hitherto been primarily focused
on linear representations of time (e.g., Casasanto & Bottini, 2013; Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010;
Tversky et al., 1991), Experiment 3 focused on circular representations of time, investigating the
role of the analogue clock in the resolution of the Noon meeting question, by comparing responses
elicited via a clockwise clock with responses elicited via an anticlockwise clock. It was found that,
in contrast to the participants in the Clockwise condition, who showed a preference for depicting
2 p.m. on the face of the clock, the difference in the proportion of 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. depictions
among participants in the Anticlockwise condition was marginal. Thus, while the prevalence of
2 p.m. responses among participants in the Clockwise condition might be due to participants using
a space–time mapping that is consistent with the customary direction of motion around the clock,
using an (anticlockwise) space–time mapping that is inconsistent with the customary direction of
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motion around the clock may have caused interference; hence, responses among participants in
the Anticlockwise condition were mixed.
Implications for Future Research
Taken together, the results provide further evidence that people automatically access and use
culturally specific spatial representations when reasoning about time. However, as cross-linguistic
research investigating the interpretation of ambiguous metaphorical expressions about time is
comparatively scarce (but see Bender, Beller, & Bennardo, 2010 for German, Mandarin, and
Tongan; Elvevåg, Helsen, De Hert, Sweers, & Storms, 2011 for Dutch; Lai & Boroditsky, 2013
for Mandarin), follow-up research might build upon these preliminary findings by examining
whether the patterns observed in this study vary systematically across languages and cultures.
For instance, because graphic conventions in Arabic-speaking cultures have an implicit leftward
directionality, Arabic literates have a polarized right-left spatial continuum which can be co-
opted for time (e.g., Tversky et al., 1991). Thus, one question that arises is when would Arabic
participants move forward Wednesday’s meeting to if they were provided with an Arabic calendar
which highlights the right-to-left orientation of time in Eastern culture? Similarly, speakers of
Mandarin frequently make use of vertical metaphors for talking about events in time (e.g., Chun,
1997; Scott, 1989; Yu, 1998); thus, how would Mandarin participants resolve the Wednesday’s
meeting question if they were provided with a vertical calendar that highlights the up-to-down
orientation of time reflected linguistically in Mandarin?12
Implications for Theories of Metaphor
Recently, at the 12th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, cognitive linguists were
encouraged to: (a) “look back,” taking stock of the past 25 years of research in cognitive linguis-
tics; (b) “look forward,” considering the next generation of cognitive linguistics research; and
(c) “look outward,” extending research to understudied populations and applications, particularly
in regard to endangered languages and signed languages (ICLC-12, June 2013). While recent
metaphor research, especially in the domains of space and time, has taken heed of the notion
“looking outward,” by investigating spatial representations of time among an increasing range
of indigenous communities,13 the question remains of how it is possible to “look forward” and
pave the way for the next generation of metaphor research. With the advent of new interactive
technologies, one possible solution is to turn our focus to the role that emerging cultural arti-
facts play in creating wider cognitive and computational webs (cf. Gibbs, 1999). In particular, for
12It should be noted that preliminary cross-linguistic research investigating the Wednesday’s meeting question indi-
cates that when translated into some languages (e.g., Dutch, Danish), the question remains ambiguous, while in other
languages (e.g., German, Mandarin), the ambiguity is not apparent (Bender et al., 2010; Elvevåg et al., 2011; Lai &
Boroditsky, 2013; see also Duffy & Feist, 2014); thus, whether or not multiple competing interpretations are available in
the language being examined is a factor that should be taken into consideration in further cross-linguistic research in this
area.
13Examples include Amondawa (Sinha et al., 2011), Aymara (Núñez & Sweetser, 2006), Mian (Fedden & Boroditsky,
2012), Pormpuraaw (Boroditsky & Gaby, 2010), Tzeltal (Brown, 2012), Yélî Dnye (Levinson & Majid, 2013), Yucatec
Mayas (Le Guen & Balam, 2012), and Yupno (Núñez et al., 2012).
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future research, the iGeneration (born after 1999; Pendergast, 2009; Rosen, 2010) may provide
a rich testbed for investigating whether people’s interactions with digital cultural artifacts shape
embodiment and, hence, metaphorical thought. For instance, there has been a recent surge of
videos on YouTube depicting “technotoddlers” interacting with a range of digital technologies,
the most prominent of which is the iPad (Wohlwend, 2013). One video entitled A Magazine is an
iPad That Does Not Work (CBS News Online, 2011) shows a toddler using her fingers to press,
tap, swipe, and pinch on the screen of an iPad. Subsequently, she attempts to use the same finger
movements on the pages of a magazine but appears perplexed and loses interest when the mag-
azine is unresponsive to her actions. While such casual observations should be interpreted with
some caution, recent research from the field of neuroscience suggests that digital cultural arti-
facts are indeed radically altering the ways in which young minds are developing and functioning
(e.g., Small, Moody, Siddarthm, & Bookheimer, 2009; Small & Vorgan, 2008). Taken together,
these findings raise the question of how new cultural artifacts may, consequently, be influencing
metaphoric thought. To illustrate, consider the ways in which people interact with touch screen
calendars on smart devices.14 The iPad (iOS 7), for example, enables users to alternate between
different “views” of time, each of which is understood through different space–time metaphors:
in the “day” view and the “month” view, users advance through the hours of the day and the
months of the year by vertically swiping the screen upwards (“UP IS EARLIER”; “DOWN IS
LATER”), whereas in the “week” view, users move later through the days of the week by hor-
izontally swiping the screen leftwards (“LEFT IS EARLIER”; “RIGHT IS LATER”). Thus, by
automatically alternating between different space–time metaphors—namely, “UP IS EARLIER”
and “LEFT IS EARLIER”—digital cultural artifacts dictate a necessity for users to be flexible in
their representations of time, as they switch to thinking about different time spans on different
timescales (cf. Casasanto & Jasmin, 2012).15
In addition, while recent lines of metaphor research have begun exploring the cognitive and
neural basis of metaphor, the focus has largely been centered on the processing of metaphor as a
function of language-related factors, such as novelty, interpretability and valence (e.g., Cardillo,
Schmidt, Kranjec, & Chatterjee, 2010; Schmidt & Seger, 2009; Subramaniam, Faust, Beeman,
& Mashal, 2012). Drawing on the assumption that conceptual metaphors are as much internally
represented in the minds of individuals as they are spread out into the social and cultural world
(Gibbs, 1999), new insights into the “metaphorical brain” (cf. Lai & Coulson, in press) might
similarly be gained by extending the neuroscientific investigation of metaphor out into the digital
world, thereby exploring metaphor processing as a function of interactions with digital cultural
artifacts. Moreover, future research in cognitive linguistics would benefit from exploring the roles
that cultural artifacts—both existing and emerging—play in shaping metaphoric thought.
14I thank Michele Feist for raising this point.
15It should be noted that recent research has sought to distinguish between two fundamentally different representations
of deictic time: one with an “internal” perspective, where the deictic center (the ego) correlates with the present and
metaphorically signifies the experience of now and a second with an “external” perspective, where the deictic center
is displaced to an external vantage point, which is perpendicular to the axis on which time is represented (Casasanto
& Jasmin, 2012; Núñez & Cooperrider, 2013). Moreover, recent research on temporal gestures indicates that, in their
conceptualisation of external deictic time, people adopt a “moving attention” perspective (as opposed to a “moving ego”
or “moving time” perspective), which is grounded in patterns of interaction with cultural artifacts (as opposed to patterns
of interaction with the natural environment; Casasanto & Jasmin, 2012).
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CONCLUSION
In sum, the findings from this paper provide further validation that people’s perspectives on the
movement of events in time are not only grounded in their experiences of motion in space but also
in their patterns of interactions with cultural artifacts. In addition, the results extend prior research
by showing that, in their interpretation of ambiguous metaphorical expressions about time, people
automatically access and use spatial representations of absolute time, whereby moving forward
in space corresponds with moving later in time. Furthermore, asking participants to use a reverse
space–time mapping causes interference, which is reflected through their temporal reasoning.
In addition, the results from this study give rise to the question of why cultural artifacts have
such an effect on temporal reasoning. Cultural artifacts, such as calendars and clocks, externalize
thought (cf. Tversky, 2011); thus, they provide a means of not only mapping temporal paths in
space, but also indicating specific moments or events along a (linear or circular) temporal path.
As such, cultural artifacts simultaneously abstract and depict a model of time, thereby providing
a more concrete form of temporal representations than purely symbolic speech. Cultural artifacts,
thus, play a role in the extended cognitive process (e.g., A. Clark & Chalmers, 1998), acting as a
means of not only aiding embodied cognition, but also influencing it.
Furthermore, the findings give support to the Mediated Mapping Hypothesis (Sinha et al.,
2011), which suggests that time-reckoning is dependent on the cultural construction of counting
practices based upon large number systems (Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004), as well as
the cultural-cognitive schema of a linear number line (Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008).
As such, direct space–time mappings arise as a result of the combination of numeric symbolic
cognitive processes with language which, in turn, are supported by historically developed cul-
tural artifacts, such as calendars and clocks. In sum, by highlighting new avenues for empirical
research investigating the role of cultural artifacts in temporal reasoning and understanding, this
paper demonstrates that, by drawing on separate (but converging) lines of research on space–time
mappings, it is possible to gain greater and richer insights into metaphoric representations of
time.
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